

"THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND
MOMENTS OF CLASS STRUGGLE: THE CASES OF 15-16 JUNE WORKERS'
UPRISING AND GEZI RESISTANCE IN TURKEY"

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MOMENTS OF CLASS STRUGGLE: THE CASES OF 15-16 JUNE
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ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND MOMENTS OF CLASS STRUGGLE: THE CASES OF 15-16 JUNE WORKERS' UPRISING AND GEZI RESISTANCE IN TURKEY

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This thesis examines the relationship between the production of space and moments of class struggle, focusing on two significant events in Turkey: the 15-16 June 1970 Workers' Uprising and the 2013 Gezi Resistance. The study explores how these uprisings reflect broader socio-economic and political transformations. By analyzing these two events, the thesis aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how social space determines class struggle and the formation of social movements, by both prompting and limiting them. The research incorporates Lefebvre's theory of the production of space, Braverman's analysis of labor process, and Arrighi's periodization of accumulation regimes to contextualize the events within the shifts in capitalist mode of production. The findings highlight the contrasting characteristics of these uprisings (one as a *war of position* through organizational continuity and the other as a *sudden explosion*), discuss their implications for social agency and reconsider theoretical frameworks.

Keywords: 15-16 June, Gezi, production of space, moment, social movement, social agency, class struggle, accumulation regime, financialization, reconstruction of the

state, social transformation, class formation, labor migration, uprising, resistance,
Lefebvre, Braverman, Arrighi, Gramsci

ÖZ

MEKÂNIN ÜRETİMİ İLE SINIF MÜCADELESİ MOMENTLERİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: TÜRKİYE’DE 15-16 HAZİRAN İŞÇİ AYAKLANMASI VE GEZİ DİRENİŞİ ÖRNEKLERİ

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Bu tez, mekânın üretimi ile sınıf mücadelesi momentleri arasındaki ilişkiyi, Türkiye’deki iki önemli olay olan 15-16 Haziran 1970 İşçi Ayaklanması ve 2013 Gezi Direnişi’ne odaklanarak incelemektedir. Çalışma, bu direnişlerin daha geniş sosyo-ekonomik ve politik dönüşümleri nasıl yansıttığını araştırmaktadır. Bu iki olayı analiz ederek, tez, toplumsal mekânın sınıf mücadelesini ve toplumsal hareketlerin oluşumunu nasıl hem teşvik ettiğini hem de sınırladığını anlamak için derinlemesine bir bakış açısı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma, olayları kapitalist üretim tarzındaki değişimlerin bağlamına oturtmak amacıyla Lefebvre’nin mekânın üretimi teorisini, Braverman’ın emek süreci analizini ve Arrighi’nin birikim rejimlerine ilişkin dönemlendirmesini kullanmaktadır. Bulgular, bu direnişlerin karşıt özelliklerini (birinin örgütsel sürekliliğe sahip bir *mevzi savaşı*, diğerinin ise *ani bir patlama* olduğunu) vurgulamakta, toplumsal özne sorununu ve bu konudaki teorik çerçeveleri yeniden değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: 15-16 Haziran, Gezi, mekânın üretimi, moment, toplumsal hareket, toplumsal özne, sınıf mücadelesi, birikim rejimi, finansallaşma, devletin

yeniden inşası, toplumsal dönüşüm, sınıf oluşumu, işçi göçü, direniş, ayaklanma,
Lefebvre, Braverman, Arrighi, Gramsci

To Kuntik and Muncik...

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The Department of Sociology at METU has never been a poor environment in terms of providing a space to structure your thoughts. I cannot name everyone, but I would like to specifically mention Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç, Dr. Mehmet Barış Kuymulu, Dr. Barış Mücen, and Dr. Antoine Dolcerocca, whose well-thought-out courses were a blessing for someone as scattered as me. A significant part of the thesis took shape through the papers I wrote for their courses. In addition, Assoc. Prof. Erdoğan Yıldırım's challenging, sometimes frustrating, but always fruitful discussions were a rare gift for someone like me, who can only shape their thoughts through debate.

I returned to the Department of Sociology almost 20 years after dropping out of it. My last memory of the department was about our current department head, Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz-Hoşgör, who, back then, I believe, was giving her first lectures. Her caring and dedicated attitude towards students remains vivid in my mind. To be welcomed in the same way by her 20 years later played a key role in helping me warm up to the department and finally commit to finishing what I had once left behind. For an older student like myself, maintaining a continuous relationship with the school is not easy. For this reason, I would also like to thank Dr. Sibel Bekiroğlu, one of the former departmental assistants, and the current assistants Dilan Yıldırım and Yankı Doğanay for their companionship.

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During the writing process, the first-hand accounts of my father-in-law, Rasim Yılmaz, regarding the actors of the 15-16 June events caught my attention, particularly the details about Balkan immigrants and the influence of their community relations on the class movements of the period. This unexpected contribution provided a historical depth my thesis needed.

Just as with the content and methodology of this thesis, I have always considered myself a student of history. In this regard, I owe a debt of gratitude to my late father, who encouraged me at an early age to explore the history of humanity. I suppose I have been fortunate from the very beginning. The unwavering support of my mother, Sibel, and my sister, Gül, has sustained me throughout my life, as well as during the writing of this thesis.

Above all, this thesis is about the history of the working class and social agency. I must also acknowledge the contributions of Yücel, and his late brother, Ali Filizler, in shaping my ideas on these subjects. Last but not least, I must emphasize that this thesis is not about my personal ideas, or those of any individual, but rather about the actions of countless working-class heroes. Although they are too many to name, I would like to mention one in honor of them all: İsmail Kızılcay, who we lost in the Ankara Train Station Massacre on October 10, 2015. May his spirit live on in the future chapters of this history.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*“The best laid schemes o’ Mice an’ Men
Gang aft agley...”*

- Robert Burns

1.1. Rationale for The Study

“More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state.” This is the opening sentence of *The State in Capitalist Society* written by Ralph Miliband in 1969. Writing a memorable opening sentence may rely on the artistic creativity of the author in literature, but in social theory it seems to have a correlation with the extensiveness of forthcoming or ongoing social transformations and how heavily it is felt by the author. Miliband’s literary opening is no exception. It marks the upcoming era of neo-liberal transformation in which the state (paradoxically) casts a large shadow over every sphere of daily life. What comes after is an increasing presence of the state felt by individuals on a daily basis: “...a car owner facing state emission laws in California, a family facing school language in Catalonia, India, or Belize, a couple dealing with a new pregnancy in China, a homeless person deciding where to sleep in San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, or New York, a Palestinian in the Occupied Territories having to decide which line to cross and when, or a citizen of Singapore or Malaysia having to conform to prescribed behavior in a public building. Behind the banality of these millions of encounters between individuals or groups and governments we discover the depth of governmental presence in our lives...” (Trouillot, 2001:125)

There is nothing new in penetration of the state into the daily life or “the deep regulation of social (and personal) life” through codified law, centralization of

administration, police force, surveillance mechanisms, etc. (Gledhill, 2000). In what we call modern world, the livelihood revolves around the discipline of work and industrial organization of production for a long time and the modern political structure characterized by detailed regulation maintains the order of social life according to them. What seems to change after 1970s is the level of this penetration. The state has reached an omnipotent existence, all seeing with CCTVs and all-knowing with e-government databases. It can even listen to your prayers in person with CIMER (Presidential Communication Center) in Turkey and can judge your daily deeds with the citizen credit system of China (Liang et al., 2018). Even the taxation, which is as old as the state itself, has been largely settled in the individual daily consumption with VAT (Value-added Tax).

This level does not simply mark a quantitative change of “more than ever”, but it also marks a qualitative transformation. Miliband follows his opening sentence with touching the significance of this transformation: “More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want to achieve, individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state’s sanction and support.” (Miliband, 1969) This also signals a transformation about how politics (which basically means “affairs of city/citizens”) is conceived, how social movements are formed and how social agency, hence, the capacity to act towards a goal within a social context, comes to be.

This is also the question of this thesis. It is intended to be humble and a small step into a much broader theoretical inquiry about the current state of affairs¹ as the result of social transformations following the World War II, especially after the late 1960s often called as neo-liberal period characterized by the three headed monster: deepening commodification of social relations, financialization of economy and reconstruction of the state. The end goal of this inquiry would be reproducing a concrete abstraction of this state of affairs in their totality, not to conceive it as an absolute knowledge of the reality we live in, but to take it as a point of departure for

¹ I will use the term “state of affairs”, originally *Sachverhalt*, as Wittgenstein (1922) defines it: A fact as a certain combination of objects. Only being a constituent part of a state of affairs gives an object its properties (like points constituting a square or a circle), while the totality of actual states of affairs constitutes the world.

further observation and conception.² In this thesis those observations and conceptions will be directed towards the question of “historical subject”, agencies of social change in the age of marketization and financialization. The new social movements literature has already been underscoring the evolution of activism in response to the complexities of contemporary global issues starting with late 1960s (Offe, 1985), but they usually underestimate the continuity with past forms of collective action and neglect the role of broader historical and political contexts in shaping movements (Tilly, 2004). The purpose of the study is to reframe the relation between the social movements (especially class struggle and labor movement) and the long term transformations after late the 1960s.

Miliband’s work does not stand alone in its discussion for his period, it would become a part of a very large canon discussing the nature, function, and role of the state in capitalist society throughout the 1970s, influenced by global political dynamics, including decolonization, anti-imperialist struggles, various social movements and the Cold War. Late 1960s and 1970s were marked by significant political upheaval and revolutionary movements worldwide. The civil rights movement in the United States, anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia, and socialist revolutions in Latin America brought issues of power, inequality, and state control to the forefront (Draper, 1978; Tilly, 1978). These movements challenged existing political structures and sparked the widespread interest in understanding the dynamics of state power and class struggle (Skocpol, 1979). The period witnessed a revival of Marxist theory with intellectuals and scholars revisiting Marx’s analysis of the state as an instrument of class domination and the relationship between state power and capitalist interests (Poulantzas, 1973; Miliband, 1969). Furthermore, the economic crises of the 1970s exposed the vulnerabilities of capitalist economies and prompted a reevaluation of state intervention in the economy (Harvey, 1982: 123). Scholars explored how states managed economic crises and the implications for class

² As Goonewardena (2018:5) perfectly puts, “...commitment to understand things “relationally,” “dialectically,” “structurally,” “historically” or “holistically”—calls *totality*.” Yet, as this totality is never fixed in itself, conceiving it as an absolute knowledge of universal laws would be illusory: “...a mode of production is not a ‘total system’ in that forbidding sense; it includes a variety of counterforces and new tendencies within itself, of ‘residual’ as well as ‘emergent’ forces, which it must attempt to manage or control ...that capitalism also produces differences or differentiation as a function of its own internal logic.” (Jameson, 1991:405–406).

relations, focusing on the state's role in stabilizing capitalism and mediating class conflicts (Wright, 1978).

Probably the best known discussion on state of this era is Miliband-Poulantzas debate: Miliband (1969) maintained an instrumentalist view of the state, arguing that it is controlled by the ruling class through a network of elites who occupy key positions within state institutions while Poulantzas' structuralism (1978) highlighted its relative autonomy to maintain social order and the long-term interests of capital. Another theorist of structuralism, Louis Althusser (1971) emphasized the role of ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) in maintaining hegemony to perpetuate the conditions of production and reproduce capitalist relations within his framework inspired largely by Gramsci. Perry Anderson (1976), also influenced by Gramsci himself, criticizes structuralism with detaching the analysis of the state from the concrete historical and material conditions, missing out the historicity of the state as a product of ongoing class struggles and economic relations. Anderson (1976) emphasizes the creation of new forms of popular power and democratic governance.

Structuralism applies Saussure's linguistic model across different disciplines and underlies the universal structures governing all social and human phenomena, structural patterns functioning similar to language as a system of signs and shaping all things human. This strong focus on "the order of things" (Foucault, 1966), slowly became prominent starting from 1960s onwards including the discussions on state I mentioned before, alongside issues of class and capitalism. Anderson's criticism mentioned above focuses on the limitations of this approach including its tendency towards ahistoricism (undermining the importance of historical context and change), its abstract nature (reducing complex social realities to simplified models and binary oppositions), and its neglect of human agency and historical change (portraying social order as overly deterministic) (Anderson, 1976; Anderson, 1984). Yet, these abstract characteristics of structuralism resonate with the growing hegemony of the capital and the state in everyday life.

Anderson's emphasis on the other hand, as all of the prominent theoretical approaches on state at the time, actually resonates the social struggles going on

(Callinicos, 2010). The late 1960s and 1970s were a period of significant political upheaval and change marked by widespread protests, revolutionary movements, and ideological shifts across the globe. The post-World War II economic boom began to falter, leading to stagflation and economic instability in many Western countries. The Vietnam War sparked widespread anti-war protests and highlighted the imperialist tendencies of the United States while decolonization movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America challenged colonial powers and inspired revolutionary movements. The civil rights movement, feminist movement, and other liberation struggles demanded profound social changes.

It was not a coincidence that Gramsci was so relevant in every side of the discussions around this time. His concept of civil society consisting of a myriad of institutions, organizations, and associations is the arena where hegemony, consent for the ruling class, is established and maintained. But it is also the arena of a protracted and complex struggle, “a war of position” which involves establishing a counter-hegemony that can challenge the prevailing hegemony and gradually transform the social and cultural landscape in favor of the oppressed class.

Antonio Gramsci (1971) introduced the concept of the "war of position" in his *Prison Notebooks*, where he analyzed the conditions under which revolutionary change could be pursued in capitalist societies. Unlike the "war of maneuver," which involves direct, often violent confrontation with the state (such as a military coup or insurrection), the "war of position" is a protracted struggle aimed at gaining ideological and cultural hegemony within civil society (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci understood that in advanced capitalist societies, the state is bolstered by a complex system of civil society institutions (such as schools, churches, media, and unions) that maintain and propagate the dominant ideology. Therefore, any successful revolutionary movement must first achieve cultural and ideological dominance within these institutions before it can effectively challenge the state itself (Gramsci, 1971). In the "war of position," the focus is on gradually building up the strength of the working class and its allies by engaging in ideological, cultural, and political battles *within* civil society. The concept of ideological hegemony is central to understanding the "war of position." Gramsci argued that the ruling class maintains

control not just through coercion (via the state and its institutions) but also through consent, which is manufactured through cultural and ideological means. The ruling class's ideas become the "common sense" of the society, shaping the beliefs and behaviors of the majority. The "war of position" is, therefore, a struggle to challenge and overturn this ideological hegemony, replacing it with a counter-hegemony that reflects the interests and values of the working class (Gramsci, 1971).

This process is necessarily slow and involves a series of engagements across different fronts—education, media, political discourse, and more. It requires building alliances, creating intellectual and cultural counter-narratives, and slowly eroding the legitimacy of the ruling class's ideology. The "war of position" is not about immediate gains but about laying the groundwork for a more profound transformation of society. Through this slow, methodical process of creating a new cultural and ideological consensus we might achieve a "regulated society" in which everybody governs and the state withers away (Gramsci, 1971).

The idea suggests that social change often occurs not through sudden, dramatic upheaval but through a gradual accumulation of victories. For instance, in modern social movements, the "war of position" can be seen in the strategies of grassroots organizing, advocacy for educational reform, media campaigns, and the creation of alternative institutions that reflect different values from those of the dominant culture. These efforts are all aimed at reshaping the ideological landscape and building the capacity for more radical changes in the future. Various historical struggles of the period seemed to reflect this framework: the labor movement's efforts to establish unions, socialist/worker's parties in parliaments, press and media of those parties, cooperative enterprises, the civil rights movements and feminist movements aiming to transform cultural and ideological norms, etc.

The reason he defined the "war of position" in contrast with "war of maneuver" was actually a discussion on 1917 October Revolution and its applicability to Western capitalist societies. He proposes that not only the capital but also the modern state with its ideological hegemony and complex civil society were not fully developed in Russia and that was the reason that made the revolution possible as it happened

(Gramsci, 1971). This discussion is not fully relevant to the subject of thesis. Yet, the concept reflects many characteristics of social movements within the time period, including the working class movement. I will use this concept not in contrast with the 1917 October Revolution and the 'war of maneuver,' but rather in contrast with what I will define as 'sudden explosions of survival.' These explosions, lacking any organizational continuity, do not seem to reflect the idea of gradual change or strategic advancement towards a counter-hegemony associated with specific social aspirations and imaginations of a future regulated society. They are more of a struggle against the current regulations in which the political and social agency is severely restricted not only by direct oppression but the "state of affairs" in general including the opportunities and sources.

In a way, a "regulated society" which entails the regulation of "political society" has really emerged through this historical period, but contrary to Gramsci's (1941) discussions on hegemony and civil society in many ways, it has been achieved by systematically excluding the masses and their social needs from the political domain, accompanied by the dissolution of an active and participatory civil society. This was the main problematic discussed by radical democracy theories. From the late 1960s to the end of the 20th century, many post-Marxist theorists of radical democracy, such as Jacques Derrida, Chantal Mouffe, and Jacques Rancière, largely focused on the exclusion of the masses from meaningful political engagement, highlighted the ways in which democratic participation was being undermined by structural exclusions and the marginalization of dissenting voices especially at later stages of the period. (Derrida, 1994; Mouffe, 2000; Rancière, 1999) But the irony of history was once again at work: The supposed inclusion of these excluded, subaltern masses did not result in the anticipated forms of radical or liberal democracy, or a robust public engagement. Instead, the inclusion of the masses has manifested in a form where individuals encounter the state on an almost daily basis, within every detail of everyday life. This phenomenon has intensified particularly after the marketization of public life and the extensive commodification of public services. This is also reflected through the discussions around "the financialization of poverty" (Mader, 2015) which refers the increasing penetration of financial markets and services into

the lives of the poor, often under the guise of financial inclusion³ The neoliberal agenda, with its emphasis on market principles, has paradoxically led to an increase in bureaucratic oversight and control, rather than the promised retreat of the state (Harvey, 2005).

This development signals a significant transformation in the concept of politics. The traditional notion of politics, rooted in Aristotle's (1998) idea of the *political community* (*koinōnia politikē*), where citizens engage in collective deliberation and pursue common interests or negotiate conflicting interests (Aristotle, 1998), seems to be eroding. The current trend suggests an end to this classical idea of politics, not in its literal meaning as "the concerns of the polis," but in the sense of active civic engagement and communal decision-making, leading to a disjunction between political institutions and the lived experiences of the populace. This exclusion has contributed to the dissolution of "civil society", a realm traditionally associated with the articulation of social interests and collective action, resulting in a weakened capacity for organized social representation and advocacy.

In a few decades after Miliband's work, the social media (owned by corporations) come to cover a large part of the "public sphere" and individual spectators/participants within it take the place of "civil society". This new public sphere facilitates the rapid dissemination of voices, needs, resistance, and social movements, allowing for swift communication and mobilization. However, it also imposes significant limitations on the formation of enduring social bonds and organizations, which are essential for the development of cohesive social subjects. The interactions within this platform often result in representations of social issues

³ Financial inclusion refers to efforts to make financial services accessible to all segments of society, particularly those who are marginalized or underserved by traditional banking systems. providing them with access to savings accounts, credit, insurance, and other financial services that can help them plan for the future (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018). This process involves turning poverty itself into a business opportunity for financial institutions, with the poor becoming targets for various financial products, such as microcredit, insurance, and savings schemes. While these products are often marketed as tools for poverty alleviation, critics argue that they can exacerbate poverty by exposing the poor to new forms of financial risk and exploitation (Roy, 2010). Financialization is characterized by the expansion of financial logic into areas of life that were previously outside the market's reach. This includes the commodification of basic needs such as housing, education, and healthcare, where access to these services increasingly depends on financial instruments like loans and insurance. For the poor, financialization can lead to precarious financial situations where they are constantly juggling debt, often at high interest rates, to meet basic needs (Soederberg, 2014).

that are both confined and dispersed across a fragmented landscape, creating an abstract and eclectic narrative of social reality (“hash” and “tag”, so to speak).

Marx defines capital as "*a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things*" (Marx, 1867:167). In this sense, the hegemony of capital has never been completed as today: in where the population itself turns into a product. Yet, this hegemony remains inherently fragile: Although class war mostly seems to disappear as a maintained and regulated “war of position” as Gramsci suggested and as observed in worker’s movements and organizations of post-World War period, it continues to appear as explosive struggles of survival. This sudden moments of politicization disturb the relations of production regulated in details by the shadow of the state, but they lack the capacity to change the state of affairs.

1.2. Methodology

As I mentioned before, this thesis is intended to be a first step of a theoretical inquiry about social agency within the ongoing structural transformations of capitalism through the historical period starting from 1970s until today, following the post-WWII economic expansion. It will be mainly a historical analysis utilizing different theoretical frameworks built upon the discussion of this transformation, especially Lefebvre’s *production of space*. But, by utilizing, I do not mean conceiving the theory as a primary tool used for grasping the “concrete” reality, and only then approaching the social facts with the set of “abstract” concepts it provides. On the contrary, as the materialist conception of history in general starts with living humans, their needs and the means to satisfy those needs (Marx, 1846), the specific purpose of this inquiry (conceptualizing the agencies of social change within the given historical period) necessitates to start with the moments in which the state of affairs is disturbed by the agency of social movements.

Lefebvre defines this new era as “the state mode of capitalism” in which he discusses the state as “the real subject” of history (Lefebvre, 1974), but he also criticizes structuralism dominating academic and Marxist circles of the time. Lefebvre saw a form of positivist determinism in structuralism’s reducing complex social

phenomena to underlying structures (a set of abstract rules) and overlooking the complexities and contradictions of social life (Lefebvre, 1971). Focusing on abstract structures tends to overlook the spatial (therefore, material) dimension of social life.⁴ His concept of “production of space” emphasizes how that space is produced through social practices, power relations, and struggles within everyday life and how spatial (material) practices shape and are shaped by social structures (Lefebvre, 1974). His framework is first and foremost an attempt to revive a materialist conception of history largely lost in this theoretical approaches.

Lefebvre also conceptualizes paroxysmal “*moments*” which are born out of these social relations of production but disrupt them: Those moments set up “a structuring against the uncertain and transitory background of the everyday” and “permit us to illuminate the slow stages by which need becomes desire” (Lefebvre, 1961). While utilizing certain theoretical frameworks to answer the question of social agency within the period, this “structuring” of the moments allows to reconstruct and reconcile those theories to achieve a holistic perspective. In other words, I will try to bring macro and micro sociological approaches together in order to achieve a totality between social action and structure.

Goonewardena summarizes the conception of totality in Lefebvre “as a mediated articulation of three levels of social reality”: “the global or **universal level of state and capital** logics; the **level of everyday life** containing contestations between alienated routine and utopian yearning; and the **level of the urban, which mediates between the global and the everyday**” (Goonewardena, 2011; Kipfer, 2009).

I will use a similar but different triad to structure the discussions in the thesis: **the context** (historical background), **the content** (social events and actions themselves) and **the form** (the spatial and material reality shape and being shaped by those events). The content will be the two moments of class struggle in Turkey, the context and the forms of those moments will be discussed within the relevant chapters. As it

⁴ This is also why Voloshinov describes Saussure’s structuralist theory of language as “objective idealism” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973) long before it is applied to other fields by Levi-Strauss, Althusser, Lacan, Foucault and others.

is also necessary to elaborate on the broader historical context that relates these two events with each other and makes them relevant for this study, first of all I will provide a general outline of the transformation of capitalism.

As a period of countless crises in every level, there is not a shortage of social disturbance moments within the period and transformation process. For a number of analytic purposes, I will address and discuss two from Turkey: 15-16 June Workers' Uprising of 1970 and Gezi Resistance/June Uprising of 2013. First and foremost, they seem to embody the two different types of social movement and agency which I touched upon in the introduction. While 15-16 June seems to emerge as a result of "war of positions" (Gramsci, 1947) between two classes within the context of capitalist development of post-World War Turkey, Gezi seems to erupt as a sudden explosion in an outbreak moment which assembles all the individual struggles around a focal point.

The 15-16 June Workers' Uprising in 1970 was a seminal event in Turkey's labor history and is still seen as the biggest and most impactful workers' action in the history of modern Turkey (Aydın, 2020). Its background reflects the tensions and conflicts inherent in the rapid industrialization and urbanization of Turkey, accompanied by a factory boom in manufacture and a migration wave from rural areas and smaller towns towards metropolises, under the clear influence of global trends of accumulation regime following the World War II⁵ The uprising was triggered by government attempts to curtail labor rights, specifically targeting workers' organization which rapidly became a social and a political force through 1960s and trying to limit union activities and direct actions. Those limitation attempts are also in line with the change of political atmosphere and mark the beginning of the structural transformations of 1970s. The actions are organized by the targeted organizations and took place through the industrial zones, housing a large number of factories and mobilized from periphery towards the city centers through the axis of urban infrastructure in line with those industrial zones.

⁵ The so-called economic expansion period resting on the mass production in manufactory with governmental spending of infrastructure investment and low interests. The aids of Marshall Plan received by Turkey was a part of the same accumulation regime.

On the other hand, The Gezi Uprising in 2013, the widest and biggest social unrest in terms of participation in modern history of Turkey, was historically framed by the period of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2004): extensive gentrification, privatization of public spaces, and large-scale construction projects, enabled by state/government planning and large financial credits, often at the expense of local communities and environmental considerations. The outbreak moment was the police brutality against “a handful of environment activist” defending Gezi Park, a free public area surrounded by the most celebrated streets of trade and consumption (Istiklal Avenue) and the most central square of the city, Taksim Square. It was marked by widespread protests and civil unrest throughout the country, spread through social media, attracting a diverse profile of participants and diverse forms of resistance. Despite the diversity, the main element of resistance had been the occupation of public spaces of the cities and neighborhoods by the masses and establishing public forums, as it started with the occupation of Gezi Park and Taksim Square (Tuğal, 2013).

These two moments both generated within Istanbul but 43 years apart: one in the beginning of the historical period in question and the other closer to the tail end. Both are perfect examples for conceptualizing the state of affairs within this period with its continuity, contradiction and differentiation as a process and reframing the long term transformation of capitalism within the dynamics of social movements and class struggle. Istanbul is the center of capital investment within Turkey, as well as being a hub tying the country with international trade routes and target of an ongoing mobility (with both arriving as well as leaving of population). Comparing the difference between two uprisings in terms of the accumulation regimes as their background (context); the outbreak moments revealing the contradiction within (content); and, unwrapping events and actions of agents throughout the space (form) can give the determinations of this specific period in its “generation and corruption”, in other words, in its “coming to being and passing away” (Aristotle, 1982) with a glimpse of possibilities of social change. Per contra, the similarities between these two moments in terms of **how they relate with these elements** (background, outbreak and their manifestation in space) can provide an example of how social movements and actions are both products of a totality and reproduce that totality in a

transformative way. Yet, the thesis remains limited by taking only two slices out of the continuous body of the historical process in discussion. Being aware of handicaps and limitations, this act of slicing was chosen to be able to focus theoretical frameworks and creating a framing that can be useful for the broader inquiry.

By providing a historical analysis and examining the two reactions to a couple of related but different accumulation regimes, this study aims at:

- 1) achieving a nuanced understanding of the relationship between the production of space and moments of class struggle in the contexts of the 15-16 June Workers' Uprising and the Gezi Uprising in Turkey.
- 2) using a historical perspective on the relationship between the structural transformations of capitalist mode of production (commodification of social relations, financialization of economy and reconstruction of the state) within the time period between these two uprisings and social movements.
- 3) Reconsidering and discussing Lefebvre, Braverman and Arrighi's theoretical frameworks for this transformational period and within the specific.
- 4) Elaborating on the differentiation of class struggle from "war of positions" to "sudden explosions of survival" and what this differentiation means for both social agency and social structure.

For those purposes, thematic analysis and participant observation are used to provide a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play and an exploration of the contextual and situational factors influencing these uprisings. Although historical method will be at the core of the study, given the time difference between these two events with 43 years apart, methodological tools and data sources being used to help re-constructing, picturing and contextualizing these two events have to be different.

The study will try to provide a detailed contextual background of the 15-16 June Workers' Uprising and the Gezi Uprising. That will include chronological mapping of key events, policies, and movements that set the stage for the uprisings as well as contextualization of the uprisings within broader socio-political and economic transformations in Turkey. For those purposes, I conducted an extended literature review on published works (academic or other) on Turkish labor history, urban

development and social movements. This review focuses on the published books on class history that include, collect and organize newspapers, government reports and official statistics, trade union records, statements and propaganda materials from political parties, trade unions, and activist groups, interviews with participants and witnesses.

For 15-16 June Workers' Uprising (and prior struggles such as many factory occupations of 1960s), there are a number of secondary documentations of those events that include interviews with activists, organizational statements of that time, media articles, etc. They bring together the materials I mentioned above. Some of them are published by key actors of the events like Kemal Sülker's (2015) "Two Long Days That Shook Turkey" and Sırrı Öztürk's (2001) "Working Class, Trade Unions and 15-16 June: Events, Reasons, Law Suits, Documents, Memorials and Interpretations". I am grateful to be able to read those narrations and documentations from first-hand testimony that do not lack a historical perspective. Yet I kept going back to a book with a lengthy, in-depth and extensive documentation and discussion of the events published by Zafer Aydın (year): "Workers' June: 15-16 June 1970". Almost any material that I could find about the events while conducting the research, whether newspaper articles, trade union statements, reports or testimonies, I found already documented in the book, including previous key workers' actions. So, most of the references for the materials listed will be addressed to that spectacular work of working class history. I also used the Birleşik Metal-İş (Metal Union) online archive⁶ which includes a special 15-16 June file bringing together media articles, documents, reports and trade-union records of the time. Both for 15-16 June Uprising and the labor actions prior to the event, this thesis benefited a lot from countless articles, brochures and books of Aziz Çelik who should be thanked for his extensive work on documenting Turkey's class movement and trade-union history.

For the historical transformation of Istanbul and Turkey in regards to rapid urbanization, industrialization and migration during the period, there is a good amount of literature that brings together the statistical data and policy plans. I conducted a literature review to collect that data and especially rely on seminal

⁶ <https://www.birlesikmetaldis.org/index.php/tr/yay-nlar/yayin-arsivi>

works of İlhan Tekeli, Ruşen Keleş, Çağlar Keyder, Mübeccel Kıray, Mustafa Sönmez and Rıfki Arslan.

For Gezi Uprising, I will adapt a more activist oriented approach for the reason that this study started as and originated from the discussions occurred during the Gezi resistance among the activists. One of the distinctive organizational characteristics of the Gezi Uprising, especially in Taksim Square and Gezi Park which was the center of the events, was the emergence of temporary new organisations focusing on specific tasks (from publication of newspaper to mapping, from security of the barricades to building) beside public forums. One of the newly emerged organisations in the resistance will be the main source for the purposes of historical analysis: *Gezi Post*, a daily paper prepared and distributed by a small collective of protestors knowing each other prior to the protests through friendship networks, provides an archive to observe the agenda of the resistance from an activist perspective, interactively with other (not in reach anymore) sources like forums, and Taksim Solidarity meetings.

A thematic analysis will be conducted to identify and analyze recurring themes and patterns in the texts analyzed and to interpret implications of these themes in relation to the research questions. The thematic framework used to organize and interpret the data will be naturally different, partly because the contrasting characteristics of the uprisings themselves but also because of the difference of the data sources. A difference that can be useful to draw connections and contrasts, and generate insights. Yet some themes will be repeated for both events as they are already embedded in the discussion, like demands or the key places and routes in the actions. Reporting will involve synthesizing findings into a coherent narrative that addresses the research and presenting the analysis in a structural and historical manner by integrating theoretical insights from Lefebvre, Arrighi, and Braverman to be discussed in the next chapter below in detail.

1.3. Theoretical Framework and Pre-discussion

Regarding the theoretical framework, I try to avoid the general trend in social sciences: applying the concepts borrowed from a certain framework to the intended

object of knowledge. This is generally in line with Cartesian thought or Platonic view, the criticized metaphors of knowledge in the preface of *Phenomenology of Spirit* by Hegel (1807): as a tool to grasp the reality or as a medium through which the truth illuminates us. “Hegel argues that the investigation of knowledge changes that very knowledge, and that such an investigation can never be preliminary, but constitutes the whole of philosophical investigation. The critique of knowledge is the development of knowledge as well.” (Solomon, 1983:193)

It is not a coincidence that the theoretical discussions on all three characteristics of the structural transformations ramped up in both academic and Marxist circles at the same time with the transformations itself: Miliband-Poulantzas debate on the role of state, Situationists’ attempt to re-write Capital based on the “spectacle” which absorbs life into modern production, new definitions like subaltern and precariat, upskilling/downskilling (degradation of work) debate, rise of geography within Marxist analysis, post-capitalism discussions...etc. These countless frameworks are a testament to how the social theory, or simply the activity of thinking is an inseparable part of the productive activity of society and embedded and interacting within the forces and relations of production. “It is necessary to sift the various ideas, ideologies, representations and images in order to find out how they have contributed to the renewal of the existing relations, either by stimulating this reproduction directly, or by obscuring it. Nothing can escape this sifting process unscathed: neither "critical theory", nor structuralism, nor psychoanalysis, nor surrealism: not even Marxist thought!” (Lefebvre, 1973:11)

Both to do justice to these frameworks and to avoid a Platonic approach to sociology, rather than giving general outlines and drawing some concepts for use *prior* to my discussion, I will try to give a critical discussion of those frameworks *within* the historical transformation they are related with (even belong to).

Arrighi’s (1994) conception of consecutive regimes of accumulation, each of which entails a fundamental reorganization of capitalism, places the discussed historical period in this thesis within a larger history of capitalism and enables to differentiate its characteristics. Each of these regimes swing towards the other direction from the

previous one between the “material expansion” and “financialization” periods and the logic of these swings captures the first part of the totality (“global or universal level of state and capital logics”) in its own historicity. Arrighi’s history of capitalism surely integrates the space it takes place within his theory as part of the world system, but this level of isolation of international dynamics seems to leave out the level of everyday life: “...under the weight of its historical apparatus, it seems that the crises of the 1970s was simply part of the objective and inevitable cycles of capitalist accumulation, rather than the result of proletarian and anticapitalist attack both in the dominant and in the subordinated countries.” (Hardt & Negri, 2000:239.)

Braverman’s great work *Labor and Monopoly Capital* focuses more on that level of “everyday life” left out in Arrighi’s work but not in a general sociological picture of “life under capitalism”. Braverman, as a craftsman worked in shipyards and steel industry and as a part of worker’s movement, focuses on what the many other Marxists neglect, the labor process itself within the frame of monopoly capital and “its social form”. It is written in the same decade in which Goldthorpe (1974)⁷ developed his famous scheme on “social classes”, following at least two decades of discussion on the transformation of division of labor and class relations in an upcoming post-Fordist, post-industrial and even maybe post-capitalist information society.

In the aftermath of WWII, Keynesian utopia prevails. Keynes was very optimistic about the work life of his grandchildren as he writes, “three-hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while” at the end of his century in which most jobs will be about public and service industries... when the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance...” (Keynes, 1930:369) Thanks to the decades of surplus extraction which pushed the productivity of labor to sky high, “all kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously

⁷ The Goldthorpe class scheme, developed by sociologist John H. Goldthorpe and colleagues, is a framework used to classify people into social classes based on their occupational roles and the nature of their employment relations.

useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard.” (Keynes, 1930:369-370) In 1960s, his utopic vision was being echoed on TV (one of the symbols of this new society), as USS Enterprise of *Star Trek* was wandering the universe with highly scientific and totally peaceful missions in the name of a united human race. It was the same myth and vision that dominated the academy, as in the mainstream claims of diminishing of alienation by advanced technology (Blauner, 1964). A decade later, the future was not so bright but Keynes was still alive as Bell declared USA as first “post-industrial society” in which “a greater importance attached to the possession of knowledge than the ownership of capital” in his famous book in 1973. Although we had already given up the idea of “three-hours shifts”, most of us would be working in expanding “non-profit sector” which particularly includes health, education and research. It was not only the mainstream economy but also many Marxists “have been taken in by many of the myths and fallacies so energetically promoted by capitalism's ideologists” as Sweezy confessed in the foreword for Braverman’s book, when it comes to the domination of technology. Even if not given up to the “upskilling thesis” represented by Blauner, Bell and alike, even talking about an age of monopoly capital they are “in almost total neglect of a subject which occupies a central place in Marx's study of capitalism: the labor process” (Sweezy, 1974:XI). For some Marxists, even the “existence of a working class” was in doubt, some other non-Marxist “critical thinkers” were just flipping the utopian vision of technological society into a dystopian one.

One of the first things Braverman demonstrates is that Marxist academics were not alone in their neglect. Partially as a result of Soviet Union’s struggle to keep up with capitalism alongside “the cataclysmic events of this century”, socialist movement has also been detached from the central problem. The dominance of myths like “upskilling thesis”, the failures of socialist movement and of critical theory intertwined:

...the technology of capitalism, which Marx had treated with cautious reserve, and the organization and administration of labor, which he had treated with passionate hostility, became relatively acceptable. Now the revolution against capitalism was increasingly conceived as a matter of

stripping from the highly productive capitalist mechanism certain "excrescences," improving the conditions of work, adding to the factory organization a formal structure of "workers' control," and replacing the capitalist mechanisms of accumulation and distribution with socialist planning. At any rate and whatever the precise factors at work, the critique of the capitalist mode of production, originally the most trenchant weapon of Marxism, gradually lost its cutting edge as the Marxist analysis of the class structure of society failed to keep pace with the rapid process of change. It has now become a commonplace to assert that Marxism was adequate only for the definition of the "industrial proletariat," and that with the relative shrinkage of that proletariat in size and social weight, Marxism, at least in this respect, has become 'outmoded'. (*Braverman, 1974/1998:87*)

Braverman's work is first of all a critique of upskilling thesis and it has been always considered as the other side of the debate and largely reduced to a "deskilling" thesis. This is a limited assessment of his analysis. He does not rely on the development "new working class" or shrink of an old one, neither focuses on "concrete forms of labor which it is called upon to exercise". Taking capital not as a "thing" but as "social relation" operating on a global scale as the title of his book suggests, he places his arguments on "downskilling thesis" in the frame of contradictory tendencies of capital just like the falling rates of profit as the productivity of labor increases with the organic composition of capital. Indeed, today many looks at the same post-war USA that Bell idealizes, see the crisis hand-in-hand with the rise of commercial, financial and supervisory labor. This is the same frame when Braverman's "deskilling" comes to picture: With the financialization of capital and commercialization of health, education and other services, we observe the rise of all level of service works, white-collar jobs, "professionals", "new waged middle classes" but this is also a contradictory process. Capital tends to increase unproductive labor (services sector, military, police, servants, etc.) that merely transfers value. These are different from the servants of earlier centuries of capitalism as they are placed within the profit seeking economy. As the growth of this layer also happens in the expanse of small retailers, artisans, craftsmen turning them into wage laborers (or adapt them into corporate business as "freelancers"), it surely creates a more heterogeneous "working class" in terms of skills and also creates more differences within the class. It also blurs the lines between a servant, a worker or middle class. On the other hand, after serving as a "diversion" (mainly for over production problem), they also have to become "productive" in terms of surplus

production, thus, will share similar conditions to the “industrial worker” of past ages: propertyless masses struggling also with unemployment. This contradictory movement of capital is also in “work” for the “skill” debate and that is how Braverman should be understood: upskilling will end up as downskilling, either for the same “upskilled” workers over time or for other workers over space.

Of course, today most can see that Bell is wrong about his definition of “non-profit sectors” as they will become the main areas of capital investment, turns out to be highly profitable sectors and meanwhile turns his “first post-industrial society”, namely USA, into the most vulnerable society in the face of Covid-19 pandemic, especially for populations living in traditionally “industrial” working class cities like Detroit and Seattle, black population etc.⁸ The reason of his failure to grasp the tendency is just hidden in the shift between Bell and Keynes regarding the concept of working and the dynamics of that shift is clearly captured by Braverman: “...*while unproductive labor has declined outside the grasp of capital, it has increased within its ambit*. The great mass of labor which was reckoned as unproductive because it did not work for capital has now been transformed into a mass of labor which is unproductive because it works for capital, and because the needs of capital for unproductive labor have increased so remarkably. The more productive capitalist industry has become-that is to say, the greater the mass of surplus value it extracts from the productive population- the greater has become the mass of capital seeking its shares in this surplus. And the greater the mass of capital, the greater the mass of unproductive activities which serve only the diversion of this surplus and its distribution among various capitals.” (Braverman, 1974/1998:415)

⁸ The COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately impacted populations in traditionally industrial working-class cities such as Detroit and Seattle in USA. These cities, characterized by significant economic reliance on industries like manufacturing, experienced heightened exposure to the virus due to factors such as densely populated living conditions, essential work status, and inadequate access to healthcare services (Fraser, 2020; Jones et al., 2021).

Moreover, the pandemic's effects were acutely felt among the Black population, who faced compounded risks due to systemic racial disparities in health, employment, and socio-economic status. Studies have shown that Black Americans were more likely to be employed in essential service roles (jobs?), which increased their likelihood of exposure to the virus (Oppel et al., 2020). Additionally, long-standing inequalities in healthcare access and quality contributed to higher rates of morbidity (cause of mortality) and mortality (death rate) from COVID-19 within these communities (Poteat et al., 2020) use either morbidity or mortality. The intersection of industrial decline, racial inequality, and pandemic vulnerability underscores deep-rooted disparities and fragility of the current socio-economic structure (Fisher & Bubola, 2020; Laurencin & Walker, 2020).

This today well-known transformation presents a double-edged challenge: not only the maintenance of capitalist mode of production, but also to Marxist critique of capitalism. First, "...the accumulation of capital as an historical process, depends in every respect upon non-capitalist social strata and forms of social organization. (...)capitalism needs non-capitalist social organizations as the setting for its development, that it proceeds by assimilating the very conditions which alone can ensure its own existence." (Luxemburg, 1913:447) Second, Marx never drew a sharp distinction between productive industrial workers and other wage-laborers and was beware of the tendency of a growing commercial/financial capital and the subsumption of greater portions of population as wage-workers under it. He described a number of results such as the growth of offices in Volume 3 of Capital, he marks this issue as a "difficulty", a conflict for the nature of merchant capital. After all what he anticipates was not the growth of the commercial wage-working stratum into a commercial proletariat but an over-throw of capitalism before things get to this point. One merit of Braverman's work is to demonstrate this transformation "in work", what went wrong in the decks of USS Enterprise and how "Star Trek" was dragged into "Star Wars" in less than a few decades. While doing this, he challenges this riddle for Marxist theory with great lengths. His framework is still a powerful tool to navigate what comes after.

The tendency becomes more prominent with the marketization period after 1970s, commercialization of public services and daily life as well as the subsumption of nature and public sphere while the productivity of labor increases with the organic composition. This process directly results in a rise of interactive service work in quantity and variation of new labor forms. A great deal of workers employed in ISW jobs execute a work of collectivization and socialization like in the example of information & communication technology and delivery/transportation sector. As a result of their significant role in "the annihilation of space by time", ICT enhances "productivity" in all other sectors using these technologies and by doing so, becomes another factor contributing the more hybrid forms of labor processes. But the skill set needed by improved technology (like the mental skills) or the flexibility in regards to space and time does not lead to autonomy, but more control over the labor process enhanced through surveillance without time and space constraints and intensification

of the labor process. In the example of “platform labor”, ISW companies offer platforms assisted by digital infrastructure in which small retailers, artisans, craftsmen or sometimes hobbyists are adapted into corporate business models as wage laborers. By the pressure of mass unemployment, *Uber* turned private property cars into means of production. They are mostly welcomed by an increasingly precarious population at first, like *ProZ.com* was welcomed by translators, but all ended up useful for capital for the reduction of investment and maintenance cost while the “exploitation became social and spread to services, the extraction of surplus value spread throughout society”, the collective worker grows into “socialized worker” (Negri, 2018). As the network economy prevails, the working environment, working schedule and job definitions are all blurred and become unidentifiable. While the ICT plays a predominant role in this, this blurring of job/work definitions furthers to a point in ISW sector that surplus can be extracted from social practices that are not neither identified as job nor as a work without any presence of a wage and with a contract enabling capital not only has full rights of what is produced but also right to surveillance of private life as in the example of user-generated contents on digital platforms.

So, Braverman’s framework about the changing structure of working class as usually regarded. After all, the working class is not a fixed entity but an “ongoing processes, rich in change, transition, variation, and incapable of being encapsulated in formulas” as above, “the analysis of this process requires an understanding of the internal relations and connections which serve as its motive power” (Braverman, 1974/1998:409). So, this is also a book about the “great transformation” of capitalism as a whole and the world shaped by it. As this transformation keeps bothering a great deal of social theory in variable ways, many theoretical frameworks come to explain it and make sense of the world we live in. The real merit of Braverman’s work is capturing this transformation in the way it happens in actuality, within the live interplay between forces of production and relations of production. But these elements in interplay, hence, his chapter 2 (Science and Mechanization) and chapter 3 (Monopoly Capital), follows his first chapter (Labor and its Management) for a reason: “The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is

an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. (...) Therefore in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance.” (Marx, 1846: 42-43). I don’t claim that the other frameworks I referred are missing this materialist conception of history. They all integrate this “fundamental fact” to their analysis to varying degrees. But none of them gives a vivid account of it from the trenches of the working class enduring the transformation. Thus, he accomplishes a greater dialectic of subject-object relations, preventing from idealist loopholes of historical narrative. So, none of those interchangeable frameworks, however useful, is indispensable as Braverman’s work for any student of this ongoing history. It does not provide new useful conceptualizations of what happened, but the comprehension of what those conceptualizations address. And that is the stage of not only what happened but also what can be done.

For that reason, this thesis will mostly be in line with his work in essence, while the formal discussion will mostly be parallel to the third framework, Lefebvre’s conception of “the production of space” simply because it provides a rich analysis and discussion on “the level of the urban, which mediates between the global and the everyday.” Focusing on this level is also the integral element which differentiates the materialist conception of history, hence Marxism, from all sorts of idealist conceptions of humanity:

Production in the Marxist sense transcends the philosophical opposition between 'subject' and 'object', along with all the relationships constructed by the philosophers on the basis of that opposition. How, then, is the rationality immanent to production to be defined?

By the fact, first of all, that it organizes a sequence of actions with a certain 'objective' (i.e., the object to be produced) in view. It imposes **a temporal and spatial order upon related operations**, whose results are coextensive. From the start of an activity so oriented towards an objective, **spatial elements** – the body, limbs, eyes – are mobilized, including both materials (stone, wood, bone, leather, etc.) and *matériel* (tools, arms, language, instructions and agendas). Relations based on an order to be followed – that is to say, on simultaneity and synchronicity – are thus set up, by means of

intellectual activity, between the component elements of **the action undertaken on the physical plane.**

All productive activity is defined less by invariable or constant factors than by the incessant to-and-fro between **temporality (succession, concatenation) and spatiality (simultaneity, synchronicity).** **This form is inseparable from orientation towards a goal** – and thus also **from functionality** (the end and meaning of the action, the energy utilized for the satisfaction of a need) and **from the structure set in motion** (know-how, skill, gestures and co-operation in work, etc.). The formal relationships which allow separate actions to form a coherent whole cannot be detached from the material preconditions of individual and collective activity; and this holds true whether the aim is to move a rock, to hunt game, or to make a simple or complex object. **The rationality of space, according to this analysis, is not the outcome of a quality or property of human action in general, or human labour as such, of 'man', or of social organization. On the contrary, it is itself the origin and source – not distantly but immediately, or rather inherently – of the rationality of activity; an origin which is concealed by, yet at the same time implicit in, the inevitable empiricism of those who use their hands and tools, who adjust and combine their gestures and direct their energies as a function of specific tasks.**

(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or 'ideal' about it as compared, for example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. Itself the outcome of past actions, **social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.** (*Lefebvre, 1974:71-72*)

Lefebvre's theoretical framework of "production of space" conceives space not as a passive locus on which social structures are established and human activities take place, but both as a means of production and a product of those activities. That is, social relations in every age are necessarily spatial and every society produce the space they live in. The production of space is a process in which social relations are established and reproduced. Putting it in simple words while risking to be reductive, we might say that just as Heidegger (1961) says "We don't have a body, rather, we are bodily", Lefebvre claims that the society does not "have a space" or occupy a space, but it is spatial.⁹ And "urban" refers to the body of a historically specific

⁹ This discussion is much simpler in Turkish. Lefebvre's "l'espace" actually translates as "mekan" rather than "uzam", both of which are "space" in English. The Turkish originated word "uzam" only

society. “Urban form” is to the (social) space what the “commodity form” is to production; both forms are alienating, contradictory, temporal and driven towards their desolation, waiting to be abolished. Both are not specific to capitalist mode of production, but are generalized in it.

As it is well-known, Adam Smith’s division of labour is a linear development in time: Its origin lies in our human faculties of reason and speech which leads to a propensity to barter and exchange. As a result of density of population, the division of labour rises out of these human capacities and it is boosted by extension of market thanks to the development of transportation and accumulated wealth. Most of the political economy, as well as later modernist social sciences, depicts a similar relation between human subject and space, although space can appear time to time as a “natural” restriction (scarcity) to this human development (historicity) as famously related with Malthus.

But even in this clearly Cartesian framework (which still dominates social sciences), transportation, thus, movement starts to appear as the relational category between space and time. In this limited perspective, division of labour, which is the basis of society and civilization, is just different people doing different things as density of population rises on a neutral space and means of transportation overcome the distance and leads more density of population and intensifies division of labour. Human beings assumed equals as “producers” taking their product to the market interact with each other. Transportation stands for this interaction between subjects. A “neutral”, absolute space on which human population appears and spatial interaction takes place and overcoming of this “distance” via transportation is a conception that belongs to classical political-economy (shared by philosophy of enlightenment in general) and closely related with their historical perspective on division of labour.

marks as a physical extension. On the contrary, the etymology of *mekan* is a little bit complicated for those who have no idea about Arabic. The Arabic word is derived from the root “*kun*” (being) by the “flexion of time and space”, while “*kainat*” (universe) is just the plural form of “*kun*”, being. Putting simply, it relates being with space(-time) in an enveloping manner. The daily usage of *mekan* also refers to a societal existence more directly: you can say “come to *mekan*” referring to a common space between you and the other, you can address socializing places or one’s habitual environment as “*mekan*” in speech, etc. So, “*mekan*” is an adequate translation of Lefebvre’s socially produced space but also capturing the meaning of Heidegger’s *Dasein* (“there-being”, being in there) almost literally, but in a reversed manner with regards to the relationship between being and space.

Marx does not necessarily “historicize” this framework, rather he “spatializes” this subjective history as he begins with materialist conception of history in *German Ideology*. He argues that “reason” actually relies on the social (“language as practical consciousness”) and human-beings “begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization.” (Marx, 1846:31) The division of labour is not a linear historical development it occurs within the interaction among different individuals which are readily there, but it is this physical organization that consists of forces of production and relations of production, an “immaterial but objective” condition of human existence. His division of labour conception includes property relationships and is spatial from the beginning, starting from the separation of town and country, which “can also be understood as the separation of capital and landed property.” (Marx, 1846:49) In country, “individuals are subservient to nature” and “united by some bond: family, tribe, the land itself, etc.” In town, they are subservient “to a product of labour” and “held together by exchange”. “In the first case, what is involved is chiefly an exchange between men and nature,” (hence, between human activity and absolute space); “in the second, it is predominantly an exchange of men among themselves.” We must also note that the division of labour between town and country also marks the transition from tribe to state and “these towns were true associations” (Marx, 1846:50).

What he introduces is not the historicity itself but the contradiction; population as a contradictory totality determined by this division of labour: “The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of ownership, i.e. the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product of labour.” (Marx, 1846:43). We do not actually need to remind ourselves that “the relations of individuals to one another” is necessarily a spatial existence, as the discussion already follows from the separation of town and country.

So, although it deserves a lengthy discussion, in short, capital makes its first appearance with the commerce and industry of the town, of the cities. The capitalist mode of production as the domination of town over country, becomes possible later,

only with a new separation between the commerce and industrial labour. After all, this mode of production is not only a “generalized commodity production” (although not wrong, this would be a definition limited to classical political economy and its labour theory of value) but also “the unity of the labour process and the process of valorization” in which “anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism in the manufacturing division of labour mutually condition each other”. (Marx, 1867:739-742)

As Elden (2001) states, Marx does not exclude space from his analysis as an “unnecessary complication”. Moreover, Elden himself also is not fair when he says that analyses of space “never claim center stage”. His? reference to “circulation of capital, passages on the scarcity of space, the analyses of the town/country relation and the military, amongst others” in various works of Marx shares the same unfairness of most contemporary discussions. Most of the references to space with regards to Marx cover the valorization process, hence the general formula of capital, M-C-M’ cycle. I won’t dwell on this part much, as it has been discussed by various authors of urban literature (Castells, Harvey and others) with reference to circulation discussion in *Capital Volume 2* as well as the famous formula of “annihilation of space by time” in *Grundrisse*: “Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. (...) The more developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by time.” (Marx, 1858:524)

Actually, one does not need to go to *Capital Volume 2*, but the spatiality of capitalism is already there in Volume 1, especially in regards to the production of relative surplus value (upon which the central tendency of capitalism through the falling rate of profits stands) as well as the general formula of capital, commodification of labour, transformation of common lands, origins of industrial capital and so on. Even before *Capital*, *Grundrisse* and *German Ideology* as well as Engels’ *The Condition of Working Class* directly confronts with the question. The

creation of surplus value, the labour process (the other side of the unity that this capital cycle actually depends on), also relies on space, a specific socially produced space. On that part, we can talk about a complementary process, annihilation of time by space, so to speak. When Marx left behind “seemingly” the elementary form of wealth in modern society, the commodity, in the first few chapters of capital, he started to “lightly touch upon the relation between the division of labour in manufacture, and the social division of labour which forms the foundation of all commodity production.” (Marx, 1867:475) Then, he once again emphasizes that the separation of town and country is the foundation of all division of labour brought about by commodity exchange and “the whole economic history of society is summed up in the movement of this antithesis” (Marx, 1867:209). But, the capitalist mode of commodity production is not simply an advanced commodity production, it is different in temporal as well as spatial terms. I won’t dwell much on his capitalist temporality which is related with absolute surplus value, as it has been repeatedly referred so many times in literature. One thing to touch upon is that, as it relies on labour-power being readily found in the market, it also relies on some spatial transformations such as the enclosure of common lands, development of putting-out system, etc. The more important point is that, Marx defines the production of absolute surplus value as “formal subjugation” of labour to capital, where the relative surplus value is the “real subjugation”. The “real” is real because it is spatial: his lengthy discussions on starting from how co-operation provides a “free” surplus to capitalist for the subjugation of labour on the factory floor points out the annihilation of time by space which will in the end lead to the capitalist spatiality of industrial town: “different stages of the (labour) process, previously successive in time, have become simultaneous and contiguous in space.” (Marx, 1867: 55)

In short, every moment of capitalist accumulation as well as the whole history of relations of production is explained through a dialectic of space and time. It is the case when separation of town and country is defined as the foundation of all civilization, it is again the case when the genesis of industrial capitalism is discussed as a direct result of the colonial system, not merely the result of technological development. If we speak in Lefebvrian terms, the “absolute space”, assumed natural

ground of human activity, becomes historical space from the beginning; whence the human-beings start to produce their own means of subsistence.¹⁰

The rise of capital is based on separation of the town and the country and the commodity market of the town. The spatiality of capitalist mode of production, subjugation of labour to capital based on manufacture and factory system presupposes this separation and commodity market to a point, but whence the forces of production are unleashed, it also crushes the historical town as well as country and creates its own town as an extension of the temporality and spatiality of the factory, comes to reproduce itself as a system on that ground. This is actually discussed by neither Lefebvre nor Foucault first, but already described as clear as it can be by Engels (1845:75)

The centralising tendency of manufacture does not, however, stop here. Population becomes centralised just as capital does; and, very naturally, since the human being, the worker, is regarded in manufacture simply as a piece of capital for the use of which the manufacturer pays interest under the name of wages. A manufacturing establishment requires many workers employed

10 Thus, the assumption of a non-historical, totally natural and neutral space belongs to an idealist conception of history which starts with “non-bodily” human subject or consciousness. What Marx does is to offer a “materialist understanding of history” (he never coined the term “historical materialism”, that comes later and most of the time the term is used hand-in-hand with pushing Marx back to the framework of political-economy) starting with the survival, the need, and the production of means to satisfy this need. On that ground, he had to spatialize history, begin with nature and differentiate socially produced space from it just to establish the totality again. Seve (2018) summarizes his anthropology perfectly: “1. Productive activity (Tätigkeit, which quickly replaced Praxis in Marx, a term which does not sufficiently express this crucial productive dimension): Human beings, according to *The German Ideology*, are essentially distinguished from animals by the fact that they produce their means of subsistence and therefore their very being; 2. Mediation (Vermittlung): The immense power of human activity is owing not only to the production (the seeds of which exist in the animal world) of the tool that mediates more and more the relationship to nature but especially to the social labour where this mediation acquires crucial dimensions; 3. Objectualisation (Vergegenständlichung): Human productive activity generates an entire universe of objects, social relationships, symbolic productions, ways of being, of feeling and thinking, a second humanity no longer natural-internal but social-external where the human psyche endlessly accumulates the world of man; 4. Appropriation (Aneignung): Though individuals are granted membership of the species *Homo Sapiens* from the outset, they must become a member of the humanity, to hominise themselves by appropriating a singular part of this objective humanity, through a formidable dialectic of the external and internal that without animal equivalent and of considerable anthropological consequence. 5. Alienation (Entfremdung): Cultural humanitas not being given to individuals in advance, its personal appropriation depends on social conditions which favour or thwart it, and in every class society, it clashes unequally but inevitably with alienation, with the stranger-being of the immense social human powers which, not being the property of all, are not controllable by anyone.” The idea that there is no “essence of man” and human is the “ensemble of his relations” is the summary of it. The “relation” he is talking about is “Verhältnis” that implies conditions, circumstances, objectified relations (like money-form or urban-form) which is different from “Beziehung” which is just interpersonal relations.

together in a single building, living near each other and forming a village of themselves in the case of a good-sized factory. They have needs for satisfying which other people are necessary; handicraftsmen, shoemakers, tailors, bakers, carpenters, stonemasons, settle at hand. The inhabitants of the village, especially the younger generation, accustom themselves to factory work, grow skillful in it, and when the first mill can no longer employ them all, wages fall, and the immigration of fresh manufacturers is the consequence. So the village grows into a small town, and the small town into a large one. The greater the town, the greater its advantages. It offers roads, railroads, canals; the choice of skilled labour increases constantly, new establishments can be built more cheaply, because of the competition among builders and machinists who are at hand, than in remote country districts, whither timber, machinery, builders, and operatives must be brought; it offers a market to which buyers crowd, and direct communication with the markets supplying raw material or demanding finished goods. Hence the marvelously rapid growth of the great manufacturing towns.

Grown out of and rise above the separation of town and country, unlike simple commodity production, capitalist mode of production based on surplus-value does not rest on the separation but crushes it and unleashes a “generalized urbanization”:

The country, on the other hand, had the advantage that wages are usually lower than in town, and so town and country are in constant competition; and, if the advantage is on the side of the town today, wages sink so low in the country tomorrow that new investments are most profitably made there. But the centralising tendency of manufacture continues in full force, and every new factory built in the country bears in it the germ of a manufacturing town. (Engels, 1845:71)

And only in these new urban form, “commerce and manufacture attain their most complete development” and only in here “the centralisation of property has reached the highest point.” (Engels, 1845:2) Describing the outlook of these great towns, Engels provides a glimpse of Lefebvrian conception of “abstract space” and “contradictory space”: “The brutal indifference” and “the dissolution of mankind into monads” in where one can observe “hard egotism on one hand, and nameless misery on the other, everywhere social warfare, every man's house in a state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the protection of the law” and just wonder how “the whole crazy fabric still hangs together.” (Engels, 1845:57)

So, what is the significance of Lefebvre’s theory? The significance, moreover the difference, does not lie in the discontinuity or a break in thought, on the contrary it

lies in the continuity: *The Critics of Everyday Life* openly refers to the materialist conception history of Marx as he repeatedly discussed and refined up until *Capital*. Lefebvre was right to say that Marxism stands as a critic of everyday life against the idealist conception of humanity, society and history¹¹. Moreover, his phenomenal work *The Production of Space* is actually based on his previous work which concerns itself with Engels' question in a paragraph ago: *The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of Relations of Production* (Lefebvre, 1973). The difference and significance are in the answers he gave, as a result of the transformations that capitalism went by, the transformations which are themselves results of the dynamics described by Marx and Engels, but also a result of the fact that it survived without overcoming its contradictions.

As Engels pictures it in detail, the urban form is the social body (space) of industrial capitalism that holds all the contradictions of process (time) of capitalist production. But, again as he narrates in flesh and blood, urbanization also provides answers to the riddles of capitalist mode of production that Marx laid out in *Capital*: the riddles of M-C-M' cycle (foundation of over-production crisis) and the diminishing of surplus value due to the rise of productivity (the falling rate of profits).

As Marx describes, capitalist production is not simply a commodity production, but is a reproduction process of capital itself in circulation. And as this valorization process is only a contradiction in itself in both directions, it relies on the expansion of the market. There, the constant urbanization possesses the answers again in both directions via the uneven development simply described by Engels. This is the process defined by Lefebvre as the disappearance of nature.¹²

¹¹“The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, **the production of material life** itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, **must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life**. (...) Therefore **in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact** in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance.” (Marx, 1846) “For Marx, of course, the reproduction of the means of production and the continuity of material production do not take place without the reproduction of social relations, any more than life itself takes place without the repetition of everyday motions and actions.” (Lefebvre, 1973:15)

¹² Henri Lefebvre's concept of the "disappearance of nature" refers to the idea that in modern, industrialized societies, nature is increasingly subsumed and transformed by human activities, particularly through urbanization and the development of capitalist economies. Lefebvre argues that as

But, combined with the falling rate of profits and devalorisation of labour set in motion by the increasing productivity and growing constant capital, this urbanization process entails other consequences. “The battle of competition, is fought by the cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities depends, (...) on the productiveness of labour, and this again on the scale of production.” (Marx, 1867) This leads to centralisation: “The smaller capitals, therefore, crowd into spheres of production which Modern Industry has only sporadically or incompletely got hold of,”¹³ and “...an altogether new force comes into play — the credit system, which in its first stages furtively creeps in as the humble assistant of accumulation, drawing into the hands of individual or associated capitalists, by invisible threads, the money resources which lie scattered, over the surface of society, in larger or smaller amounts; but it soon becomes a new and terrible weapon in the battle of competition and is finally transformed into an enormous social mechanism for the centralisation of capitals.” (Marx, 1867:778) So, the financialization of capital through stock markets and giant banks and monopolization of capitalist enterprises through the trusts and cartels were already on horizon hand-in-hand by the time Marx delivered Volume 1. But this centralisation law does not have the ability to maintain the accumulation of capital by itself.

The growing tendency towards stagnation (both out of over-production and falling surplus) has to be overcome by the reproduction of social relations themselves. This takes us back to the expansion of urban form. This expansion entails a vast transportation network consisting of railroads and shipping. It is not a surprise that the giant corporations of the late 19th century era came into being around this transportation network like the steel industry (which will be followed by building companies), coal industry and later oil industry (Braverman, 1974). As this transportation network also freed the cities from depending on the surrounding for food, monopolization of food industry followed, also giving rise to the marketing structure consisting of a network of distribution, advertising, etc. which will set up the example to many other consumer product companies (Braverman, 1974). This is

cities expand and industrial processes dominate, the natural environment is progressively eroded, both physically and symbolically, leading to a world where the distinction between the natural and the artificial becomes blurred or even lost entirely (Lefebvre, 1974).

13 Metaverse, Hepsiburada, Amazon!

the process, at least for the beginning, that Lefebvre describes as: “But what has happened is that capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since the writing of *Capital*, it has succeeded in achieving "growth ". We cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the means: *by occupying space, by producing a space.*” (Lefebvre, 1973:23)

According to Arrighi (1994), within the history of capitalism, this transformation in the late 19th century era marks a new systemic cycle of accumulation (US Regime): While the previous regime faces its limits of “continuing to profit from the reinvestment of capital in the material expansion of the world economy” and like always, financialization takes over the trade and production, the new regime overcame the situation by “internalizing the transaction costs”. What he means by this term is pretty much parallel to Braverman’s framework with regards to organizational structure and Lefebvre’s framework with regards to outwards operations. It is “the internalization within a single organizational domain of activities and transactions previously carried out by separate business units” (Arrighi, 1994:184-185) and “almost nonexistent at the end of the 1870s, these integrated enterprises came to dominate many of the [US’s] most vital industries within less than three decades” (Chandler, 1977: 81-82). They are not originated from manufacturing enterprises but it is the railway companies that “...had pioneered most of the organizational innovations that were to revolutionize the structure of accumulation in the United States, and along with those innovations went a thorough reorganization of distribution through the rise of mass marketers (the mass retailer, the advertising agency, the mail order house, the chain store)...” (Arrighi, 1994:284) What they create is “economy of speed”, hence annihilation of space by time.

These trusts and cartels rising up around transportation network, the scale of their operations, naturally entailed “scientific management” coordinating many branches from design to sales according a total planning, in other words, “the creation of hierarchies of top and middle managers specialized in monitoring and regulating markets and labor processes” (Arrighi, 1994:285). But more importantly, it entails “the centralized state power, with its ubiquitous organs (...) wrought after the plan of

a systematic and hierarchic division of labour.” (Marx, 1871:335) and necessitates “the manipulation of society by the state” (Lefebvre, 1973:34) and leads to “the rise of the real subject, namely state power” (Lefebvre, 1974:85).

In total, this is what Lefebvre meant with the concept “absolute space” as the space of state and the space of capitalist accumulation. *Crédit Mobilier* scandal in USA between 1864 and 1868 sets up the perfect example¹⁴ in which public biddings were secured as monopoly profits, while stock and land speculation were enabled around the construction of a railroad which basically took any direction needed for boosting profits on the map of the continent. What was considered to be a fraud a few years later, in 1872, has become the standard of business in time on every level.

If the factory system and industrial town produced capital which “is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things” (Marx, 1867:932), the railroads (and modern shipping) paved the way to the capitalist modernity as we know it: urban space without a necessity of rural hinterland, rational administration and central planning, national and international networking, a fetish of constant growth, credit system and financial institutions, public bidding and government contracts, and so on.

From here we can actually jump to an actual question with regards to the social agency and class struggle in our age. The relative surplus value is not a late comer of capitalist mode of production, actually it is there from the beginning. In a very beautifully formulated way, Marx pairs this relative surplus value production generated from co-operation with the “real subsumption” of labour under capital. Working for the capitalist is just the “formal subsumption”, as the artisans in the putting out system working for the same merchant separately. It will be replaced by inside contracting in which the merchant put together the artisans in the same place,

14 Shortly: Abraham Lincoln, a former lawyer of railroad companies, pioneered a railroad act to promote and subsidize the construction of a railroad from east to west, linking occasionally existing towns but mostly non-existent ones. Union Pacific, a railroad company which will absorb many other ones in time, is selected for the job. Union Pacific, supported by federal loans and land grants, established *Crédit Mobilier America*. Through contract frauds between two companies, the production of the railroad was overbilled as well as stock manipulation and land speculation were enabled around the project (White, 2011).

has more control over them but still a formal way of subsumption. Only when it evolves to the factory system, while the artisans lose control over the process of production, the capital has full control over their activity, over their movement as an agent of administration without whose authority the production process seems to be impossible. As the capitalist production, as a reproduction of capital itself, starts to rely heavily on commodification of social and public spheres as well as commodity production in the factory, even put voluntary work and social media to use in that regard, can we discuss that a “real subsumption” of the society and “the social” under capital for today as Negri discusses?

1.4. The Socio-Political Context of the Study: The Social Transformation after 1970s

The post-World War II period between late 1940s and the early 1970s is often referred as the "Golden Age of Capitalism." It was a period of economic growth and expansion characterized by high industrial production. Industrialization of warfare (and militarization of production, per contra) in World War II played a pivotal role in shaping the postwar economic landscape: It drove technological and industrial productivity, established the United States as a dominant global power, fostered the militarization of economies, and led to the creation of transnational institutions of trade and national welfare states:

- The demand for war materials led to innovations in manufacturing processes, which were later adapted for peacetime industries. The war accelerated scientific research and development, particularly in fields like electronics, aviation, and nuclear energy. These innovations had widespread applications in civilian industries post-war (Stokesbury, 1980). The development and use of assembly lines, mass production techniques, and new materials during the war contributed significantly to postwar productivity (Overy, 1994). Innovations in transportation and communication, as well as manufacturing, significantly boosted industrial output too (Hobsbawm, 1994)
- The USA emerged from WWII as the world's leading economic and military power. It accounted for a significant portion of global industrial production and had the strongest military infrastructure. The U.S. dollar became the

dominant international currency, further cementing this position (Kennedy, 1987) Practically being the factory of Allied war effort, “United States Gross National Product grew by 52 percent between 1939 and 1944 (...) industrial output tripled, and even consumer spending increased... given the American advantages of abundant raw materials, superb transportation and technological infrastructure, a large and skilled labor force, and, most importantly, two large ocean barriers to bar bombing of its industries.” (Gropman: 1996:2-3) “United States came to enjoy a virtual monopoly of world liquidity. In 1947, its gold reserves were 70 per cent of the world’s total. (...) In 1938 US national income was already about the same as the combined national incomes of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, and almost three times that of the USSR. But in 1948 it was more than twice that of the above-mentioned group of Western European countries, and more than six times that of the USSR. (Arrighi, 1994:284)

- WWII led to the creation of a permanent military-industrial complex, particularly in the United States. But it is not specific for the United States: “Germany, once it abandoned its Blitzkrieg strategy, increased its productivity more than the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, and despite German attacks on Britain and the Soviet Union, these states performed outstandingly too.” (Gropman: 1996:2-3) This military-industrial complex played a crucial role in the economy, influencing policy and industrial priorities. The mobilization for war saw unprecedented government intervention in economies, with substantial investments in military infrastructure and research. (Eisenhower, 1961) Military efforts and advancement in productivity has a long history embedded in the history of civilization, WWII is just an accelerated example of this relation with the precursors of key elements of today’s world outlook from large scale transportation with containers to SUV cars, from the rise of Silicon Valley to usage of computers and internet connection. High levels of defense spending continued into the Cold War, driving technological innovation and industrial growth. This military Keynesianism contributed to sustained economic expansion in the postwar period (Hooks, 1991).

- This was surely a period of “material expansion” (Arrighi, 1994): Increased production capacity and technological innovation (labor productivity in general) prioritized investment in tangible assets and production facilities over financial instruments and speculative activities. During periods of material expansion, capital accumulation rests on expansion of world trade with a focus on building and expanding physical infrastructure, such as railways and shipping routes as well as factories. The Bretton Woods Conference, officially known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, was held in July 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA. The conference led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now part of the World Bank Group. (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993) The most important key element of the conference was establishing Bretton Woods System. The "gold standard" in which a country pegs its currency's value to the price of gold to be able to facilitate international trade by providing a stable and predictable exchange rate system was nothing new, although it has gone through certain changes. In The Bretton Woods system, the U.S. dollar was fixed to gold at \$35 per ounce, and other currencies were pegged to the dollar which effectively made the U.S. dollar the world's primary reserve currency (Bordo, 1993) while newly found IMF and World Bank oversee the international monetary system and provide financial assistance for reconstruction and development.
- The end of World War II marked the beginning of a widespread decolonization process in which India and Pakistan (1947), numerous African countries including Ghana (1957), Nigeria (1960), and Algeria (1962), countries in Middle-East and Asia like Indonesia (1949), Vietnam (1954), and Egypt (1956) saw the end of colonial rule. While promoting decolonization, the U.S. aimed to counter Soviet influence in newly independent states by supporting pro-Western regimes and policies. This was not merely a political process but as part of the broader aspect of capital accumulation, a response to the changing needs of global capitalism and the restructuring of the world economy, a shift from territorial imperialism to a more decentralized and market-based global system led by US hegemony within the concept of Cold

War. Decolonization facilitated the integration of newly independent states into the global capitalist economy through mechanisms such as direct foreign investment, international trade agreements, and the influence of institutions like the IMF, World Bank and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) (Arrighi, 1994).

- Just as Keynes was a key figure in Bretton Woods conference, Keynesianism was a key element of international policies with its emphasis on government intervention in stabilizing the economy and promoting “full employment” through fiscal and monetary policies, in other words, building of welfare states. Governments introduced social security, healthcare, and education reforms to ensure social stability and reduce the appeal of radical ideologies by providing a buffer against the economic fluctuations. (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hobsbawm, 1994) Two key elements can be seen as government spending on infrastructure and welfare spending. As the rise in labor productivity enhance capital accumulation in this period, Infrastructure projects funded by the state absorbs some of this surplus capital to create new markets and facilitating the circulation of capital which otherwise tends towards stagnation. (Baran & Sweezy, 1966) They also provide immediate employment and enhance the productivity of private capital further by improving transportation, communication, and utilities. (Braverman, 1974) Welfare spending, on the other hand, absorbs surplus labor and reduce the social tensions caused by unemployment and poverty (Baran & Sweezy, 1966), helps to maintain social stability by providing a safety net for the working class (Braverman, 1974). On an international plan, alongside with direct capital investment in manufacture, The Marshall Plan (which is originally named European Recovery Program and targeting the recovery of Western Europe after war) and similar US financial aids were instrumental in the reconstruction of nation-states' economies as such, also leading to the creation of institutions like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Milward, 1984).

In the aftermath of WWII, Keynesian utopia prevails. Keynes was very optimistic about the work life of his grandchildren as he writes, “three-hour shifts or a fifteen-

hour week may put off the problem for a great while” at the end of his century in which most jobs will be about public and service industries... when the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance...” Thanks to the decades of surplus extraction which pushed the productivity of labor to sky high, “all kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard.” (Keynes, 1930:370) In 1960s, his utopic vision was being echoed on TV (one of the symbols of this new society), as the spaceship “USS Enterprise” of *Star Trek* was wandering the universe with highly scientific and totally peaceful missions in the name of a united human race. It was the same myth and vision dominated the academy, as in the mainstream claims of diminishing of alienation by advanced technology (Blauner, 1964).

Indeed, this period witnessed a steady increase in real wages due to numerous factors all related with the economic landscape summarized above: improvements in industrial processes (Maddison, 1991), an increased need for a more educated and skilled workforce (Goldin, & Katz, 2008), fiscal stimulus, social security programs, public investment in infrastructure and education and welfare policies providing a safety net that enhanced workers' bargaining power and consumption capacity (Esping-Andersen, 1990). But, interrelated with all these structural factors and the political atmosphere of post-war, the rise of social movements, strong labor unions and effective collective bargaining was the dynamo of this progress in life standards of working class (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Many reasons like disillusionment with fascism and authoritarianism (Hobsbawm, 1994), role of socialists in the resistance movement during the war (Judt, 2005) as well as recognition of the contributions of workers to the war effort (Fraser, 1984), widespread demand for reconstruction and reform after the devastation of war (Esping-Andersen, 1990), Cold War politics promoting social reforms and labor rights by western governments against Soviet Union on one hand, Soviet Union's support for leftist movements on the other (Westad, 2005) contributed to this convenient atmosphere for social movements.

Charles Tilly (2004) strongly emphasizes the interplay of structural changes, political opportunities, and organizational capacities in explaining the emergence and success of social movements in this period:

- This period of prosperity created a fertile ground for social movements as people had more resources and time to engage in collective action.
- Rapid urbanization and industrialization brought people together in cities and factories, facilitating communication, organization, and collective identity formation.
- Tilly argues that social movements are more likely to arise when political opportunities expand. The post-war period saw significant changes in political structures, a growing emphasis on human rights, equality, and social justice. The success of the Allied powers in World War II, framed as a victory for democracy and freedom, raised expectations for social and political rights, inspiring movements for civil rights, gender equality, and decolonization.
- Advances in communication technologies, such as radio, television, and later, the telephone, enhanced the ability of social movements to disseminate information, coordinate actions, and mobilize support across wide geographic areas.

Just as the rise of real wages, Post-War year also saw a fast decrease in unemployment worldwide with the immediate reconstruction after the war facilitated by initiatives like the Marshall Plan followed by the years of economic boom in 1950s (Eichengreen, 2007). While specific yearly global unemployment data are scarce and the unemployment rate was fluctuating year-to-year as always, U.S. Census Bureau provides some numbers aligned with the general trend: In 1946, U.S. unemployment was approximately 3.9%, it fell down to a historic rate of 2.9% in 1953. (Gordon, 2016) But, the unemployment rates also mark the emerging challenges and limits of this “golden age”, as we observe a rise towards the end of 1960s. In 1971, U.S. unemployment was already around 5.9%. The crisis embedded in the structural conflicts of capital accumulation approached as fast as the speed of material expansion itself and it was already knocking at the door at end of 1960s marked by various discontents and revolts. 1970s started as a time of political crisis which raises questions of transformation and paradigm shift in almost every country as well as within newly found transnational institutions. As the period of economic

expansion following the Second World War gradually has come to an end, a disenchantment from hegemonic discourses of development and dissolution of welfare states (and the international aid programs within the welfare conception) occurred.

The tipping point, the event known as *Nixon Shock*, was directly related to where it was all started and institutionalized: In 1971, United States terminated Bretton Woods system, thus the fixed convertibility of US Dollar to gold. This is a necessary measure against overvaluation of the U.S. dollar in the face of the persistent trade deficits, the cost of the Vietnam War, expansive fiscal policies to sustain the system, stagflation (stagnation of economic growth combined by high inflation) (Frieden, 2006). One of the pillars of Bretton Woods was USA's acting as the central bank of the system with the significant trade surplus just after the war and the other pillar was "its military aid to foreign governments and direct US military expenditures abroad" (Arrighi, 1994) providing the necessary liquidity for the world trade. This state of affairs began to change as a natural result of its process:

- Western Europe and Japan became more competitive in global markets. This shift led to increasing U.S. trade deficits, meaning the U.S. was importing more than it was exporting, leading to an outflow of dollars to other countries. This created an imbalance in the international monetary system as the U.S. had to supply a significant amount of dollars to the rest of the world (Frieden, 2006).
- The Vietnam War significantly strained U.S. finances. The war effort required substantial government spending, which contributed to budget deficits and inflation (Heller, 1967).
- The fiscal policies led by Keynesian domestic spending aimed at social reforms and poverty reduction, as well as low level of interest rates pressured to enable capital investments in production, contributed to high inflation (Patterson, 1996).
- All these factors led to an oversupply of dollars in the global economy. This, in return, led to speculation on the currency. Countries and investors increasingly converted their dollar holdings into gold, depleting U.S. gold reserves (Eichengreen, 2008).

On August 15, 1971, US President Richard Nixon announced the suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold, effectively ending the Bretton Woods system. The suspension was intended to address the immediate problem of gold outflows and dollar overvaluation. This move, known as the Nixon Shock, led to the transition to a system of floating exchange rates. (Eichengreen, 2008) But as always, the laid scheme has unintended consequences: "...continuous changes in exchange rates among the main national currencies and in rate of interest differentials multiplied the opportunities for capital held in off shore money markets to expand through trade and speculation in currencies. (...) by the mid-1970s the volume of purely monetary transactions carried out in off shore money markets already exceeded the value of world trade many times over. From then on the financial expansion became unstoppable. According to one estimate, by 1979 foreign exchange trading amounted to \$17.5 trillion, or more than eleven times the total value of world trade (\$1.5 trillion)..." (Arrighi, 1994:307-308) So, once again, the material expansion period led to a financialization period as a result of "the characteristic reaction of capital to the intensification of competitive pressures which have invariably ensued from all major expansions of world trade and production." (Arrighi, 1994)

The Nixon Shock marks the new phase of a very long history of transformation of commodity money to fiat money, a further abstraction of money-form. Fiat money is the type of currency not backed by a physical commodity like gold or silver, governments maintain its value solely through regulation and control of the money supply. The shift to fiat money allowed central banks greater flexibility in managing monetary policy, enabling the expansion of credit system without which capitalism could not be developed in the first place. So, this was the dawn of a new financialization period with further increased role of the state as an active economic agent as the sole guarantor of the value of money and the flow of credits with it.

We can say that "the tendency of the rate of profit to fall" (Marx, 1894:317) was at the heart of this cycle, where investment in constant capital (technology, infrastructure, built environment all of which raises the productivity of labor) relative to variable capital (labor itself) leads to a reduced rate of profit as the labor is the source of surplus value. This can also be expressed from a reverse perspective: Prices

of inputs needed for industrial production, hence the raw material and labor, becomes expensive for the capital relatively to the output of the production process, hence the commodities. It creates an upward pressure on the capital accumulation process. This pressure was indeed in play approaching the end of 1960s, beginning with the rise in real wages, or “pay explosion” (Brown, 1975) as defined by the mainstream economists of time. But, “...whereas before 1968 they rose more slowly than labor productivity (...), between 1968 and 1973 they rose much faster, thereby provoking a major contraction in returns to capital invested in trade and production.” (Arrighi, 1994:303) Other facets of this pressure would follow like the doubling in the price of oil between 1970-1973. This price pressure was also accompanied by a counter tendency, sudden drops in the prices of some intermediate industrial inputs like the 1973 steel crisis: As the capital was flowing away from production towards the money market more and more, the demand for steel suddenly fell beyond expectations, the market was saturated by over-produced steel. The bankruptcy of steel industry was then followed by a general stock market crash.¹⁵

The ongoing crisis made it clear: There were sure signs of over-production, nothing seems to be “sustainable” and investment in production cannot maintain surplus extraction at enough rate for capital accumulation anymore. Marx (1863) defines crisis as “the forcible establishment of unity between elements [“moments”] that have become independent and the enforced separation from one another of elements

¹⁵ There were also a number of international conflicts, most notably *Yom Kippur War* in Middle-East which largely contributed the global energy crisis of 1973. Actually, Nixon shock turned out to be an indirect attack on oil producer nations by causing a sudden decrease in oil prices. While there were no overproduction or over-accumulation problem, and the mass commodity production was in full force after the second world war, those oil producer nations used to enjoy a steady increase in oil prices. But when the market is fed with commodities, their values tended to fall, so does the rates of profit with the increased productivity. Nixon Shock was also an allotment of this fall onto those nations, among other things. The oil embargo on West by Arab countries in 1973 was a retail to Nixon Shock as much as it was about Israel and Yom Kippur War. The results of this political action were unintended, on some parts opposite of its original intentions. It strengthened the place of US in West as an already oil producing country and empowered Brezhnev regime as Russia was a large oil producer, too. But at the same time, it accelerated the integration of USSR into world market via the exchange of their energy resources with the opportunity of profitable deals for them. We may argue that it paved the way of a faster dissolution in the future (as this profitable state of market on behalf of USSR could not be maintained forever) and also the formation of energy oligarchs dominating Russia (and Azerbaijan) who are playing their part in the global arena today. On the other hand, it did not go as intended for Arab countries as the dependence on Middle East oil started to be handled as a problem in the West. And as part of a solution to that problem, it had also political effects on South American states as the rising playground of energy source extraction.

which are essentially one”.¹⁶ The second part of this definition had clearly being observed in every subsequent resort in the circulation of capital at the time: the balance between the labor market and the rates of profits, the balance between the productivity of labor and the consumer market, the balance between the prices of raw material commodities, energy sources and user products are all disturbed, deranged and in turbulence. There comes the end of post-World War economic expansion period alongside with the welfare state policies that had been taking care of social needs and public life with a portion of the surplus produced in the factory floors.

Following “neo-liberal” period would be simply “the establishment of unity” by absorbing that portion of surplus back into capital. In order to maintain circulation of capital now accumulated The market should be expanded once more by “the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society.” (Marx, 1867) This time, as there is no more “new worlds” to be discovered and the old one had already been destructed by a total war and reconstructed recently (the main reason of the “golden age”), what is going to be colonized and included in the market by this “brute force” will be daily life, nature, public sphere, public sector that had already absorbed a portion of past surplus, even human body and all the other things that started to be discussed in academic literature frequently with the titles “colonization of...” after 70’s. That was a process of deeper capital penetration in the social space and time in order to keep the relations of production (society) intact.

In short, obstruction in surplus production in one hand and the problem of capital over-accumulation on the other necessitated the expansion of commodification, so-called colonization of “lifeworld” (Habermas, 1981), daily life, public sphere, knowledge etc., paving the way for financial capital to be able to speculate on this expended market of commodities.

There can be no more time or space “lived outside of modern production” (Debord,1967) or a public space based on the expenditure of surplus in order to

¹⁶ This definition relates to the root cause of crisis: a commodity having an independent form of existence in money, hence, the internal opposition within the commodity between use-value and exchange-value. This manifests itself through various oppositions within commodity circulation (Marx, 1863). We can say that “material expansion periods” and “financialization periods”, two phases of capitalist accumulation following each other as defined by Arrighi (1994) are also external manifestation of this contradiction.

reproduce society separately from the time and space of commodity production: “...while unproductive labor has declined outside the grasp of capital, it has increased within its ambit.” (Braverman, 1974)¹⁷ Any human interaction, including one’s relationship to one’s self through own body, is now the arena of capitalist production. The marketization of every sphere of human life including basic education, public health, etc. as well as knowledge, entertainment or leisure time, necessitated the management of them as capital management. The society is reproduced, re-constructed and re-built in the image of capital (“human sources”) time and again within the circulation.

In 1973, the famous Trilateral Commission, a think-tank organization including North America (US and Canada), Western Europe and Japan is founded in the lead of David Rockefeller (Gill, 1992). Its first report was written by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki and published in 1975, titled *The Crisis of Democracy: On the Governability of Democracies*. Many of the concepts and dominating paradigm in politics in following decades, like “steady governments”, “small and effective state” and so on, were represented in this declaration of class war aiming “to restore the prestige and authority of central government institutions”. According to the report, if there has been any democratic success story up to that

¹⁷ Braverman, coming from a working-class and trade-unionist background, argues about the same transformation that most of social theorist argues at that period in his book *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (1974) which may well be the clearest analysis of what was going on based on a detailed examination of capitalist production. Of course, here he speaks about unproductive labor from the perspective of capitalist production, although he also demonstrates the contradictions of capital about productivity following the double meaning of productive-unproductive labor distinction of Marx: “Labor may thus be unproductive simply because it takes place outside the capitalist mode of production, or because, while taking place within it, it is used by the capitalist, in his drive for accumulation, for unproductive rather than productive functions. And it is now clear that *while unproductive labor has declined outside the grasp of capital, it has increased within its ambit*. The great mass of labor which was reckoned as unproductive because it did not work for capital has now been transformed into a mass of labor which is unproductive because it works for capital, and because the needs of capital for unproductive labor have increased so remarkably. The more productive capitalist industry has become—that is to say, the greater the mass of surplus value it extracts from the productive population—the greater has become the mass of capital seeking its shares in this surplus. And the greater the mass of capital, the greater the mass of unproductive activities which serve only the diversion of this surplus and its distribution among various capitals. Modern bourgeois economics has completely lost the power to treat the question of productive and unproductive labor, in part because of this historical change. (...) ever since the mass of unproductive labor has been virtually destroyed outside the corporation and recreated on a different foundation within it (...) the very idea of the “wealth of nations” has faded, to be supplanted by the concept of “prosperity,” a notion which has nothing to do with the efficacy of labor in producing useful goods and services, but refers rather to the velocity of flow within the circuits of capital and commodities in the marketplace.” (Braverman, 1974).

date, it would be in these Trilateral countries, “involving a lessening of class conflict and the assimilation of substantial portions of the population to middle-class values, attitudes, and consumption patterns; and successful resistance, on a collective and individual basis, to the challenges posed externally by Soviet military might and internally by communist party strength.” This was quite a summary of what had been going on from a hegemonic perspective. But, they add, “this happy congruence of circumstances for democracy has come to an end”. Why? Because there is a “overloading of governments” which means according to the report:

(1) the involvement of an increasing proportion of the population in political activity; (2) the development of new groups and of new consciousness on the part of old groups, including youth, regional groups, and ethnic minorities; (3) the diversification of the political means and tactics which groups use to secure their ends; (4) an increasing expectation on the part of groups that government has the responsibility to meet their needs; and (5) an escalation in what they conceive those needs to be.

What is to be done was obvious in the face of social discontent: The politics should be freed from the “overload” of the social demands so that the state authority can be restored. With this restored authority of state, the economy could be on its way without any disturbance. The report goes on and on stating a number of political facts we are facing today: eliminating of small parties, establishing “principal parties” of the regimes as the sole ground of politics, establishing presidential systems, etc. It was not a conspiracy of this commission, of course. The report was just echoing what had been already in progress and the only way to be able to reproduce and maintain existing relationships of production. What they mean by the restored authority of state is “the illusory "general" interest in the form of the State” (Marx, 1846) as the paragraph from the report above makes it clear when emphasizing on how people conceive what their needs are and stating the increase on expectations and diversity of those needs. And the existing division of labor cannot be maintained if it cannot be represented as the general interest of the society.

The above discussion on the social agency, transformation and action after 1970s has been reached through this historical context. 15-16 June Uprising was sparked by direct political measures, which are in line with the attitude in the Trilateral

Commission report, against the working class which is well organized during the post-World War industrialization and urbanization of Turkey. But the years after the uprising had witnessed a sharp transformation, not only in terms of the conditions led to that moment, but also in terms of the composure and structure of its agents as well as the urban form the events took place in.

CHAPTER 2

A WAR OF POSITION: 15-16 JUNE 1970 WORKERS' UPRISING

2.1. Historical Context: Urbanization, Migration and Industrialization in Turkey after Second World War

Between 1950 and 1970, Turkey underwent significant transformations characterized by rapid urbanization, substantial internal migration, and burgeoning industrialization. These processes were interlinked reshaping the socio-economic landscape of the country and they are also highly related with the international dynamics of the post-war world. The accumulation regime characterized by economic aid, FDI, technology transfer, and global trade integration, influenced Turkey's socio-economic trajectory.

The country's adaptation of global economic strategies, such as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), and its integration into international markets, facilitated its transformation from a largely agrarian society to an increasingly industrialized and urbanized country. The discussed international accumulation regime under the control of Bretton Woods institutions facilitated flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer between these years, crucial for Turkey's industrialization:

- The United States, under the Marshall Plan, provided substantial economic aid to European countries and their allies, including Turkey. This aid was aimed at rebuilding war-torn economies, fostering economic stability, and curbing the spread of communism. Turkey, as a strategic ally, received economic and military assistance, which supported its industrialization and modernization efforts (Tekeli, 1982).
- Turkey's participation in global trade increased, facilitated by bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. The country's export-oriented industries grew,

particularly textiles and agricultural products, which found markets in Europe and the Middle East.

- The geopolitical context of the Cold War also played its role. As a NATO member and a strategic ally of the West, Turkey received economic support and favorable trade conditions, reinforcing its integration into the Western economic bloc.
- In line with many developing countries during this period, Turkey adopted an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy. This approach sought to reduce dependency on imported goods by promoting domestic industries and manufacturing. The ISI strategy was influenced by global economic trends and the experiences of other nations, particularly in Latin America, where ISI had been implemented with varying degrees of success. The global shift towards protectionism and state-led economic planning after the war provided a framework that Turkey adapted to its own economic policies (Keyder, 1987).
- The international accumulation regime also facilitated flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer, crucial for Turkey's industrialization. Turkey attracted FDI from Western countries, particularly in sectors like textiles, automotive, and electronics. Multinational corporations established manufacturing bases in Turkey, bringing in capital, technology, and managerial expertise. This influx was part of a broader strategy by Western firms to access new markets and cheap labor in developing countries within the context of post-war economic boom (Kasaba, 1993).
- The post-war era saw significant technology transfer from developed to developing countries. In Turkey, this included machinery, industrial processes, and expertise in manufacturing. The establishment of joint ventures and licensing agreements led to modernization and adaptation of mass production.
- The global economic system also encouraged labor mobility. The global demand for labor in industrializing and industrialized countries led to significant migration patterns. In Turkey, the shift from agriculture to industry and services was accompanied by massive rural-to-urban migration. This internal migration was not only driven by domestic economic

opportunities but also influenced by global labor market trends (Kıray, 1972). In other words, the workers' migration to Germany and other countries and the migration from rural areas to Istanbul and other big cities are the same totality.

- Urbanization was both a cause and consequence of industrialization. As cities grew, they became centers of consumer markets, attracting further investment and facilitating economic activities. This urban growth mirrored global patterns where cities became the focal points of economic and cultural life, driving economic development as we discussed in theoretical framework.

Within this international context, the period between 1950 and 1970 was a transformative era for Turkey, marked by significant urbanization, migration, and industrialization. These processes reshaped the country's socio-economic fabric, leading to long-term changes in Turkish society. As we will discuss, the complexities and interdependencies of these phenomena lays the ground of workers' movement and 15-16 June Uprising, but more importantly, the economic regime boosting this holistic process also contains the nucleus of further contradictions and dissolution of itself, such as *gecekondu* movement, privatization of industry and services, urban transformation, land speculation, construction-led economy and "culture wars". As the history never lacks irony, those same elements will play the central role in transformation of class struggle and social movements discussed in this thesis.

2.2. Growth by Producing and Occupying Space in the Example of Post-War Period Istanbul

The processes of urbanization, migration, and industrialization were deeply interconnected. Industrialization spurred urban growth by creating jobs that attracted rural migrants. In turn, urbanization fueled further industrial expansion by providing a labor force and markets for industrial products. This cyclical relationship was central to Turkey's socio-economic transformation during this period (Kasaba, 1993).

The Turkish government, post-1950, adopted various policies aimed at industrial growth. These included state-led industrialization, import substitution strategies, and

investments in key sectors like textiles, machinery, and chemicals. The government established several State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) to spearhead this industrialization effort, including Petkim and Erdemir, which were crucial for developing the petrochemical and steel industries, respectively (Kasaba, 1993).

The period also witnessed substantial growth in industries such as textiles, automotive, and electronics. The textile industry became a significant export sector, capitalizing on Turkey's comparative advantage in cotton production and labor costs (Keyder, 1987). Industrialization created numerous job opportunities, leading to an increase in urban employment. However, it also brought challenges with inadequate working conditions, and socio-economic disparities. The rapid industrialization often outpaced the establishment of adequate labor protections, leading to issues such as low wages and poor working environments (Tekeli, 1982).

In line with the international system, Turkey's governmental policies on industrialization were resting on ISI and SEEs:

- To protect nascent domestic industries from foreign competition, the Turkish government imposed high tariffs on imported goods. These tariffs made imported products more expensive, encouraging consumers to buy domestically produced goods. Additionally, non-tariff barriers such as import quotas and licensing requirements were implemented to further restrict foreign competition (Keyder, 1987).
- The Turkish government provided subsidies and financial incentives to encourage domestic production. These included low-interest loans, tax breaks, and direct subsidies to SEEs and private enterprises engaged in manufacturing. This financial support was crucial in reducing production costs and making domestically produced goods competitive in the local market (Tekeli, 1982).
- The ISI strategy emphasized the development of capital-intensive and basic industries, such as steel, chemicals, and machinery, which were essential for the country's infrastructure and industrial needs. This focus was intended to build a strong industrial base that could support broader economic development and diversification (Keyder, 1987).

- The government played a proactive role in establishing and funding State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in these critical industries. For instance, the establishment of Petkim in 1965 was a significant step towards creating a domestic petrochemical industry, which provided essential raw materials for various other sectors (Kasaba, 1993). Similarly, Erdemir, established in 1965, became a major producer of iron and steel, supporting the construction and manufacturing sectors. While Etibank was established earlier, it expanded its operations significantly in the 1950s and 1960s to support the mining and metallurgy sectors. The enterprise focused on exploiting Turkey's mineral resources, including boron, chromium, and copper and was critical for supplying raw materials to other industries and reducing the need for mineral imports (Tekeli&İlkin,1993). Turkish Electricity Institution (*Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu*, TEK) was established to manage electricity generation and distribution across Turkey. The creation of TEK was a response to the growing energy needs of an urbanizing and industrializing country (Kasaba, 1993).

The ISI strategy led to the establishment of new industries primarily in urban areas. Cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir became industrial hubs, attracting a significant influx of rural migrants seeking employment. During this period, Turkey experienced an unprecedented rate of urbanization. The urban population increased substantially, with cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir expanding rapidly. According to Tekeli (1982). the urbanization rate doubled, transforming Turkey from a predominantly rural society into an increasingly urban one.

The rapid influx of migrants into urban areas strained existing infrastructure and housing. This led to the proliferation of informal settlements (*gecekondu*), as the demand for affordable housing outpaced supply. The urbanization process also placed significant pressure on urban services such as water supply, electricity, and transportation systems, leading to challenges in urban planning and management (Tekeli, 1982).

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expanding rapidly. According to Tekeli (1982), the urbanization rate doubled, transforming Turkey from a predominantly rural society into an increasingly urban one.

- Migration led to depopulation and labor shortages in rural regions, impacting agricultural production and causing demographic shifts. The outmigration often left behind an aging population, altering the social fabric of rural communities (Keyder, 1987).
- The surge in urban populations resulted in overcrowded cities, with significant challenges in housing, sanitation, and employment (Kıray, 1972). The rapid influx of migrants into urban areas strained existing infrastructure and housing. This led to the proliferation of informal settlements (*gecekondu*), as the demand for affordable housing outpaced supply. The urbanization process also placed significant pressure on urban services such as water supply, electricity, and transportation systems, leading to challenges in urban planning and management (Tekeli, 1982).

In this sense, TEK was an embodiment of the unity between urbanization, industrialization and migration as a response to these needs, in return boosting industry and urbanization further. As in that example, once again all became possible by occupying and producing space with the agency of the state. The Turkish government implemented a series of policies aimed at promoting urban development during the 1950-1970 period. These policies were multifaceted, targeting infrastructure expansion, housing development, and economic restructuring to accommodate and sustain the growing urban population.

Government prioritized the development of transportation infrastructure as a key element of its broader economic and urban development strategy. This period saw extensive investments in expanding and modernizing the country's roadways, railways, and public transportation systems:

- The government undertook significant road construction projects aimed at improving the national highway network. This included the construction of new highways and the expansion of existing ones, particularly around major

urban centers such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.¹⁸ These highways facilitated the efficient movement of goods and people, which was crucial for industrial growth and urbanization (Tekeli, 1982). They would also play a significant role in the actions during 15-16 Haziran as they were built as the axis of industrial sites for product and labor movement.

- In urban centers, the development of public transportation systems, including buses and trams, was a key focus. The introduction and expansion of these systems made daily commuting easier for urban residents, supporting the labor needs of growing industries (Kiray, 1972).
- Alongside roadways, the railway network was also expanded and modernized. Railways played a vital role in transporting raw materials and finished goods, particularly for industries located in inland urban areas (Keyder, 1987). The enhanced railway network supported the logistics of industrial operations, allowing industries to source raw materials from various parts of the country and distribute products to both domestic and international markets. This was particularly important for heavy industries that relied on bulk transportation.
- The expansion of public transportation was often accompanied by urban planning initiatives aimed at integrating transport networks with residential and commercial zones. This helped manage the spatial growth of cities and supported the establishment of new urban districts, further accommodating the increasing urban population. The land speculation, suburb construction and urban transformation as we know it also came to forth around these roads: “Land speculators parcel out all the fields, lengthwise and horizontally, from Haydarpaşa to İzmit, from Sirkeci to Silivri, calling it the Ankara-Istanbul highway or the Istanbul-London asphalt, and sell them to the public with various attractive advertisement forms and payment facilities.” (Sayar, 1953).

These investments set the stage for further urban expansion in the decades to follow, but of course transportation is not the sole focus of government policies addressing

¹⁸ Expanding London Asphalt and naming it Marshall Avenue also captures the transformation of the period and international dynamics, we will elaborate on that later.

the issue. The government expanded educational and healthcare facilities in urban areas to support the growing population (Kıray, 1972). To address the socio-economic challenges of rapid urbanization, including poverty and unemployment, the government introduced various social welfare programs with the spirit of Keynesian economics (Keyder, 1987). The government also prioritized the expansion of essential utilities, such as electricity and water supply, which were critical for supporting both residential and industrial growth. The establishment of the Turkish Electricity Institution in 1970 to support industries and residential needs of energy sources was one example (Kasaba, 1993). Investments in sanitation and waste management infrastructure were also essential components of developing urban planning (Keyder, 1987).

But establishing housing projects which includes incentives for private sector was the real complementary policy topic next to the transportation investments. As urban populations grew, the demand for housing surged, prompting the Turkish government to implement various housing policies aimed at accommodating this growth and managing urban expansion.

- The government initiated large-scale housing projects to provide affordable housing to the growing urban population. These initiatives were particularly aimed at low-income families and migrants from rural areas, who often settled in informal housing (*gecekondu*) due to the lack of affordable alternatives. State-sponsored housing projects were part of a broader strategy to formalize and regulate urban development, reducing the prevalence of informal settlements (Kıray, 1972). The phenomena of *gecekondu* has been one underlying factor of worker's organization and every aspect of this issue, whether it is the relevant autonomy of social bonds in these neighborhoods, state invention of them or the shortcomings of housing policies would be a decisive factor on the characteristics of social movements and political participation.
- To coordinate housing and urban infrastructure development, the government established planning agencies that focused on creating comprehensive urban plans. These plans included zoning regulations, land use planning, and the development of new urban districts (Keyder, 1987).

- Alongside public housing projects, the government encouraged private sector participation in housing development. This included providing incentives such as tax breaks, low-interest loans, and subsidies to private developers. The aim was to stimulate the construction of a diverse range of housing types, from low-income to middle-income housing, catering to the needs of different socio-economic groups (Kasaba, 1993).
- To further facilitate housing development, the government implemented regulatory reforms that streamlined the process of land acquisition and construction. These reforms were intended to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and make it easier for both public and private entities to undertake large-scale housing projects. This regulatory environment also aimed to attract foreign capital investment in the construction sector (Tekeli, 1982).

This context was reflected and materialized in Istanbul's outlook as the industrial hub, later expanding to other cities in Marmara region and set the stage for the incoming 15-16 June Uprising. These are not only the years of heavy labour migration from rural areas, but also migration years for capitalist companies and families that grew by trade and the seizure of non-Muslim possessions through Anatolia during and after independence war. Sabancı family moved Akbank from Adana to Istanbul in 1954 and Koç family turned their business operations into a conglomerate legally in 1963 and moved its center from Ankara to Istanbul soon after, in 1964 (Sönmez, 1996).

Between capital and labour migration which are strongly tied, the demographic transformation was more stratified, complex and contradictory than it is usually pictured, accompanied by not only dispossession in rural areas but also dispossession within the urban center and emergence of a new middle-class population. This third aspect of migration is an inseparable part of the whole process with the first two. It is not a surprise that the start of capital migration was soon followed by 6-7 September 1955 Istanbul Pogrom which constitutes another moment.¹⁹ Although a detailed

¹⁹ Moment in Lefebvrian terms focuses on uprisings and challenges against the existing regimes, they are seen and discussed with a kind of revolutionary optimistic perspective. This seems to be a weakness of the conception, as the examples like Istanbul Pogrom are excluded from Lefebvre's and

historical analysis of the event is not in the scope of this thesis, it is closely related with the context of social transformation in discussion. The 1955 Istanbul Pogrom, also known as the "Istanbul Riots" or "Septemvriana," refers to a coordinated attack and violence on the Greek minority in Istanbul that took place on September 6-7, 1955 and was initially triggered by the false news that the house of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki had been bombed (Vryonis, 2005). Mobs targeted Greek homes, businesses, churches, and schools, resulting in widespread destruction, physical assaults, and several deaths. While the primary victims were Greeks, other minorities, including Armenians and Jews, were also affected. According to Fikret Başkaya (2009), the pogrom was not merely an outbreak of ethnic violence but a state-sponsored event aimed at diverting the working class's attention from rising social and economic issues by scapegoating the Greek minority and it should be seen in the context of the bourgeoisie's attempt to homogenize the nation-state. It is another discussion how organized the pogrom was, it certainly can be seen as a pivotal moment that accelerated the ethnic homogenization of Istanbul, leading to significant shifts in the city's social and economic fabric. Focusing on this aspect, Taner Timur (1994), has analyzed the aftermath of the pogrom, arguing that it marked a critical point in the forced transformation of Istanbul from a cosmopolitan city to one that was more ethnically and culturally homogeneous. The violence and subsequent exodus of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews facilitated the consolidation of a Turkish bourgeoisie, minority-owned properties and businesses were often taken over by Turkish nationals and this transfer of wealth and property significantly altered the economic landscape of the city, contributing to the rise of a new class of Turkish entrepreneurs who benefited from the removal of minority competition.

Both Başkaya (2009) and Timur (1994) underscore the role of this event as a tool to reinforce nationalist ideology and maintain control over the working class through a united Turkish identity that excluded and oppressed ethnic minorities. Yet, the same process also led to new urban tensions through another wave of diversification, marginalization and exclusion (Erder, 1997) within this supposedly unified identity.

other Lefebvrian theorists' discussion of movements and moments although they fit into the defined characteristics of a moment. This issue deserves a lengthy discussion in itself but it will be also an important point to consider when I will discuss these characteristics and the use of moment conception.

2.3. Differentiation and Shaping of the Urban-Form

This urban tension (occurred in the level of everyday life) would play an important role in 15-16 June Uprising, as well as the series of class struggles leading to that moment and the social transformations following the moment. This will be discussed in the following chapters, but, as it is the urban-form that mediates between the social struggles and socio-political context, it is essential to look at the (trans)formation of this urban-form through the process first. The differentiation process and the generated formation of Istanbul would highly determine the social actions prior, during and after the Uprising either by enabling or limiting the possibility of those actions. So, grasping this form in its genesis will also provide a more concrete understanding of the actions.

Rıfki Arslan (2011) brings the data of Istanbul Master Plan Office reports and academic literature together to provide a wholesome picture of the urbanization process of Istanbul between these years. The data on population and urban growth I will summarize are from those reports via his study, unless stated otherwise:

- In 1950 and earlier, Istanbul's industry was largely represented by small industries. 65% of those employed in manufacturing worked in establishments with fewer than ten workers. The 1950 industry and business census conducted by the State Institute of Statistics, when compared with the results of the population census, confirms the presence of a widespread small industry sector. These small industrial enterprises are still densely located in districts like Eminönü, Beyazıt, Karaköy, and Dolapdere, often coexisting with commercial functions.
- The areas around Eminönü and Galata served as the main city centers. Üsküdar and Kadıköy acted as secondary centers linked by water routes. Besides district markets, no other significant centers were observed. The planning approach of this period was more about following tendencies and producing formal zoning plans.
- From the years following the end of World War II until 1950, it is seen that significant migration from Anatolia directed towards Istanbul, and the population increased from 860,000 to 983,000 (1945-1950). In 1950, the

urban settlements did not extend more than 30 km from the center (Eminönü-Karaköy). At this time, the furthest settlements from the center were Bakırköy with 25,000 inhabitants; Eyüp with 15,000; Sarıyer and Beykoz with 15,000; and Kızıltoprak and Erenköy with 15,000. The most densely populated areas were within five kilometers of the center in the Historic Peninsula, Beyoğlu, Kadıköy, and Üsküdar. It can be said that 70% of the population resided within this described area. The directions of urban development or new construction areas were along the east-west coasts and the Bosphorus axis. This includes the development of the immediate surroundings of densely populated areas and the filling of the gaps within these areas. The emergence of squatter houses (gecekondu) as a construction method for low-income groups and their recognition as a problem are also features of this period. The initial squatter settlements appeared in Zeytinburnu, near the city walls of the Historic Peninsula, and along the Ankara Road.

- In 1960, the urban population had increased by nearly 70% compared to 1950, reaching 1.68 million. This increase corresponded to 60-70,000 people per year. The number of settlement units increased from 37 in 1950 to 49 in 1960, meaning 12 new settlement units had formed in ten years. The urban population now lived within seven kilometers of the city center. Settlements with populations ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 were located within seven to thirty kilometers. Urban settlements extended beyond the main urban core. Significant population explosions occurred mostly on the western side between Küçükçekmece and Tuzla, with the Şişli and Golden Horn areas reaching populations of 100,000, and Sağmalcılar and Kâğıthane evolving from 3-4,000 residents to 20-30,000 residents. On the eastern side, significant population increases were observed in Kartal and Maltepe alongside the development of Üsküdar and Kadıköy. Squatter settlements had become part of the traditional urban structure, forming distinct residential areas. The initial formations around industrial areas gradually turned into residential areas for low-income groups from various sectors. During this period, while initial settlements continued to grow and densify, new gecekondu settlements emerged in areas like Gaziosmanpaşa, Alibeyköy, Osmaniye, and around the

Golden Horn, becoming residential areas for low-income groups. Residential areas began to take shapes that reflected social stratification. Outside of these areas shaped by low-income groups, the regions north and south of the London Road and Ankara Road revealed social differences in urbanization. The areas overlooking the Sea of Marmara (on the south side of the roads) in the Şişli, Mecidiyeköy, and Levent regions on the Beyoğlu side emerged as residential areas for high-income groups. The avenue connecting Taksim, Şişli, Mecidiyeköy, and Levent can be considered a line that separates different structures and social groups in this region (Arslan, 2011).

- Although small industry continued to dominate with a 55% share in this period, it experienced a 10% decline compared to 1950. While their traditional locations remained densely populated, clustering began in areas like Topkapı, Levent, and Eyüp. The trend of large industries expanding outward gained strength in this period. Especially, industries using horizontal space increasingly developed along the Ankara Road on the Anatolian side and the London Road on the European side, drawing more industrial activities to Kartal and Maltepe. This period also saw the emergence of new industrial zones in Bakırköy and Gaziosmanpaşa and the transformation of Şişli and Kâğıthane into industrial areas, adding new dimensions to urban growth.
- The development of centers occurred through the growth and extensions of existing ones. While Eminönü and Karaköy grew by converting residential areas into workplaces, Beyazıt and Aksaray strengthened as extensions, and Şişli showed similar development tendencies. Kadıköy and Üsküdar centers were also observed to be moving beyond being daily shopping centers. Although complete functional specialization had not yet been achieved in the Eminönü-Karaköy centers, some functions began to decentralize, not necessarily leaving but searching for new areas. The concentration of industrial and storage functions along with industry in the Golden Horn, and the movement of some professional services towards secondary centers were examples of this trend. On the other hand, financial institutions and the office services and representations of industries continued to seek locations in commercial centers, leading to the concentration of office buildings, especially in the extensions of Karaköy towards Dolmabahçe. The years 1960

and onwards would be years involving regional planning, industrial area planning, addressing squatter problems.

- In 1970, the number of settlements in urbanized areas increased by 12 new units from the previous period, reaching 61. Over ten years, the urban population grew by over 150,000 annually, reaching 2.7 million, and rural lands rapidly turned into urbanized areas. The proportion of the population within the seven-kilometer ring from the business center fell to 55% of the total urban population. The same proportion was 70% in the previous period, proving that development extended outward. While urban settlements were within 30 kilometers on both sides until 1960, by 1970, they expanded to 40 kilometers, extending the urbanization boundaries eastward to Gebze and westward to Silivri.
- The population of the North-West Development Areas, including Sağmalcılar, Rami, Eyüp, Gaziosmanpaşa, Küçükköy, and Alibeyköy, reached 400,000. The development along the London Road continued in the form of population explosions, with Bakırköy and its surroundings developing the most. The development towards the north was divided between two income groups, with the Bosphorus hills becoming the settlement area for high-income groups, and the direction towards Kâğıthane becoming the settlement area for low-income groups. The acceleration of this development by the Bosphorus Bridge and ring roads was inevitable.
- Despite the absence of an effective mass transit system, the development of settlements in the east-west direction can be explained by the presence of two major highways (Ankara and London Roads) and the preference of industry for settlement in the same direction. However, in the North-West Development Areas, which developed into large settlements during this period, different factors played a role. While industrial settlements were a driving factor in this area, there was no specific transportation system that encouraged development. It can be said that land ownership regimes and prices were effective in this area, emerging as settlement areas for low-income people. The settlements on the eastern side gained even more speed during this period, with old settlements densifying while new chain settlements emerged north of the Ankara Road in the form of population

explosions. Soğanlık, Başibüyük, Yakacık, Ümraniye, and Fikirtepe can be counted among these settlements. *Gecekondu* settlements experienced their fastest growth years during this period. Entirely squatter settlements became recognized as units within the whole city. Gültepe, Çeliktepe, Fikirtepe, Yahyakemal, Alibeyköy, and Kâğıthane were the large *gecekondu* settlements of this period, all located around industrial areas.

- *Gecekondu* settlements transformed with a new property regime²⁰ (Keyder, 2020) during this period and afterwards: Large landowners and speculators divided lands around urbanized areas into small parcels and sold them as shares of the whole. This not only opened areas outside zoning plans to settlement, providing much greater profits to landowners but also allowed low-income groups to construct on their own properties (Keyder, 1987; Keleş, 2006). This new construction form, while meeting a significant demand, led to illegal construction but provided a legal basis for ownership but differed little from them in terms of construction conditions. But it was in line with the limited financial resources and administrative capacity of Turkish state and its prioritizing industrial growth by finding a cheap solution for housing problem without a need of larger planning or any downward pressure on wage demands (Keleş, 2006). After all, the cheap labor was the competitive advantage of Turkish capital in the international market and state lands inherited from Ottoman were plenty.
- In 1970, 40% of those employed in manufacturing were in small industries. Compared to 1960, the proportion of small industries had decreased. Organized industry developed as concentrations and extensions of previous industrial areas. The Eyüp-Rami-Gaziosmanpaşa region, which developed in the previous period on the western side, became more concentrated and

²⁰ Keyder (2020) uses this term to address the informal transformation of land property and house-owning in relation with the historical background providing the opportunity for *gecekondu*: In the Ottoman legal system, all land was considered state property unless explicitly stated otherwise by the authority, so real estate was something that had to be claimed from the state's domain and then defended against the state (Keyder, 2005). The legal system and property regime never fully transitioned to a modern framework following the Ottoman Empire, so, during this era, migrants settled on land and built homes on the outskirts of existing cities while they were implicitly allowed to take over land although full ownership was rarely officially recognized and the property regime remained uncertain (Keyder, 2005). The new property regime described shortly above has emerged as a kind of privatization and fencing process within this ambiguous conditions and effected class relations in ways to be discussed later.

extended towards Küçükköy-Alibeyköy-Kâğıthane. Industrial areas north and south of the London Road developed towards Halkalı-Sefaköy-Firuzköy, with Bakırköy and Zeytinburnu becoming more concentrated. A total of 180 new industrial establishments were founded in these areas between 1960-1969. On the Beyoğlu side, the Haliç-Bomonti-Büyükdere Avenue area continued to densify with 64 new industrial establishments. Industrial establishments on the Anatolian side continued to develop along the Ankara Road, with the Kartal and Maltepe areas, which began developing in earlier periods, maintaining their importance with 36 new establishments, joined by the Tuzla, Yakacık, Çayırova, and Gebze industrial areas. During this period, industry began to show spatial differentiation, with specific trends emerging in site selection based on type and size. On the western side, consumer and intermediate goods manufacturing industries were predominant, while capital goods and intermediate goods manufacturing industries were more common on the eastern side. The industries on the eastern side, due to their technology and capital-intensive nature, required more space, used horizontally, and consumed more electrical energy compared to water. Industries established on the western side in areas like Sefaköy, Firuzköy, and Halkalı, which intensified recently along the London Road, displayed similar characteristics to those on the eastern side, while those established in traditional industrial areas were more labor-intensive and used less space. But, in general, average number of workers per enterprise in Turkey's public and private sectors during these years saw a significant increase, supported by internal capital accumulation and the widespread implementation of Fordist production methods, which emphasized mass production and consumption (Boratav, 2006). For Istanbul and later for Marmara region, big factories occupying larger space on the road axis mentioned, including hundreds of workers commuting from the working class neighborhoods around those factories became the norm.

The details in this descriptive section give some clues on the reasons of the Uprising in terms of answering why it happened, such as the living conditions of working class, segregation, lack of formal social security, etc. But, more importantly, it

includes and demonstrates all the key elements coming together in the action: The road axis that the workers' organization marched through, the names of the factory areas on the axis in which the workers organized, the names of the neighborhoods that both provide the work force to those areas and forming the communities that support the actions of the workers, the intense integration of these social spaces as well as the sharpening segregation of the population in those spaces. All of these are the key elements that will show up in every scene of the Uprising. In other words, the urban-form described in this section provides the answers to the question of "how the Uprising happened" rather than "why", and how it happens is a more important question than why it happens for both the purposes of this thesis and the materialist understanding of history discussed above. When we look at the conflicts and actions surrounding the moment of uprising, this urban-form of social relations will be sole ground of them.



Figure 1. London Road to Marshall Boulevard Source: Cumhuriyet, 29.11.1953.

2.4. The 15-16 June Uprising and the content of the struggles leading to the moment

During this period, trade unions began to gain strength, particularly those affiliated with the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (*Devrimci İşçi*

Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – DİSK). In early 1970, the Turkish government proposed amendments to the existing labor laws, specifically targeting the structure and activities of trade unions. These amendments were seen as an attempt to curb the growing influence of DİSK against Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Türk-İş*). The proposed legislation included provisions that would limit the ability of unions to organize and strike, effectively weakening DİSK's position in the labor movement (Yıldırım, 2002). The proposed amendments included stricter controls on union activities and made it difficult for workers to switch affiliations from Türk-İş to DİSK (Çelik & Lordoğlu, 2006). On June 15, 1970, workers affiliated with DİSK began organizing strikes and demonstrations to protest the proposed labor law amendments. The initial protests started in Istanbul, where workers from major industrial sectors, including metalworkers, textile workers, and other factory employees, took to the streets. The protests quickly spread to other industrial centers, notably Izmit, which was a hub of Turkey's burgeoning industrial sector (Özdemir, 2009). The protests escalated on June 16, with an estimated 100,000 workers participating in strikes and demonstrations across Istanbul and Izmit. The scale of the protests was unprecedented, with workers marching through the streets, blocking major thoroughfares, and it is also wasmarked by strikes and factory occupations as they were practiced by the workers many times before (Aydın, 2020). The government responded with force, including police and military interventions, resulting in several deaths and hundreds of injuries (Aydın, 2020).

Although the uprising was an unprecedented action in size and brought together many types of actions and occupied the city for a time span of two days, it was rather an aggregated result of a lot of actions and conflicts dispersed in the time line of the whole period in an organized manner from 1946 to 1970. Of course, all big social movements and actions are results of historical conflicts, but compared to more recent uprisings, the elements of 15-16 June (actors, participants, spaces, practices) can be followed step by step through the whole period leading to the moment of uprising. It was indeed a war of position which turned into a front battle during two days. The originating story of the uprising almost strictly followed the historical and spatial context provided above.

In 1946, changes were made to the Associations Law, lifting the ban on forming associations based on "class principles", in line with the international post-war/cold war context. This amendment allowed for the establishment of leftist parties and unions. Unions were established in many provinces of the country, especially in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (DİSK, 2020: 39). Turkish State facing with the reality of unions rather than the concept of it, 1946 law was followed by the Labor and Employer Unions and Union Confederations Law No. 5018 was in February 20, 1947, enacted by the DP Government, it strictly prohibited the political activities of trade unions (Mahiroğulları, 2001: 164). Several trade-unions continued to being established after the law and not surprisingly, transportation workers were leading actors of the trend. The Eskişehir State Railways Workers' Union was established in 1948, followed by unions in Sivas and Izmir in 1949 (Mahiroğulları, Başel, 2016: 3).

The first confederate, TÜRK-İŞ, was established on July 31, 1952 as a double act of both worker unions coming together and state control on the movement. Aziz Çelik (2010) discusses how TÜRK-İŞ was supported by the US AID programs (Çelik, 2010) in order to provide a moderate and controlled alternative to the growing influence of left. This support included well-documented financial assistance and organizational training, aimed at ensuring that Turkish labor movements did not align too closely with communist ideologies prevalent during the Cold War (Çelik, 2010).

Despite the legal status granted to trade unions, the right to collective bargaining and strike was not included in the law. The right to strike and collective bargaining was recognized by the 1961 Constitution (Makal, 2011: 269-287). The 1960s in Turkey were marked by political and social upheaval, including a growing awareness of workers' rights and increasing labor unrest. The economic policies of the time, which emphasized rapid industrialization, also led to growing disparities and harsh working conditions, fueling labor discontent (Aydın, 2010). The founding members of DİSK including influential unions such as the Mine Workers' Union, the Glass Workers' Union, and the Turkish Union of Heavy Industry Workers had already formed a coalition in Istanbul in 1960. These unions represented a growing segment of the labor movement that felt TÜRK-İŞ had failed to adequately represent their interests,

particularly in the context of collective bargaining and the right to strike (Koç, 2008). The dissatisfaction was partly due to TÜRK-İŞ's close ties with the government and its moderate stance, which many workers felt did not adequately challenge the state or employers on critical labor issues.

A key event leading up to the establishment of DİSK was the Saraçhane Meeting on December 31, 1961. This gathering, named after the Saraçhane area in Istanbul where it took place, was a massive rally of workers and trade unionists organized by various labor leaders, including those who would later form DİSK. The Saraçhane Meeting was a protest against labor legislation and government policies perceived as suppressive of union activities and workers' rights. It marked a significant moment of unity and mobilization within the Turkish labor movement, highlighting the widespread dissatisfaction with the existing union structures and state policies (Boratav, 1988). The Saraçhane Meeting demonstrated the capacity for large-scale mobilization within the Turkish working class and underscored the potential for a more militant and independent labor movement. It was a precursor to the more organized efforts that culminated in the founding of DİSK, which sought to capitalize on this momentum by creating a new confederation that would not be constrained by the same limitations as TÜRK-İŞ (Aydın, 2010). The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) was established on February 13, 1967, as long tracted actions of these trade unions, as well as local initiations throughout the important hubs of industry and working class settlements in Istanbul. The formation of DİSK was slowly established within a series of class actions between 1961 Saraçhane Meeting to 15-16 June. Prior to the foundation of DİSK, two strikes were especially important due to their reflections on the general context:

- The workers at the Kavel Cable Factory in Istanbul faced low wages and poor working conditions, common grievances among industrial workers in Turkey during this period of rapid industrialization and economic transformation. The strike began as a response to these harsh working conditions and was fueled by a broader dissatisfaction with the lack of effective representation and advocacy for workers' rights by existing labor unions, particularly TÜRK-İŞ, which was seen as too conciliatory towards the government and employers (Koç, 2008).

- On January 29, 1963, 173 workers affiliated with the Maden-İş Union initiated a sit-in at the Kavel Cable Factory in response to the non-payment of annual bonuses and increasing union suppression. The situation escalated when the employer responded by firing some workers and declaring a lockout. On February 4, 1963, the workers began a full-fledged strike. The situation quickly intensified as the workers blocked strikebreakers from entering the factory, leading to clashes with the police. The local community and workers' families supported the strike, gathering in front of the factory in solidarity. The conflict saw some workers arrested as the police intervention turned violent (Koç, 2008).
- The strike became a symbol of class solidarity, with workers from other factories, including General Electric and Demirdöküm, providing support. The Demirdöküm workers, in a unique show of solidarity, even initiated a campaign where they grew beards. (Çelik & Lordoğlu, 2006). The critical point of this solidarity is about the fact that Kavel and all these factories in solidarity belonged to Koç Holding as a joint venture with General Electric established in 1946 as a result of foreign investment agreement.
- Furthermore, in a critical move, 23 union leaders and 45 officials from TÜRK-İŞ dissociated from the confederation, criticizing its insufficient support for the Kavel strikers (Çelik & Lordoğlu, 2006). This was a critical step towards an independent trade-union confederation.
- The Paşabahçe Strike of 1966 was also a pivotal moment in the history of the Turkish labor movement and a catalyst for the formation of DİSK. The strike began when negotiations between the Paşabahçe workers and the factory management failed. The workers demanded better wages, improved working conditions, and greater respect for their rights. The strike quickly gained momentum, drawing widespread support from the workers and their families. The solidarity among the workers was evident in their ability to maintain a unified front despite various pressures, including attempts by management to replace them with non-union labor (Aydın, 2010).
- The importance of the strike was due to the fact that it continued even though Türk-İş came to an agreement with the owners and declared that the strike is ended. Several key unions came together to form a support committee known

as the "Paşabahçe Grevini Destekleme Komitesi" (Committee of Supporting Paşabahçe Strike). This committee included prominent unions such as Petrol-İş (Petroleum Workers' Union), Maden-İş (Mine Workers' Union), Lastik-İş (Rubber Workers' Union), Basın-İş (Press Workers' Union), and Tez Büro-İş (Commercial Office Workers' Union). The creation of this committee demonstrated significant inter-union solidarity and coordination, a crucial factor in supporting the striking workers at the Paşabahçe glass factory (Koç & Koç, 2008). The committee's formation was a strategic move to consolidate efforts, share resources, and provide moral and financial support to the strikers. This solidarity was vital not only for sustaining the strike but also for amplifying the demands of the workers for better wages and working conditions. The committee's actions included organizing rallies, collecting funds, and garnering public support, which were instrumental in maintaining the momentum of the strike and putting pressure on both the factory management and the government (Çelik & Lordoğlu, 2006). The cooperation among these unions during the Paşabahçe Strike highlighted a growing sense of unity and collective action among workers, consolidated with the establishment of the DİSK (Aydın, 2010).

One important point of these strikes was their location. Both were in more traditional industrial locations. Kavel was in İstinye, a neighborhood known with its shipyards in Ottoman Empire. The factories which were in solidarity with Kavel Strike and belong to Koç were around Haliç. Paşabahçe glass factory was in Paşabahçe neighborhood known for glass industry for a long time and the factory was established as early as 1884 (Çelik & Aydın, 2006). The neighborhood is also an early example of a neighborhood grown into existence around a factory. It started with the workers sleeping around the factory and in the storehouses, later became a neighborhood when the migrant workers started to construct trenches and gradually houses. It was the only example of such a neighborhood next to Bosphorus, being an exception to the class lines summarized above.

With the establishment of DİSK, workers action escalated leading to the controversial proposed amendments from the government and 15-16 June Uprising.

DİSK organized a protest on June 24, 1967, to repeal the Labor Law enacted on the same date. A large number of workers gathered in Ankara's Tandoğan Square and held a mass demonstration. On February 6 and 7, 1968, 25,000 workers in the Kozlu and Üzülmez regions of Zonguldak went on strike due to the failure of collective bargaining agreements: Many workers were injured, and two miners and a police officer died in the police-intervened conflicts. The actions ended with the signing of a collective agreement on February 21 (DİSK, May 3, 1976:1).

More importantly, increased number of strikes turned into a wave of factory occupations moving throughout the axis of London and Ankara Roads between 1967 and 1970, again with a significant support from newly developed working class neighborhoods, gecekondu population as well as other factories connected through the same axis and newly found confederation. The start of this wave was also directly related with the foundation of DİSK:

- The factory occupations in Turkey began when 1,200 workers at the Derby Tire Factory in Zeytinburnu, who were members of the DİSK-affiliated Lastik-İş (Rubber Workers' Union), faced opposition from their employer regarding union representation and occupied the factory in 1968. The employer refused to recognize Lastik-İş and instead assigned Kauçuk-İş, a union affiliated with TÜRK-İŞ, as the authorized bargaining agent. The workers, rejecting the collective bargaining agreement with Kauçuk-İş, spontaneously escalated their protests into a factory occupation. (Aydın, 2020). The Derby occupation was followed by smaller occupations of Altınel Press Factory, Kavel Cable (again) and Emayetaş in the same year.
- The wave of occupations escalated in the next year, The Singer Sewing Machine Factory occupation took place in January 1969. 520 workers working at Singer Factory in left the "independent" Çelik-İş union and joined the Maden-İş union affiliated with DİSK. Following this development, the employer fired three workers to intimidate the workers. Thereupon, workers occupied the factory to protest the dismissals and gain union rights. The next day, the police intervened against the workers. Singer workers actively resisted police intervention. The conflict between the workers and the police, with stones and sticks, continued at regular intervals for 5 hours.

Neighborhood population and workers' families gathered around the factory to support the occupying workers. The factory was placed in Kartal, on the axis of Ankara Road. With the arrival of new police forces, workers were forcibly removed from the factory. As a result of the clashes, 14 workers and 8 police officers were injured (Aydın, 2020).

- Then Demirdöküm workers occupied the factory in Silahtarağa (near Haliç) for similar reasons in 1969. The occupation was actively supported by the surrounding factories and close gecekondu neighborhoods. The occupation lasted 5 days. The police intervened in the factory with sound, fog, tear gas and batons. Workers resisted with iron rods, sticks and stones. The public and workers' families also threw stones at the police from outside and pushed the police back. (Aydın, 2020) The factory strike and occupations started to face with the police and sometimes military forces in clashes more often and increasingly in a more organized manner.
- Again in 1969, Gamak Motor Factory in Topkapı was occupied after similar confrontations with the administration about trade-union affiliation. The administration resisted Maden-İş whose president, Kemal Türkler, was also leading DİSK. The significance of the occupation was the killing of a worker, Şerif Aygün, under the fire from police forces. (Aydın, 2020) That event led to further politicization of the movement increasingly becoming militant and facing with the state on a larger scale.
- In March 1970, Sungurlar Boiler Factory in Silahtar was occupied with similar reasons and an agreement with Türk-İş against workers' general will in the factory. The factory was surrounded by military units to end the resistance (Aydın, 2020), evident of the increasing political tension surrounding the movement in the awe of 15-16 June as well as approaching military coup.

In this context, at the same time with the growing occupation movement, the government took action to amend Law No. 274 on unions in 1970, in an attempt to regulate the establishment and conditions of unions, union federations, and confederations. The constitutional amendment affecting unions' rights and Articles 274 and 275 of the constitution were changed with Türk-İş's support. The

amendment was sent to the National Assembly in February 1970 with the signing of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. The government aimed to shut down DİSK with the legal amendment, starting preparations to restrict workers' organization through unions. The amendment was not only limiting the rights for strikes and other protests, but centralizing control over unions and union membership with quotas which would make it harder for new trade-unions to be established as well as create problems for DİSK trade-unions to be recognized legally (Çelik, 2018).

The law restricting workers' fundamental rights led to strong opposition. Turkey Workers' Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TİP*) launched a legal struggle to prevent the law from coming into force. On February 26, 1970, TİP, together with DİSK, submitted a bill to the Parliament (Öztürk, 2010). As the draft legislation neared completion despite the strong opposition and a number of smaller actions, DİSK leadership, convened an emergency meeting in June 5, 1970 to mobilize their members and coordinate a response, including a preparation for a general strike (Aydın, 2020). DİSK's leadership convened another meeting in June 12, following the approval of the amendment in National Assembly and Kemal Türkler called for a large assembly to be held with all trade-union administrations and workplace representations to be held in June 14 in order to decide what to do against the law (Öztürk, 2010).

On the morning of Monday June 15, Cumhuriyet broke the news of actions decided in the meeting with 800 trade-unions. According to the news, DİSK called for a general strike and take action in the streets starting from that morning, although Leader of DİSK, Kemal Türkler called the workers to a rally on June, 17 in his speech during the meeting (Öztürk, 2010). Indeed, an application for a rally on June 17 had been already done but it was refused by Istanbul Governance. The details of the decisions and planning are still unclear. There are different views on how much of the actions followed was planned by DİSK administration for that day or initiated by worker leaders in factories. But it is not disputed that a rally action taking the streets from all directions in Istanbul was discussed as it happened in actuality, DİSK had been threatening the government with? general strike and more importantly, a lot of factories were already involved with local actions of strikes, some of which were

again for trade-union rights and attracting a large support and solidarity network (Aydın, 2020). No matter how many of the following actions were decided in detail, the coordinated action in the morning of June 15 without any clear public announcement is a testament for the organization level of the movement.

On the morning of June 15, workers from Maden-İş, Lastik-İş, Kimya-İş, Gıda-İş, and Basın-İş did not start work, left the factories, and began the resistance. Workers united with other workers in the region, forming a large cortege and protesting the law with a mass resistance. The labor actions of June 15-16, 1970, in Istanbul became the largest and most massive resistance in Turkish working class history up to date (Öztürk, 2010).

The resistance, which began with 115 workplaces on June 15, attracted estimably over 100,000 workers from 168 factories on June 16 (Öztürk, 2010). The action mainly took place in the Marmara and Kocaeli regions, with participation primarily from industrial workers. The actions that shook Turkey left the government in a difficult situation. A large law enforcement force was used in the actions including the intervention of the 1st Army Command. Following the events that resulted in many injuries and deaths, DİSK leaders called on workers to stop, leading to the end of the actions. Thousands of workers from many factories participated in the two-day actions. In addition to DİSK member workers, many workers from Maden-İş, Metal-İş, and Türk-İş also participated in the demonstrations (Öztürk,2010; Aydın, 2020).

After the actions ended, incidents occurred in Ankara, Adana, Bursa, and Izmir. As a result of the clashes, at least four workers and a police died, 200 people were injured, and hundreds were detained. Following the events, the Council of Ministers declared a 60-day state of emergency in Kocaeli and Istanbul. After the declaration of the state of emergency, DİSK President Kemal Türkler and the leaders of DİSK and member unions were arrested (Koç, 2003: 87).

As a result of the actions, 260 people were prosecuted in 69 separate cases. The cases were heard and concluded in martial law courts. The martial law courts held DİSK responsible for the June 15-16 events, declaring that the actions were led by DİSK

and accusing them of inciting the public. In the martial law courts, not only workers, DİSK leaders, and politicians, but also youth leaders of the period were tried. These trials were conducted under the name of *Dev-Genç*²¹ trials, and some members of Dev-Genç were arrested and tried due to the June 15-16 actions (Öztürk, 2010). The aftermath of these events saw a temporary withdrawal of the amendments, but also increased repression, particularly targeting DİSK and its affiliated unions (DİSK, 2020). The high level of organization is already evident in the way the actions conducted and maintained despite the large measures over the city. But maybe more importantly, DİSK's growing impact as a social agent throughout the 1970s (Öztürk, 2010) regardless of the results of the uprising as well as the court acts and prosecutions against them presents an important discussion and could be better understood through its relation with the broader political and social movements:

- The scale and intensity of the protests, particularly in the industrial hubs of Istanbul and Kocaeli, demonstrated the potential power of organized labor, a realization that significantly influenced the broader leftist movements, including youth and revolutionary groups (Zürcher, 2004, 267; Keyder, 1987). The student movement, already radicalizing, saw in the labor unrest a confirmation of the need for a broader alliance between workers and students to challenge the state's authoritarianism with the solidified belief among youth activists that the working class could be a powerful revolutionary force, capable of confronting the government and effecting change through mass action (Ahmad, 1977). This might be the most important impact of the actions on the political atmosphere of 1970s as this period saw an increase in revolutionary rhetoric and a shift towards more militant strategies within the student movement (Bozarslan, 2000).
- The uprising had a significant impact on the development of revolutionary movements in Turkey. The state's harsh response, including martial law and

²¹ Dev-Genç (*Devrimci Gençlik*, or Revolutionary Youth) was a leftist student organization in Turkey, formed in the late 1960s. The group was heavily involved in protests against U.S. imperialism, Turkish state policies, and capitalist structures, and it became one of the leading youth groups during the politically turbulent 1970s in Turkey. Over time, Dev-Genç became associated with armed struggle and was linked to various leftist factions.

Dev-Genç's activities culminated in clashes with right-wing groups, and it faced severe repression from the state, especially following the military coup in 1971, after which many members were arrested or went underground (Ahmad, 1993; Zürcher, 2004).

military intervention, convinced many in the revolutionary left that peaceful or legal challenges to state authority would not be tolerated. Prominent figures from earlier generations of Turkish Left Movement such as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and Mihri Belli, have argued that the 15-16 June Uprising marked a critical juncture where the Turkish left recognized the need to escalate their tactics (Kıvılcımlı, 1978; Belli, 1975). Consequently, the events of June 1970 played an enforcing role for revolutionary organizations, which were established by leaders of youth movement at that time, toward more radical tactics, culminating in guerrilla activities and confrontations with state forces in the early 1970s (Çulhaoğlu, 1987).

- This impact also deepened the already existing fractures within the leftist movement, particularly between those who believed in working within the legal framework to achieve change and those advocating for revolutionary methods as the uprising highlighted the limitations of peaceful protest in the face of state repression (Kıvılcımlı, 1978).
- In return, the uprising had a decisive impact on the labor movement itself. While it temporarily set back trade union progress due to state repression, it also reinforced the idea that labor could not be separated from broader political struggles and further politicized the labor movement, making it more receptive to revolutionary ideas in the years that followed (Boratav, 1988). The 1976 DGM (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri* or State Security Courts) Resistance is a clear example of this politicization: In July 1976, DİSK called for a general strike against the establishment of these special courts, which were perceived as a repressive tool designed to suppress political dissent, particularly targeting leftist activists, trade unionists, and other opposition groups (Şener, 1982). This direct political strike saw significant participation from workers across various sectors with massive rallies and work stoppages (Öztürk, 2010).

To summarize, it can be set that 15-16 June Uprising had a pivotal role of setting the stage of political atmosphere in the following decade of 1970s, catalyzed the radicalization of social movements and politicized working class movement further at the same time. Most of the references above state two interactions as the main

reason of this impact on the political atmosphere: the brutal actions of the state towards workers in the uprising and enhanced interactions between the youth movement and the workers' movement through actions. But once again, the interactions between social agents and the resulting political atmosphere cannot only be understood by the historicity of events without bringing in the spatial dynamics of their actions and encounters. Although I already pointed out how the organization of workers was embedded in the urban-form of the time, I will start with how the uprising was embodied within this form before discussing the spatial dynamics of this interaction and transformation within the social agents and movements.

2.5. Spatial Dynamics of the 15-16 June Uprising

On the morning of June 15, workers from Maden-İş, Lastik-İş, Kimya-İş, Gıda-İş, and Basın-İş did not start work, left the factories, and began the resistance. Workers united with other workers in the region, forming a large cortege and protesting the law with a mass resistance. Otosan, ECA, Singer, and Tekel workers marched from Ankara Road to Kartal, uniting with workers from Çayırova and Tuzla on one of the transportations hub we discussed. With the participation of Otosan and DMO workers, the workers, forming a large cortege, moved towards the Yıldız Tabya region. During the march, Eyüp Police Station was blockaded successfully to release workers detained by the police (Öztürk, 2010; Aydın, 2020). On the European side, a march was held on the Bakırköy-Topkapı-Sağmalcılar route on June 15, 1970. Kavel, Türkay, Beldesin, Tekfen, Türk Philips, and Profilo workers halted work in the factories and joined the actions. On June 15, the production stopped in almost all workplaces organized by DİSK member unions within the industrial hub (Aydın, 2020; Öztürk, 2010).

On the morning of June 16, workers took to the streets in large numbers early in the morning. Workers marched towards Topkapı, then to Aksaray, Sultanahmet, Cağaloğlu, and Eminönü. In response to government directives, the governor took measures to break the workers' resistance. As workers approached the Golden Horn, both bridges were opened to prevent them from crossing to Beyoğlu as the workers marched towards Taksim Square (Aydın, 2010). In response, workers from

Bakırköy, Bayrampaşa, and Gaziosmanpaşa approached from three directions, merging at the Auer Factory on Maltepe Gümüşsuyu Avenue and heading towards Topkapı (Ateşoğulları, 2003). The workers' march was repeatedly interrupted by military barricades, but the workers' resistance could not be broken (Aydın, 2010).

Kavel workers, shipyard workers, Profilo, Philips, Tatko Service, and pharmaceutical factory workers marched towards Levent, merging with other workers in İstinye (Aydın, 2010). Workers who passed the barricade headed towards Mecidiyeköy, merging with another group of workers in Esentepe. Workers blocked by law enforcement forces were surrounded in Gayrettepe, preventing them from merging with Profilo workers. Consequently, workers headed towards the Golden Horn. Workers on the European side created a large circular line, closing around the Unkapanı bridge (Öztürk, 2010). Workers on the Anatolian side conducted their actions in three main lines: towards to Ankara Road. These workers aimed to march to Kadıköy to unite with ECA, Tekel, Singer, and Vinylex workers. However, the workers' march was frequently interrupted by law enforcement forces (Aydın, 2010).

Workers who passed the law enforcement barricade were stopped again in Suadiye, and those who passed this barricade were stopped again in front of Fenerbahçe Stadium. Law enforcement used firearms against workers' resistance, leading to a major clash between workers and law enforcement. Actions that began in Üsküdar faced police intervention, resulting in scuffles between workers and police. With the escalation of events, the military intervened (Ateşoğulları, 2003).

Workers who set out from Gebze joined other workers in Kartal, forming a large cortege heading towards Kadıköy Square. Otosan and Tekel workers from Üsküdar marched towards Beylerbeyi, merging with another group of workers in Kadıköy. Workers in Kadıköy were met by a large law enforcement force, with barricades set up to block the workers' passage resulting in a major clash between workers and police in Kadıköy (Sülker, 2005). During the clash, a group of workers managed to pass through the barricades set up by law enforcement and reached the Kadıköy pier, surrounding the district governor's office and the police station. As events spiraled out of control, law enforcement surrounded the Kadıköy pier and began shooting at

resisting workers. As a result of the police shooting, three workers named Yaşar Yıldırım from Mutlu Akü Factory, Mustafa Bayram from Vinleks, and Mehmet Gıdak from Cevizli Tekel Factory, along with a shopkeeper and a police officer died, and hundreds of workers were injured (Aydın, 2010).

On June 16, a major labor resistance was also carried out in Ankara: The action, which included students, took place in the Büyük Sanayi Bazaar. Demonstrators, who tried to march in a cortege from Ulus to Kızılay, were frequently stopped by police, and many students and workers were detained (Ankut, 2012). In Kocaeli, workers gathered in masses in the city center, holding a rally. Faced with the massive action in the city, the government took measures and sent military units to the region. Worker corteges were also held in Adana, Bursa, and Izmir (Aydın, 2010).

To sum up, the actions rally on the streets towards the historical center of the city (especially Eminönü, Kadıköy and Taksim) was initiated in waves pretty willfully and successfully to a degree prevented only by natural geographical obstacles of Istanbul (Golden Horn and Bosphorus), despite the lack of communication technologies compared today. The rallies can be summed up by four main routes and hubs: Alibeyköy-Silahtar-Gaziosmanpaşa route, Topkapı-Çekmece-Zeytinburnu route, Levent-Boğaz route and Ankara Road on the Anatolian side bringing together smaller routes not only including İstanbul districts, but also Gebze and İzmit. It should be clear that how it all comes together with the context of relations of production materialized in the built environment with its connections and segregations, and how the urbanization process led by capital accumulation and state planning determines the possibilities and limits of social action and movement in this example.

But, although the production of space is where the relations of production are materialized, established and reproduced with their decisive determination on (social) acts of human-beings (Lefebvre, 1974), that space still have to be occupied with human population with their already established (historical) social relations and it is open to the effects of those historicized relations during their movement and activity within the space.

The wave of actions in the late 1960s are largely supported by the student movements, district bureaus of TİP and early leftist organizations who will gain power in the same *gecekondu* neighborhoods surrounding the factory areas in 1970s (Aydın, 2020). The affiliation between DİSK and Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) was also well documented, as all of the founders of the party in 1961 were the leaders of trade-unions that would also establish DİSK, although its known leaders, board members and MPs would be mostly intellectuals that were invited into the party in 1962 (Ünsal, 2006). But the affiliation stayed strong, there was a partial worker participation in the administration of party, for example, Hüseyin Güven, a worker in Sungurlar Factory, was selected as General Secretary in 1970 during the rising tensions. This affiliation was more layered and complex than generally known. Aydın (2020) documented some tensions within TİP surrounding the worker actions and they are critical to grasp the whole dynamics of the workers' movement at the time.

Aydın (2020) highlighted the role of activities of TİP's branch in Eminönü for the strong support around the occupations in this region. The TİP's Eminönü branch was led by Vahit Tulis who was involved with *Partizan* Magazine, one of the newly organizing leftist movements and circles in 1960s within and outside of TİP. The support of these groups largely opposing TİP's stand of prioritizing parliamentary action, both in occupations and 15-16 events were also discussed by Sırrı Öztürk (2010), a worker activist during the years and in the uprising. He states that the participation of Dev-Genç, revolutionary student organization, in the uprising was one of the reasons that DİSK administration tried to limit the uprising, although not fully succeeded (Öztürk, 2010). Dev-Genç activists would be lead a number of leftist organisation that gain a large support in *gecekondu* neighborhoods later in 1970s.

This political tensions within DİSK, TİP and leftist movements in general might not be addressed as much as the political affiliation between DİSK and TİP, but it is still addressed by a number of published sources (Öztürk, 2010; Arınır & Öztürk, 1976; Aydın, 2020; Kurtuluş Yolu, 1977; Partizan, 1978) and interviews with a number of participant workers in the actions within these studies. But a deeper, historical/spatial connection behind the fabric of the movement hasn't been discussed as a specific

topic and largely neglected despite the information was also documented in the same studies as well as other sources: the immigrant identity of the workers and activist of this period. This is a theme that was mentioned in relation with individual activists in those books but never discussed otherwise and caught my attention during my reading and researches for the thesis.

As discussed in the previous chapter about the actions leading to the uprising, the occupations were more prominent in certain areas, some of them were seen repeatedly in the documents, as in the example of Silahtar. Silahtar is closed to Golden Horn and Eminönü, as well as related with the neighborhoods occupied by Balkan immigrants, Alibeyköy and Gaziosmanpaşa (Narlı & Şen, 2001), through the transportation network. Vahit Tulis, TİP administrator of Eminönü region, was born into a Balkan immigrant family from Bulgaria. He is not a rare example of Balkan immigrants among the actors of the movement mentioned in the studies and documentations about working class movements in 1960s and 15-16 June uprising: A number of interviewed witnesses were also from Balkan immigrant families (Aydın, 2020; Öztürk, 2010), as well as Şerif Aygün killed in Gamak Occupation (Aydın, 2020). Sırrı Öztürk, an activist who played a great role in documenting the movement, was also from a Balkan immigrant family resident in Gaziosmanpaşa, as well as a number of leaders of trade-unions that established both TİP and DİSK including the first general secretary of both TİP and Istanbul Trade-Union Coalition in early 1960s, Şaban Yıldız, who was born in Greece.

This influence is not surprising. The working class formation has always been based on waves of migrations and certain migrant populations in certain periods for the entire history of capitalism. The labor force migration prior to and in the beginning of post-World War years was largely from Balkan countries, especially former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece (Kirişçi, 2000; Vasileva, 1992). Balkan immigrants primarily settled in districts such as Alibeyköy, Zeytinburnu, and Gaziosmanpaşa (Narlı & Şen, 2001; Vasileva, 1992) where they formed significant communities and played a role in the development of *gecekondu* neighborhoods. These areas are also strongly related with industrial and manufacturing hubs and axis

as we have discussed. Many immigrants were employed in these factories following each other through community ties (Şimşir, 1986; Kirişci, 2000; Vasileva, 1992).

It should be considered that not only the population growth and settlement follow the route of industry and transportation investments, but the choice of migrated population to settle due to factors like land-ownership, availability to build communities without intervention plays a role in the expansion routes. This is a more reciprocal interaction than being conceived while focusing on the representation of space within the context of urban planning (or lack of it) and development.

Turkey's history of labor migration is deeply intertwined with its socio-political landscape, particularly in relation to the movements of Balkan Muslims, Kurds, and Alevis. These groups migrated under varying circumstances, influenced by factors such as wars, state policies, and socio-economic pressures. Each wave left a significant impact on the country's demographic and cultural fabric as ground of political and social movements; as in the above example of the relationship between Balkan migrants and the working class movement of 1960s.

The migration of Muslim populations from the Balkans to Turkey, especially following the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the population exchanges of the early 20th century, significantly impacted the urban labor market in Turkey. But the migration from the Balkans to Turkey was not merely a result of nationalist movements and wars but also a process deeply rooted in the needs of capitalist development within the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish Republic as the influx of Balkan Muslims, known as "muhacirs", provided a cheap and exploitable labor force essential for the agrarian economy of the nascent Turkish state (Aydın, 2005). These migrants, having been primarily agrarian in their homelands, brought valuable farming skills and experience, which they applied in the Turkish countryside. The state allocated land to many of these migrants, often in regions that had been depopulated or were underdeveloped, with the goal of increasing agricultural productivity and stabilizing the rural economy (Boratav, 1981). The contributions of Balkan migrants to the agricultural sector were significant, as they helped to expand arable land, improve farming techniques, and increase crop yields, which were

crucial for Turkey's economic development during the early Republic (Keyder, 1987).

During the early to mid-20th century, the demand for labor in industries such as textiles, manufacturing, and construction was high and Balkan migrants, part of whom were more familiar with urban work environments from their time in the Balkans compared to other labor migrants, were well-suited to fill these labor needs (Timur, 1994). The relatively high levels of literacy and political awareness among Balkan migrants compared to other migrant groups, combined with the poor working and living conditions, made them more likely to engage in organized labor activities and align with leftist movements (Yıldız, 2001). It should be also noted that *muhacirs* had a history of exposure to the socialist movements and ideas in Balkans dating back to 19th century (Yıldız, 2001; Zürcher, 2004).

Just like the relation between the working class organization solidified in DİSK and the *muhacir* communities in the discussed neighborhoods, further wave of labor migration was intertwined with different political and social tensions while all of them went through integration/marginalization processes with impacts on social movements.

*Alevi*s, a significant religious and cultural minority in Turkey, began migrating to urban centers in large numbers during the mid-20th century.²² This migration was driven by multiple factors, including economic hardships of their villages and the desire to escape sectarian violence in rural areas, particularly in Eastern Anatolia. (The historical dynamics of this conflict will be elaborated further in the chapters on Gezi Uprising.) The rural regions where many Alevi's lived were economically underdeveloped, with limited access to education, healthcare, and employment opportunities that pushed many Alevi's to seek better livelihoods in the growing industrial cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (Massicard, 2013). This marginalization persisted in their new environments, where they were frequently

²² For further review on the socio-political consequences of this migration, please see: *The Alevi's in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity* (Massicard, 2013) and *The Circuitous Politicization of Alevism: The Affiliation between the Alevi's and the Left Politics* (Ertan, 2008).

excluded from the social and political mainstream (Şen, 2007). Historically, Alevis have been more inclined towards leftist ideologies, partly due to their long history of oppression and found themselves aligning with leftist movements (Gülalp, 1997). Secularism has been a core principle for many Alevi communities leading to alignment with secularist movements as well as social rights movements (Bozarslan, 2003).

In the urban context, Alevis also settled in *gecekondu* areas on the outskirts of cities and Alevis, *muhacirs*, and working-class communities have coexisted starting from 1960s in areas like Alibeyköy and Gaziosmanpaşa (Neyzi, 2001). Two remnants from Ottoman Empire, the autonomous reflexes of Alevis and the state's leaving the burden of providing accommodation and social security off the shoulders of the state (as well as lowering wages) by letting *gecekondus* (Karpas, 1976), fitted each other perfectly. This state of affairs also laid the ground for a long time involvement between the arriving Alevi population in these *gecekondus* and the newly found revolutionary organizations (Massicard, 2013) underscoring a break with legal framework of politics to oppose the state.

Kurdish migration, particularly from the 1950s onwards, was driven by a combination of economic underdevelopment and political conflicts in the Kurdish populated cities. This migration intensified during the 1980s and 1990s, as the conflict creates a war environment (Gambetti, 2005). Many Kurds who migrated to urban centers like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir settled in *gecekondu* areas on the periphery of cities and like earlier migrations characterized by poor living conditions, lack of infrastructure, and even more precarious employment opportunities compared to earlier periods. Combined with the political marginalization and experience they had, these neighborhoods became a site of resistance for them both as members of new urban poor working in low-wage and precarious jobs, interacting with leftist movements (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008) and as the social agent of making the Kurdish issue a central theme in Istanbul's political landscape, influencing electoral outcomes and policy debates (Yıldız, 2001).

The shared experience of *gecekondu* among all this overlapping waves of working class migration from different populations fostered a sense of solidarity among

gecekondu residents, leading to the formation of alliances across ethnic and religious lines (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008) which was reflected through the political movements which centered more and more in these neighborhoods started to identified with the left as the term "kurtarılmış bölge" ("liberated zone") shows a term which gained prominence throughout the 1970s (Yılmaz, 2005). Istanbul, in particular, saw the emergence of several such areas in districts like Gaziosmanpaşa and Gazi, where revolutionary groups often provided community services, organized political education, and resisted state interventions, sometimes through armed confrontations with police forces (Bora & Günel, 2010).

The labor force migration to these *gecekondu*s was not the only migration that played a role in the transformation of social movements during these years. As stated above, the radicalization of the movements rested on the interaction between working class and youth movement and Istanbul was also a hub for educational migration, alongside with Ankara and Izmir, where the youth movement started to grow in universities in the 1960s. This period saw the establishment of new universities and the expansion of existing institutions, aimed at accommodating the growing demand for higher education parallel with the industrialization (Zürcher, 2004). Istanbul University, already a prestigious institution, expanded its enrollment capacity, while new institutions like Boğaziçi University, established in 1971, contributed to making Istanbul a key center for higher education in Turkey (Ahmad, 1977). This expansion of universities in the 1960s was crucial in providing opportunities for students from lower socio-economic backgrounds, including those from rural areas, to pursue higher education. The university boom allowed more students from lower-income families to attend university, breaking down some of the barriers that had previously limited access to higher education to the more affluent segments of society (Boratav, 1988). This was an important ground for the discussed interaction leading to radicalization.²³

²³ This phenomenon is not about the leaders or founders of revolutionary youth organisations but it is reflected through the backgrounds of some of the prominent leaders of the radical break in the beginning of the 1970s: *Ibrahim Kaypakkaya* was the son of an Alevi family living in a small village of Çorum and came to Istanbul to enroll in Istanbul University. *Mahir Çayan* was born in Samsun and came to Istanbul as a high-school student, later enrolling in Istanbul University. *Ulaş Bardakçı* was from the famous Alevi town Hacıbektaş, Nevşehir and enrolled in METU which was about to become sort of a "liberated zone" of the student movement. These names were among the few important figures and leaders of the emerging revolutionary organisations of 1970s.

Although the phenomenon of *gecekondu* slowly had become the cradle of class struggle based on the issue of urban poverty and there has always been a certain degree of class solidarity and involvement with left politics in *gecekondu* neighborhoods occupied by certain migrated populations and closely related with left politics, the urban tension (Erder, 1997) is more layered and complex as well as the class identity. Erder's (1997) term of urban tension first of all refers to the struggles of migrant *gecekondu* population who often end up in precarious, low-income jobs and their conflict between *gecekondu* residents' needs and the state's attempts to impose order. But, her conception also includes the tensions which arose between different ethnic or religious groups, as well as between new migrants and established urban residents within *gecekondu* areas as waves of migration keeping piled up on each other (Erder, 1997). These tensions were often exacerbated by perceptions of unequal access to resources and opportunities, as well as by the state's uneven enforcement of laws and regulations. Conflicts might have emerged over the use of public spaces, access to municipal services, or the distribution of aid (Erder, 1997). After all, despite the shared experience of urban poverty and exploitation, tight-knit communities based on kinship, shared regional origins, and mutual support are crucial forms of social networks in helping new arrivals find housing, jobs, and other necessities (Erder, 2013).

These social relations of *gecekondu* are as ambiguous and unstable as the legal, spatial and historical aspects of the urban-form itself: Erder (2013) discusses how local and national politics played a crucial role in shaping the district's growth with politicians engaging in clientelist practices. These relationships were complex and could change rapidly, depending on shifts in political power or economic conditions. Erder (2013) demonstrates the shaky nature by examining the urban policies, such as land regularization and redevelopment projects often influenced by these political dynamics, with varying impacts on the residents of Ümraniye. While some policies led to improvements in living conditions, others resulted in displacement or increased insecurity for the district's inhabitants which also provided a ground for inner conflicts (Erder, 2013).

This instability is highlighted by the concept of "rotating poverty" (Pınarcıoğlu & Işık, 2012) in which the poverty is passed around or "rotated" among community

members or within extended families, allowing some individuals to temporarily escape poverty while others fall into it. Despite these ever-changing dynamics inside the *gecekondu* neighborhood, they are still divided from the core of the city as marginalized areas by the roads branched through the same axis where the 15-16 June Uprising took place. Pınarcıoğlu and Işık (2012) focus on the example of Sultanbeyli which is a *gecekondu* neighborhood on the E-5 (now re-named as D-100) for their discussion. While their focus is not the road and the mobility, E-5 shows up as allowing the mobility and growth of the area while also demarcating the boundary between more affluent, formal parts of the city and the district subjected to the rotating poverty in a book written 42 years after 15-16 June 1970 (Pınarcıoğlu & Işık, 2012)

2.6. The Return of the Everyday: Another *Gecekondu* Movement

The main axis of urbanization determining the capital and human movement in all its appearances in Istanbul seems to be D-100/E-5 highway. It became a part of a larger (international) network with the construction of bridges on Bosphorus and Golden Horn as well as airports and with the additional highways that are forming the North Marmara Highway. The origin of this axis is Londra Road and later Marshall Avenue which was mentioned in relation with the events and context of 15-16 June Uprising: The project originated in 1930 during a conference at Dolmabahçe Palace, initiated by the British Automobile Association. The project included a proposal for an international road, starting in Calais and reaching Istanbul, aimed at promoting tourism and connecting Europe, laying the groundwork for the modern D-100 (E-5) highway in Turkey (Üngür, 2018). The project addressed a number of reasons necessitated this road. One reason is self-explanatory considering British Automobile Association proposed it. The fact that the association was British, the proposal was in the days prior to World War II (we were not within the post-colonial context discussed in the introduction yet) and the road is projected to reach Calais is another self-explanatory point. Two other points are also closely related with the upcoming war and, like all things modern, with Nazi Regime. Building of roads was not only the strategy of German state at the time to boost economy and provide employment after a great depression and this importance of the projects like this was mentioned

by Atatürk in his National Assembly speech in 1937 (Üngür, 2018). A German architect invited in 1936, Martin Wagner, touches upon a final reason in his report: the need for the construction and completion of the main highway network due to the increasing mobilization of the armies (Üngür, 2018).

The road project, which was interrupted due to World War II, it was brought back to the agenda by the United Nations, at the same time with the Marshall Plan was put into practice by the USA for the purpose of economic development and military integration against the communist bloc (Üngür, 2018). In 1948, OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation) was established. OEEC had the authority to continue the work within the framework of a common development program and, in particular, to control the distribution of aid. In 1961, OEEC evolved into the famous OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development).

The Economic Cooperation Agreement, which included the aid to be provided by the USA, was signed on July 4, 1948. The law was discussed and accepted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 8 and came into force by being published on July 13. The principles of the highway policy to be established within the scope of Marshall aid were laid down in 1947 by the General Director of the American Federal Highways Agency. Based on this report, Turkey adopted a 23,000 km state highway network in which E-5 route was defined and prepared a 9-year program (Üngür, 2018). That was the reason of the naming directly addressing Marshall program, hence, Bretton Woods system.

During the 1950s, various public and private construction companies were marketing their lands based on their proximity to Marshall Boulevard (Üngür, 2018). They parcel out the fields and sell them to the public with various attractive advertisement forms and payment facilities. According to Boysan (2010) 150,000 parcels were created in this way in 1953, spreads along the axes formed, creating the new city of Istanbul. More importantly, this story around the London Road is also the origin story of the land speculation and construction-based speculative economy leading the way to Canal Istanbul Project.




Figure 2. Timeline of road constructions on the axis of E-5/D-100 Source: Üngür, 2018

Erdem Üngür (2018) also points out new middle-class housing projects around this roads: “First comes the Bahçeli Evler housing area, which started to be built around the old London Asphalt in the early 1950s with the private initiative of Fikret Yüzatlı and Avni Başargan. This settlement set an example for other companies and triggered land speculation around it. This form of urbanization, which takes place in the north of Marshal Boulevard, mostly proceeds through build-and-sell business and appeals to the newly formed middle class. Second is Ataköy Site, the first part of which was completed between 1957 and 1962. The Ataköy project, which was carried out (...) on the historical gunpowder factory land purchased from the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation by Turkey Real Estate and Credit Bank) in 1955, appealed to the upper-middle class.” This examples point out that the next cycle of economy identified with real estate boom and financialization was already implemented within the previous regime of ISI with almost all of its elements, including the transformation of production sites to newly formed gentrified neighborhoods.

Maybe more importantly, it is necessary to state that a strict periodization of capitalism focusing on political-economic terms and systems usually tends to

overlook the cyclic and limping nature of capital accumulation. That kind of periodization also overlooks the fact that the undividable relation between urbanization, migration and industrialization processes only come together and ripped apart constantly in everyday life. The moment a system or regime is defined on certain characteristics and dispositions that differentiate it from the others, counterpart tendencies start to make their presence felt as deep currents.

This is also true when it comes to class analysis, classes don't exist as entities in themselves and a defined population as a class tends to transform and re-form in itself from the beginning. Similarly, class movement, like any social movement is subjected to this transformation through this or that deep current created by its own movement. For the organized working class created 15-16 June, that deep current was the social ground allowing them being a network of communities throughout the landscape of the developing urban space and strengthening their ability of organization: *gecekondu*. Çağlar Keyder (2020:24) defines this deep current as “the hidden mobilization” of 1960s and demonstrates how it determines the social and political atmosphere after 1970:

This slow-motion mobilization challenged the Republican imaginary of the society where there had been a clear division between the elites in the city and the great unwashed in the countryside whose access to the city had to be strictly circumscribed. It also challenged the prevailing conception of property by blatantly flouting the tenets of ownership as migrants would squat on land that did not belong to them – and the authorities were mostly helpless to prevent the occupation. Eventually, of course, the *gecekondu* movement created an alternative world in the cities that challenged the cultural and political hegemony of the Republican elite.

(...)

This was never a smooth process, often meeting reversals, but in the vast majority of cases the mission was eventually accomplished. Demands were mostly presented in the form of collective action by the residents of newly formed neighborhoods and the struggle would continue in the form of a long-lasting war of position.

Keyder (2020:25) also draws on the structural and historical conditions that enabled this movement:

There are certainly structural conditions that made possible the eventual success of the *gecekondu* movement: with modernization in agriculture, growth of manufacturing and services in large cities, and the persistent urban-rural gap in incomes, migration that brought the new workers to town could not be avoided. Secondly, no government during the 1960s or after was strong enough to formulate a housing policy whereby they would either undertake the construction of inexpensive housing to be made available to migrants, or arrange to sell them public land in allotments and on credit. The migrants had no choice but to engage in political and collective action. Thirdly, the property structure in cities, and especially in Istanbul, was sufficiently ambivalent that migrants did not have to confront clearly recognized private owners of land. There was a lot of public land (belonging to the state), and land whose mostly non-Moslem owners had perished or were no longer in the country to defend their property.

Keyder (2020) concludes with a analysis saying that this population became the power behind the center-right parties against statist Republicans for the next decades. This totalizing conclusion, that is true for the most part, overlooks the totality itself. I discussed the effects of Balkan migration on the formation of this neighborhoods as well as organized working class that empowered DISK and leftist movements at the time, I also discussed other waves of labor migration including Alevis and Kurds whose communal historicity played a differentiated role on the political affiliations of *gecekondu* population, as well how they faced with the state and authorities. Just as a counter example of Keyder's discussion (2020), Alevi population of *gecekondus*, including the very same Alevi neighborhoods with strong radical left affiliations, have also been strongly affiliated with Republican People's Party against the conservative appeals of center-right threatening them. There are a lot of dynamics in play within the migrant populations but generally, the historical remnants of communities were in play, just like the state-owned land as a remnant of Ottoman Empire and the process is more complex than Keyder's summary.

But his main point that the *gecekondu* movement became a part of the market mentality (Keyder, 2020) is valid regardless of these political affiliations. Parallel to the gentrification dynamics set by construction companies around the transportation axis discussed above and the migrated working class became a more complex and contradictory entity in itself through property: "If the shantytown dwellers eventually become the owners of shack-houses, they turn into champions of private property, free enterprise and democratic politics." (Karpas, 1976:29)

Yet, the history of capitalism is embedded in the story of towns against rural, the never-ending working class formation and dissolution has always been embedded in the history of immigrants and settlers. It is essential to remember that Kurdish migration and its impacts on the social movement especially in Istanbul are excluded from Karpat's analysis written in 1976, although Keyder took it as a fixed point. Furthermore, sadly, the newer waves of labor migration such as Afghan and Syrian workers who are already an important portion of the working class in Turkey are excluded in this thesis.²⁴

As also Mike Davis (2004) concludes, under the structural transformations we discussed, the cradle of revolutionary movements has been shifting towards the new urban poor which is also reflected through the shift from factory occupations of 1960s leading to 15-16 June Workers' uprising to the liberated zones of 1970s within the same context of the shift of class struggles from war of position to explosive struggles of survivals.

²⁴ It is hard to find statistics about refugee workers in Turkey but according to ILO report, the number of Syrian workers actively employed was already 813.000, most of which working informally, in 2017.

CHAPTER 3

2013 JUNE UPRISING: GEZI RESISTANCE AS A MOMENT

3.1. Historical Context: The emergence of Total State

Parallel to the state of the world, Turkey faced several economic challenges, including high inflation, rising public debt, and a growing balance of payments deficit in 1970s. The increase in oil prices significantly impacted Turkey, a country heavily reliant on imported energy, thereby escalating inflationary pressures and straining the foreign exchange reserves (Keyder, 1987). This economic turmoil was compounded by political instability, characterized by frequent changes in government and increasing social unrest.

In response to these crises, the Turkish government implemented a series of stabilization and structural adjustment policies. These included significant devaluations of the lira, cuts in public spending, and a move towards liberalizing trade. The shift towards an export-oriented growth strategy was particularly notable, as it represented a departure from the ISI model (Boratav, 2005). The IMF and World Bank also had substantial influence, as their financial support was contingent upon the implementation of specific economic policies, including fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, and the promotion of private sector development (Boratav, 2005).

This financial support and credits only pushed the state further into the public investments in large-scale infrastructure projects, which was already essential for ISI strategy, in order to achieve integration of this new free world of trade. The expansion and improvement of road network were significant focuses of government investment. Notable projects included the development of the Trans-European

Motorway (TEM) network, which aimed to link Turkey more closely with European trade routes and markets (Keyder, 1987). One of the most iconic projects of the 1970s was the construction of the Bosphorus Bridge completed in 1973 in order to facilitate trade, and improve accessibility, further integrating the city into the global economy (Pamuk, 2007). Hence, the axis, on which we have been moving back and forth with migrants, workers and capital, started to take down any natural limits to keep up the pace.

Within this context, *gecekondu* movement was a double movement. This period was marked by significant socio-economic challenges for *gecekondu* residents, including inadequate housing, lack of basic services, and limited access to formal employment (Keyder, 1987). Socially, *gecekondu* residents faced significant stigmatization and marginalization. They were often perceived as a burden on urban resources and services, and their settlements were viewed as undesirable by the urban middle and upper classes. This social exclusion was compounded by limited access to formal employment opportunities, as the unemployment started to rise as discussed in the introduction (Güvenç, 1996).

In the turbulent political landscape of the 1970s in Turkey, *gecekondu* residents often found themselves caught in the middle of political struggles. Various political parties and movements sought to mobilize *gecekondu* residents, either as a voting bloc or as part of broader political struggles, including leftist movements advocating for workers' and tenants' rights (Karpas, 1976). The residents of *gecekondu* areas began to organize to demand legal recognition, infrastructure improvements, and social services. These struggles led to the passing of laws and regulations aimed at regularizing and upgrading these settlements, although implementation was uneven (Güvenç, 1996). The struggles of *gecekondu* residents in the 1970s laid the groundwork for future urban policy debates, the issues of housing, urban poverty, and the right to the city, influencing subsequent housing policies and urban planning strategies (Erman, 2001).

In other cases, authorities adopted a more pragmatic approach (sometimes as a part of right-wing political campaigns Keyder was referring to), providing basic services

and legal recognition in an effort to integrate *gecekondu* areas into the urban fabric as well urban transformation and rising construction industry (Karpas, 1976). This was the counterpart of the movement in which the migrant working class residents of these neighborhoods were turning into settlers (Karpas, 1976).

Just as the policies on *gecekondus* and urban transformation, the transformation from ISI to open market strategy was also indecisive under the pressure of social demands and movements (which the Trilateral Commission wouldn't approve at all). The 24 January Decisions in 1979, supported by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, provided financial assistance in exchange for implementing these structural adjustment policies but these measures were deeply unpopular among many segments of the population, as they led to sharp increases in prices and unemployment (Pamuk, 2007). The "happy congruence of circumstances for democracy has come to an end" (Trilateral Commission, 1975) with the 1980 military coup.

The 1980s in Turkey were characterized by a shift from state-led industrialization to a more market-oriented economy. This transformation was initiated by the 1980 military coup and subsequent economic policies under Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who pursued liberalization, privatization, and deregulation (Öniş, 1991). The construction industry emerged as a key driver of growth during this period, benefiting from relaxed regulations, increased private investment, and a growing urban population (Pamuk, 2014). The demands of the population now can be put into a short circuit of capital cycle: The liberalization of the banking sector and financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated the expansion of credit. Easy access to credit, particularly for consumer loans and mortgages, played a crucial role in fueling the real estate and construction boom on one hand and the rapid expansion and speculative investment in real estate contributed to the formation of asset bubbles which in return contribute the financialization of economy (Harvey, 2005; Aalbers, 2016).

The project capitalism of 2000s resting largely on projects was born out of this context and its main characteristics can be summarized as below:

- The elimination of the last vestiges of urban planning, and its replacement by initiatives and investments in the form of large urban (and rural) projects. Cities are not only places where surplus-value containing commodities are produced and consumed, and labor power is reproduced, but also the transformation of the project-oriented reproduction of cities themselves into large-scale production of surplus value (and interest and rent shares within this) (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
- At this point, large infrastructure and construction projects on large rent lands derived from public lands, living and reproduction areas of social labor, nature, forests and water basins by their destruction, the relentless reproduction of the city itself, coincide with the reproduction and valorization of capital by opening up new areas of valorization for over-accumulated finance capital. (Harvey, 2012)
- The valorization of the city itself as imaginary and speculative capital based on the transfer of property and displacement leads to deepening commodification: the destructive devaluation of labor, living spaces and nature, and the grinding of labor and nature's reproduction processes within the wheels of capital (Smith, 2002).

The first steps regarding urban transformation on a larger scale in Turkey were the Real Estate Investment Partnership regulations initiated in public banks within the framework of the IMF and the “transition to a strong economy program” (TÜSİAD, 2003) before AKP won the elections. This brought about a new form of financial capital formed by the fusion of finance, industry and rent capital. In 2004, the construction of shanty houses was deemed a crime punishable by 5 years in prison and banned. This was followed in 2005 by regulations that would tear down shanty houses, historical and natural conservation areas and transfer their ownership to capital, and by granting municipalities the authority to conduct urban transformation projects together with TOKİ and private investors. In 2007, banks were granted mortgage and individual housing loan authorizations.

Thus, along with the urban transformation projects that gradually accelerated, the project accumulation of financial capital formed by the fusion of bank, industry, real

estate, municipal and state capital also jumped at a larger scale in which most of the districts and neighborhoods we discussed around 15-16 June can be brought together with the centers of Istanbul in one paragraph and one big project:

According to the plan, the city will become suitable for the demands of the cultural and business world. Projects that are being discussed in the public such as Galataport, Dubai Towers, Haydarpaşa Port, Zeytinburnu Silicon Valley will also have the chance to be realized thanks to this plan. Nine trade and service centers will be positioned on the European side and seven on the Anatolian side. These centers will spread the population within the framework of the city's development potential. (...) It will be graded according to their functionality and functions. For this purpose, business centers will be divided into categories as traditional, first, second degree and sub-center. According to the plan, Ataşehir on the Anatolian side, Silivri, İkitelli, Bağcılar regions on the European side will be turned into first degree trade and service centers. Second degree trade and service centers will be established in Pendik and Esenyurt. Sub-centers will be established on the European side in Çanta, Selimpaşa, Avcılar, Gaziosmanpaşa, and on the Anatolian side in Ümraniye, Kartal and near Sabiha Gökçen Airport. While the Eminönü region is positioned as the traditional center, the region including Haydarpaşa will be prepared as a tourism, trade, culture and residential area. In addition, the region encompassing Beşiktaş, Güngören, Gaziosmanpaşa, Kağıthane and Şişli will be evaluated as a central business district and integration zone. (...) Management, control and coordination functions will be determined on a national and international scale, and financial institutions, specialized and specialized service and trade functions will be included. (Referans newspaper, February 14, 2009. Quoted by F. Ercan, B. Ergüder, While Thinking and Feeling on Istanbul, Economics Journal Issue 500, 2009)

Starting from the 1980s, the Ministry of Transport gradually began to take over the railways, ports, airports, highway constructions, the maritime and coastal safety, telecommunications and information-communication institutions within other ministries and took the form of the "Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communication" in 2011, and the "Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure" in 2018. The 3rd bridge and the new airport in Istanbul, Eurasia tunnel (tube passage), Northern Marmara Motorway, new ports and Taksim Project, silicon/IT valley in Gebze and all the other projects in the scope of the Ministry are actually aiming to transform Turkey into a critical hub as the logistics and communication are playing the central role of fastening capital cycle in the face of the falling rates of profit. At

this point, projects like Canal Istanbul²⁵ should not be taken as simple rent speculation, and the growing axis of Istanbul with new bridges, airports and roads are not simply infrastructure investment, but rather surplus production itself (Filizler, 2023).

The 3rd Bridge was one of the most controversial projects of construction based policies of the government and opposition against it was frequently reminding the words about a third bridge said by Erdoğan back when he was the mayor of Istanbul in 1994: “the murder of the city” (Atasoy, 2013) (Indeed, later it was halted shortly by legal controversies over the location and destruction of the forests in July 2013, in the midst of Gezi Protests.)

It is also a concrete crossover between the seemingly two contradictory approaches: Weberian²⁶ “depoliticization” in which politics and other spheres are submissive to instrumental rationality of the capitalist market and Schmittian “politicization of every sphere” (Schmitt, 1933) including economy. After all, its construction was foreseen as an economic investment in the 90s and there had been speculative investments in the land and construction market around it for quite some time. And finally, it was built by political actors who had been against it before, even labeled the project as the “murder of the city”, as well as they had been against the presidency system in the beginning. From that perspective who is in charge of the government seems to be an ineffective matter, it is a matter of Weber’s “instrumental rationality” (Weber, 1922): The construction of the bridge was forced upon the political actors due to a market rationality as they involve with *politics as a vocation* (Weber, 1919). But on the other side, the very same government demonstrates almost

²⁵ Canal Istanbul is an ambitious infrastructural project proposed by the Turkish government, intended to create a new artificial shipping channel connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, parallel to the Bosphorus Strait. The project, often referred to as one of Turkey's "mega projects," is designed to alleviate congestion in the Bosphorus and enhance maritime safety (Çetin&Demirkesen, 2020)

²⁶ Max Weber's concept of depoliticization is closely tied to his theories of bureaucracy and rationalization, where decision-making in modern societies increasingly shifts from political discourse to administrative processes governed by technical expertise and formal rules. This bureaucratic management leads to the removal of political debate from key decisions, framing them instead as neutral, technical matters. This depoliticization is evident in the operation of the state, where governance is handled more through institutionalized procedures than through overt political conflict, reflecting a broader rationalization process in modernity (Weber, 1978).

a perfect example of Schmitt's *total state* under which "the public finances have assumed such proportions that cannot be considered merely a quantitative increase, but rather a qualitative transformation, a "structural change" which will affect all the sectors of public life" through public binding and "the free-market is (...) taken by the decisive influence of a will in itself essentially extra-economic, namely, the will of the state" (Schmitt, 1931:10-11) through vast government construction projects. And it doesn't stop with the public binding and project actually.

But just as in the case of Germany in Schmitt's account, need for a total state is neither "domestic" nor "national" although it can only be achieved by the charismatic leadership that claims to be both. Beginning with the paradigm shift due to the crisis in mid-70s, this long-term construction has two complementary yet frictional characteristics which would make both Weber and Schmitt highly relevant in 1980s: firstly, marketization of every sphere of human life including basic education, public health, etc. and secondly, divorcing the management of the economic sphere from any counter-social and political effect. This, so to speak, "Weberian characteristic" is complemented by the frictional Schmittian one: This transformation, initially led by a number of national/international independent bodies of market management, would need an authoritarian leadership able to forge "public will" accordingly and manage "demos" (or from then on "human capital") as a business at some point. Logical continuity between subsequent periods of AKP governments and as well as the continuity between the 1980 military coup and those governments can also be understood in this perspective.

Between 1980s and 2010s, social and political transformation in Turkey had been characterized by the constant movement towards this contradictory totality we discussed above: financialization of economy including further integration with global markets, commodification of social relations and public sphere as this integration needs them as open investment markets to financial capital and the reconstruction of the state to enhance its capacity of micro-management of these assets including population itself. Following the mass privatization of state owned industries and public services, this would be only sustainable through extensive urban redevelopment projects, which often led to the displacement of *gecekond*

residents repeatedly (Keyder, 2010) as well as marketization of public spaces and natural sites.

The 2000s were marked by significant resistance to the final wave of privatizations, such as those involving TEKEL, alongside emerging ecological struggles, including opposition to Hydroelectric Power Plants (HES), and resistance to gentrification efforts in neighborhoods like Tarlabası and Sulukule (Duran, 2011; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Adaman, 2011; Öztürk, 2012). Just before the presidential system enacted in this continuity, Gezi Protests/June Uprising was a “moment” of resistance in which the composition of the participants seemed to be hard to “totalize” even for analytical purposes, other than the common ground of resisting the existent government’s totalitarian policies and anti-democratic decision-making and the definition of “new coalitions of various classes and social groups that perceived themselves as the losers in neoliberal development” (Della Porta, 2017:7)

3.2. Following the content of the Gezi from a diary of the resistance: Gezi Post

Indeed, Gezi Park Resistance, or Gezi Protests, or June Uprising have been evaluated with countless analysis from sometimes totally opposite perspectives and can be seen as a diverse coalition of activists, including environmentalists, secularists, and leftist groups (Özkırımlı, 2014), protest against urban policies as a reflection of broader socio political changes under the ruling party (Mills, 2015), as the grievances of marginalized groups (Yörük, 2014) and also within the global context of protest movements like Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring (Gürcan & Peker, 2015). Two main reasons are enabling this: heterogeneity of the mass that performed resistance and the variety of motivations that brought this heterogeneous mass together. Hence, heterogeneity or diversity manifests itself in two aspects: the profile of the resistance and political discourses among that profile. The resistance profile had spread to a wide range from people who have never engaged in any political movement until that “moment” to an organized, active, politically narrower segment. Not only in regards to political identities, but also we can observe the same diversity for other social parameters such as class belonging or age variances. Sure, if you only sample the central points in big cities and high profile media coverage, it

may be a little bit easier to categorize the mass as something like “white collar middle class” but if you just step meters further to the barricades around Taksim (or, before the succeeded occupation day, to the front lines of clashes which are usually further away from the bigger crowd and include much less people) you would find another typology that is similar to the stronghold neighbourhoods of the resistance and if you add smaller cities to your sample there will be enough heterogeneity and diversity for both composition and motivations of the mass in action (Kuymulu, 2013). Of course, the heterogeneity in this profile was reflected in the tones in political discourse. While some solely focused on representative politics with demands of “political resignation”, some other spoke from an obviously premature "revolutionary uprising" perspective or programs with anticipated optimism. The resistance included various forms and militancy levels adorned with different discourses some of which were reproduced from submissive demands of “political recognition and respect”, some from a defensive “freedom of the private space” stand and many other political positions.

Although diversity and heterogeneity is the obvious case to make, there are still three points by which the resistance can easily be categorized and classified. First of all, it fits into a wave of protest in the form of occupation of public spaces which occurred countless countries throughout the world, especially between 2011 and 2013. Secondly, again like most of these protests, totalitarianism was at the target of the protests at the same time with neo-liberal policies involving the marketization of public life among the protestors. But the distinctiveness of the Gezi Resistance/June Uprising can be found in bringing the masses together within street politics out of the established order, just when the possibilities of making direct politics in any issue that concerns their lives had been narrowing and the “politics” turned into a spectacle where everything was almost pre-determined as much as a new bridge on Bosphorus. The desire manifested itself in the opening up and expanding the 'area' of politics in the face of reduction of it to the level of representative-parliamentary politics since the '80 coup and especially in the AKP period. In short, the Gezi Resistance is not merely the result of totalitarianism but also the crisis of the representative-parliamentary democracy itself that has only become more visible with the AKP. The

political channels of the system were so narrowed that the masses tried to open politics in a sudden and quick politicization.

As widely accepted, Gezi Protests started with the violent eviction of sit-in protesters against the Taksim Urban Development Project which aims to demolish Gezi Park, a central park in the midst of the city. At the night of May 27th, a wall of the park was demolished and 5 trees were pulled off. That sparked a sit-in protest by a few environmentalists who started to camp in the park on the morning of May 28th, in order to halt the further demolition of the park. They were violently evicted and their tents were burned down. On May 29th, sit-in protest was revived with more protesters joining the encampment with more tents. It was replied by the police with another raid on the morning May 30th, which in return caused small clashes with police during the day and increased number of sit-in protesters in the evening. Finally, the awaited raid on the May 31st, caused much larger protests not only on Istiklal Avenue and Taksim, but also in a number of other metropolitan cities throughout the country. Istiklal Avenue and Taksim Square witnessed thousands of people rushing to the protests in the afternoon. Clashes between the police barricaded the park and the mass who wanted to go into the park took all night long with many injuries and an excessive usage of tear gas even causing the death of Selim Önder (88), an old man living near the area. The next day, not only a larger crowd gathered in Taksim but also many protesters started to walk to Taksim with large number all around Istanbul, all met with police intervention. Tear gas started to be thrown from helicopters in some districts. The already started protests in other cities also increased in number while people in some other joined the protests in their cities. In the afternoon of June 1st the police force withdrew from the park, Taksim Square and Istiklal Avenue and left the area to the protesters. The protesters stayed inside and around the park in that night, demolishing the signs and machines of Taksim Project and their stay-in lasted more than 2 weeks (Tugal, 2013; Gambetti, 2014).

The apparent reason behind the escalation of protests was police brutality as stated in many discussions and researches. Gezi Report of Konda (2014) states that half of the participants decided to participate after seeing the police brutality, while 20 percent decided to participate after the removal of states, 15 percent decided after the

statement of PM disregarding public opinion in the process of decision making and threatening any opposition with the half of the population voting for them, and 10 percent decided after the Taksim Project was declared. In any case, it was known that the police brutality was not exceptional. In this case, it could also be easily related to decision making processes keeping out the residents as well as the opposition, reducing it to gaining the majority in parliamentary elections. This was also reflected in the answers of the participants to the question of “why are you here?”: “For freedom”, “demand for rights” and “against the dictatorship and oppression” constitutes the most of them (Konda, 2014). Lefebvre famously formulates right to the city as “a cry and demand” not only for the appropriation of urban space and sources entailed to it, but also for participating in life as an active and collective agent (Lefebvre, 1968). The general attitudes and perceptions of the participants in resistance fit into this formulation. Urban space and management of it was the substantial ground for the emergence of a collective movement as because it has been the substantial ground of capital accumulation and state control.

Growing tension of the first 3 days, the increase in the participation in the face of every increase in the police violation, also reflects the tension of the almost every element of the conjunctural crisis: Involvement of the government in the Syrian War became a hot topic especially after Reyhanlı bombing in Hatay (Güney, 2014). The presidential system started to be discussed more intensely on the same year. The government interventions on daily life, especially targeting women and youth such as prohibition of abortion, restriction on alcohol and places of entertainment, etc. sparked various protests. Taksim Square was closed to the May Day marchers as the government show the renovation work in the square as the reason.

While Taksim Square is banned to the worker movement, 2013 was also the year in which workers' resistance and actions reached the most prevalence since the second half of the 90s: At least 181,000 workers went on strike, resistance or demonstration, a total of 27 thousand workers made 44 legal strikes (Kaygısız, 2014). More importantly, an important percentage of those actions were more radical actions which had been rare up to that date: 11 percent of those actions was occupation of workplaces and 10 percent of them were actions such as blocking entry of the

factory, wildcat strike, taking the manager hostage. (Kaygısız, 2014) Both the protests against lifestyle interventions of government and the worker's action demonstrated a parallel sentiment: on one hand, women's right of disposition on their own body, right of disposition of people's own time and on the usage of public and private space; on the other hand, struggle to control places of production as in factory occupations and blocking actions. Environmental controversies around the third bridge was also heated on the same days because of the opening ceremony. On this ground, it should not be a surprise that more than half of the participants in Gezi Park had participated a protest before, although only a quarter of them is affiliated with any organisation or social movement. (Konda, 2014)

The resistance did not fully lack an organisational background. Taksim Solidarity Platform was found in January 2012, one and a half year before the protests, after the declaration of Taksim Project by the government and has already been conducting a campaign against the project. The Platform was comprised of 124 organizations including many political organisations as well as non-political communities such as sports club fan groups and has played the role of a representative committee during the Gezi Protests. After the occupation of the park on June 1st, we could say that the protests and actions took two parallel paths. Inside the park, it the movement took the form of prefigurative politics²⁷ focusing on building a "communal living space" (Gezi Postası, 9 June 2013) which also inspired similar initiatives in other neighbourhoods of Istanbul and in the central public spaces of other cities. Outside the Gezi Park and other occupied spaces, the clashes between the police and the protesters continued during which a number of protestors were killed (Tuğal, 2013). Inside the park, a lot of organisations predated Gezi took the main roles in the configuration of the life in the park while some new organisations focusing on specific tasks (from publication of newspaper to mapping, from security of the

²⁷ Prefigurative politics refers to the strategy and practice of creating and embodying the social relations, practices, and institutions that activists seek to realize in the broader society (Graeber, 2009). Instead of waiting for systemic change to occur, proponents of prefigurative politics aim to "prefigure" or model the desired future in the present, within their own communities and movements. This concept is often associated with social movements that emphasize horizontalism, direct democracy, and participatory practices, rejecting hierarchical structures in favor of more egalitarian forms of organization. The idea is that the means of struggle should reflect the ends being pursued, aligning everyday practices with long-term goals.

barricades to building) emerged, even their role in the action were smaller. On the other hand, forums, which were promoted by many as the main mediums of collective decision making, did not actually play an important role in direct decision making (that role largely remained in Taksim Solidarity Platform as the participant organisations played the role of spreading those decisions), in the defence of the area or in the prefigurative actions of building a communal space. They were more active on other cities and neighbourhoods.

One of the newly emerged organizations in the resistance, *Gezi Post*, a daily paper prepared and distributed by a small collective of protestors knowing each other prior to the protests through friendship networks, provides an archive to observe the agenda of the resistance from an activist perspective. *Gezi Post* was organized with a group of friends who were not in the same organization prior to the resistance and largely knowing each other only through social media. The intentions of staying in Taksim Square and Gezi Park during the resistance led to a physical organization, and only after being present in there collectively the idea of a daily newspaper was discussed with common sentiment of answering the needs of the resistance and organization of the crowd, just like the many other organizations that emerged in the field.

The group organized the making up and publishing of the newspaper with the help of people working in the publishing sector and a website and social media accounts were set to collect news country-wide alongside developing relations with other organizations in the field. The newspaper, published as a fanzine was not only distributed in Taksim, but also in neighborhoods like *Okmeydanı* through members of the group for free, while the financing was provided with donations. Later, the issues of the newspaper were uploaded on the website <http://gazetegezipostasi.blogspot.com/> which is still accessible to allow anyone to download, publish and distribute it.

With a core group of 30 people, presence in the roof organization and meetings and daily contacts with every forum around the country about their meetings, the newspaper tried to cover every aspect of the resistance and reflect the agenda. Yet,

you can observe the day-to-day transformation in tone and focus of its agenda which also presents a diary of the moods the resistance went through.

I will divide the agenda of the publication into four periods. The first period is constituted with the first three issues largely demonstrating the content and the forms of resistance:

- The headline of the first issue dated June 8th is “Our answer to the prime minister” and emphasising that the public spaces do not belong to the government or the capital, but to people. Besides that, the obvious focus was the prefigurative action in the park as well as the needs of life and regulation: A list of needs and how to does? promotion of other initiatives like Gezi Radio, Gezi Library and Gezi Vegetable Garden. Beside them, there is a short introduction of Taksim Solidarity Platform stating its role of coordination. There are only two news from other cities. A declaration from the resistance in Ankara and the demands of the resistance in Dersim. The demands of Dersim are especially interesting as it summarized many points of our discussion:

- 1- Constructions of hydroelectric power plants, dams and nuclear power stations should be stopped as they are endangering natural life and social life of communities.
- 2- The article approved on 21/05/2013 that grants all the projects that are included in the public investment program an exemption “Environmental Impact Evaluation” should be repealed.
- 3- The environmental damage in Gola Chetu caused by the Uzun Çayır Dam should be restituted.
- 4- The permits for mineral exploration which leads to destruction of the flora and fauna in the mountains should be cancelled.
- 5- The construction of military outposts should be stopped and environmental damage should be restituted.
- 6- Raa Heq (“path of truth”, doctrine of Kızılbash Alevism), our faith cannot be defined as the decrees of the state or the government. The government should give up the alienating attitude towards the Alevis. In that vein, the third bridge over the Bosphorus should be

named Pir Sultan rather than Yavuz Sultan Selim as a sign of goodwill.²⁸

7- Our language, endangered *Zazaki* should be the language of instruction in Dersim.

- Issue 2 (June 9th) focuses on various protests on the “pillage of the cities” starting from the meeting in Taksim and giving more place to the protests from other cities on that respect. On the other hand, it continues its emphasis on “communal living space” with an addition of a security alert against the police behind the barricades. It also includes three of the five general demands as formulated by the Platform: “Gezi Park should be kept as a park, police forces responsible for violence against the protesters and killing three of them should be investigated and brought to book, all those arrested should be released.”
- Issue 3 (June 10th) keeps focusing on the demonstration around the country with more news. In that issue, while we can see a “Map of the Gezi Park” what is where in and around the park demonstrating as an organized living space. There is also news critical on the masculine behaviors in the park.
- With the fourth issue (June 11th), although the former content is not totally abounded, we can observe an escalation in the political contradiction with the government, as it suddenly starts to become central topic. That is due to the statements from the government saying that they don’t recognise the Taksim Solidarity Platform and if it is needed to establish a committee to negotiate, it will be done by the government itself. The paper publishes the declaration of

²⁸ The ground breaking ceremony of the third bridge over the Bosphorus was carried out on 29 May 2013 (the anniversary day of the conquest of Constantinople) coinciding with the start of Gezi Protests. Its name was declared by the state president at the time Abdullah Gül in the same ceremony in remembrance of Yavuz Sultan Selim, Ottoman monarch best known for Alevi massacres and his struggle against Shah Ismail, again an important historical figure for Alevi population. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister of the time who later became the president was also present in the ceremony and expressed his aspiration for a faster completion than expected. The bridge was one of the most controversial projects of construction-based policies of the government and opposition against it was frequently reminding the words about a third bridge said by Erdoğan back when he was the major of Istanbul in 1994: “the murder of the city” (Atasoy, 2013). Indeed, later it was halted shortly by legal controversies over the location and destruction of the forests in July 2013, in the midst of Gezi Protests. The naming also contributed to the opposition and the controversy among Alevi population from their perspective.

Taksim Solidarity Platform on the issue, saying that the demands are obvious and the addressee, but not openly saying that they are the committee to negotiate. Alongside with two statements, the paper states that the addressee is the protesters with the headline of “Set up whatever committee you want, we are the ones you have to talk”.

- The headline of the Issue 5 (June 12th) is “If the Taksim Square falls, Gezi Park will fall” as this issue marks the police raid into the square, but not into the park. The issue solely focuses on the raid and the clashes on the morning of June 11th, as well as operations entailed with the raid.
- Issue 6 (June 13th) with the headline of “the cities are ours” repeats the main message from the beginning. Although it partially returns the news from the resistance, the main issue was the plebiscite on the statue of Gezi Park offered by the government and the criticism of their majority democracy approach resting on “yes” and “no” questions. The issue is mostly critical of the established political scene based on voting, rather than being the subject of the urban space through organization.
- Issue 7 (June 14th) and Issue 8 (June 15th-16th) marks a third period as they come after the government decides to meet with Taksim Solidarity Platform. On the June 13th there was a meeting between the Platform and the government. Issue 7 speaks about the meeting and the declaration from the Platform with a critical tone, although seeing it as a backstep from government. The issue with the headline “We are here, not going anywhere” states that the real addressee is “the Park, the Square, Dersim, Ankara, Gazi Neighbourhood and the dead ones”. As the Platform said nothing on the demands and opens a door for the plebiscite after meeting, it states that they hope “the demands of the Platform was represented against the government” and until they are done, the park would stay occupied.
- Issue 8 comes after a Taksim Solidarity Platform meeting following the meeting with government. 10 forums (each of them includes 1000 people) within the park sent representatives to that meeting upon call. In that meeting the central committee of the Platform suggest a solution of “one tent” on the Square and removing the tents in the park. 9 out of 10 forums rejected the suggestion seeing it as a compromise and the other one abstained from the

decision. The next day, a declaration of a “single tent” was declared by the Platform anyway. Issue 8 has almost the same headline with Issue 7 with an expansion: “We are not going, we are here, we are together and everywhere”. This time, the content is more critical towards the Platform with quotes from the forums. It also publishes the speech of the paper in the meeting night before, refusing the ultimatum from the government, emphasising the common decision of the forums, emphasising that the loss of the park by police raid will not be worse than a step back to a political platform that the government points without any gain. It also emphasis their demand for a direct democracy and openly criticised the attitudes of representative approach and “parenting” attitude due to the comments in the meeting. But, this issue marks the end of daily publication, as a declaration from the Platform was followed by the police raid into the park, ending the occupation day after which is covered by Issue 9.

- With the Issue 10 (June 29th), the fourth period begins. The issue reminds a speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan, saying that “if I cannot set the agenda, I cannot be the Prime Minister”. Stating that the Prime Minister was right, the paper states that Gezi Resistance is about “taking the agenda in our own hand”. Instead of a headline, there is a photo of a graffiti from the Gezi Resistance: “There is your agenda!” The following issues being published less frequently seems to try to focus on “the agenda” around the ongoing struggles after the end of the occupation in Gezi Park.
- The headline of the final issue, Issue 14 (July 29th), is “Today is 53” referring *Zafer Cömert*, the brother of *Abdullah Cömert* who was killed during the protests 53 days ago, stating the time has been stopped after the loss of his brother. The families of the victims of police violence during the process paid a visit to the Parliament and his speech on the paper was also from that day.

3.3. Lefebvrian moment of Gezi: When the Urban-form embodies the urban-tension

The Gezi Resistance of course did not fall from the sky. Prior to that, it is necessary to talk about hundreds of movements and protests occupying a long period of time,

from the Kurdish movement to the resistance of TEKEL workers²⁹, from ecological struggles and urban movements, to the protests against AKP government's authoritarian regime and police terrorism, from the advocacy of the lifestyle or the feminist movement. If Gezi was the result of something, it was the result of all the struggles that were carried out and the outcome of long process composed of these struggles. But it is also an explosion point and a breaking moment from that continuity. As the resistance erupted, it assembled all these struggles during the process that preceded it and integrated much more than the total sum of them. In this respect, Gezi Resistance was a moment.

A moment is “*the attempt to achieve the total realization of a possibility*. Possibility offers itself; and it reveals itself. (...) Every realization as a totality implies a constitutive action, an inaugural act. Simultaneously, this act singles out a meaning, and creates that meaning. It sets up a structuring against the uncertain and transitory background of the everyday.” (Lefebvre, 1961:2002) Just like when the people realized they are becoming more and more alienated from the city they live in, and that their own/public places are being confiscated one by one, in a “moment”, a critical moment in which a group of “bona fide environmentalists” who wanted to protect the fauna of the park were confronted by disproportionate police violence and surpassing a certain threshold of consciousness, becoming a totality of mass, unorganized at first but yet directed towards a goal in the street, square, and resistance. Like every moment, Gezi “is constituted by a choice which singles it out and separates it from a muddle or a confusion, i.e., from an initial ambiguity.” (Lefebvre, 1961/2002:200)

Although looking only the moment not the process would be fallacious, it is also very convenient that the focal point of the resistance was urban tension as well as the outbreak moment was the police brutality against “a handful of environment activist” defending Gezi Park, a free public area surrounded by the most celebrated streets of trade and consumption (Istiklal Avenue) and the most central square of the city,

29 TEKEL Resistance also occupied a city center in 2007, this time in Kızılay, Ankara. And despite the other widespread actions against privatizations and a lot of worker resistance, it specifically gathered social opposition around class struggle and became an important moment. Also, if Gezi marks the transition from second period of AKP governments to third period, TEKEL Resistance was the moment that marks the transition from first to second.

Taksim Square³⁰. In short, the urban tension on the scale of whole city instead of on the scale of *gecekondus* has been the most important “locality” in the focus of the resistance that makes it so strong and fulcrum of the movement enabling its spread to a wider population. All other political discourses have existed in the resistance necessarily deploying themselves around the urban issue.

“However, the relation of the moment to the everyday cannot be determined by externality alone. The moment is born of the everyday and within the everyday. From here it draws its nourishment and its substance; and this is the only way it can deny the everyday. It is in the everyday that a possibility becomes apparent (be it play, work or love, etc.) in all its brute spontaneity and ambiguity.” (Lefebvre, 1961:2002) The urban tension (Erder, 1997) on the scale of the whole city as a greater proportion of urban population is subjected to the instability and marginalization of *gecekondus* with varying degrees. This is the main issue that led to the explosion of Gezi as a moment with the traces of important processes in the background. While the resistance was both exploding and spreading to a wide population, the main motivation behind it was the pillage of cities and urban spaces in general, and production of (urban) space according to this pillage. Of course, the political elements embedded in the body of the resistance cannot be limited with the right to the city as a demand; on the contrary, this demand occupies a much smaller place than the general movement. However, the fact that this massiveness and explosiveness could not be achieved in any case that took place in the process before this moment, caused the urban question to be manifested as a source of legitimacy for the movement in every step and legitimacy is rarely a moral reference as opposed to popular belief. It is a material ground on which a social force or an agent can produce and reproduce itself. Thus, the subjects that constitute the movement could reproduce themselves through the urban struggle because of its substantiality as a ground.

30 Taksim Square was also just in the center of one of the biggest urban renovation plans of capital investment in which on the one hand the Golden Horn and some of the Bosphorus will be turned into an international “door” and on the other hand poor (and “troublesome” for the state as well as trade) neighborhoods at the center of the city, *Tarlabası* to *Okmeydanı*, will be turned into shiny high price residential areas. But beside being a common meeting place for the “commoners”, it has also a symbolic importance for workers’ movement as the Square of 1. May. With this much burden it was of course open to contentious event.

The ties between the financialization of capital and impoverishment of larger populations through the marketization of everyday life, especially in semi-peripheral countries like Turkey, are realized largely through urban policies as a “rational” capitalist strategy in this historical period of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2004) And “the greater the incentive for places to be differentiated in ways attractive to capital” (Harvey, 1990), social interaction and everyday life is increasingly commodified. As the capital accumulation increasingly depends on the production of urban space and this entails large public binding and state-led projects like the third bridge or Taksim Project, the dominance of capital and the shadow of the state in daily life grows hand in hand: “The street became a network organized for and by consumption. (...) Time became “merchandise time” (...) The street regulated time outside of work; it subjected it to the same system (...) a “system of objects” that has become symbol and spectacle.” (Lefebvre, 1968). With the financialization of capitalism, “... the (relative) abundance of industrial products in today's so-called consumer society is accompanied by an inverse phenomenon: new scarcities. Those commodities which were formerly abundant because they occurred 'naturally', which had no value because they were not products, have now become rare, and so acquired value. They have now to be produced, and consequently they come to have not only a use value but also an exchange value. Such commodities are 'elemental' - not least in the sense that they are indeed 'elements'. In the most modern urban planning, using the most highly perfected technological applications, everything is produced: air, light, water - even the land itself.” (Lefebvre, 1974) So, there comes a moment in which collective management of this new scarcities becomes an actual agenda against “the space of the market, the space through which flows follow their paths, the space which the state controls - a space, therefore, that is strictly quantified.” (Lefebvre, 1974)

As in almost every moment, Gezi emerged as a two-way movement. The first aspect was opening a narrowly tightened political area. The second and reverse aspect was a very fast mass politicization that broke this narrow framework and fastly exceeded the limits of existing organizations but unable to find its own political presentation and consolidating itself back to the existing political scene.

3.4. The Tension between Organisation and Movement

The strength and weakness of the Gezi Resistance were mainly due to two reasons that were mentioned before: heterogeneous resistance profile and diversity of resistance motivations. What kept them together was the character of the resistance based on the powerful ground of the urban tension. However, this character could not be transformed into a concrete, strong and determined politics alone and the resistance ended up with little to no achievement and (compared to the other burned out big moments of the history) with relatively little legacy.

The partial reason for this was that the heterogeneous resistance profile was to some extent unorganized. Even with that weakness, Taksim Solidarity Platform³¹, consisting of dozens of components, demonstrating the fragility of bourgeois powers, has established itself as an interlocutor against the government as a kind of "temporary subject" and has managed to take on the legitimacy of the resistance based on the urban-based political-social character. It is quite natural that so many components and such a heterogeneous structure will dissipate if it cannot transfer the temporary situation to a permanent position. But the real failure lies somewhere else.

It can be seen in the tension between Gezi Forums and Taksim Solidarity on June 14 about how to proceed, discussed in the 8th issue of Gezi Post. Taksim Solidarity's decision against the will of the people in the park, although they called for the forums in the first place, is an evidence that the relationship between organizations and movement itself has a rift, disconnected than most of the social movements of the past, including 15-16 June Uprising.

On the third issue of the *Gezi Postası*, a map was published covering what is where in and around the occupied park. Everything on that map - health-care center, barricades, food tents, toilets – was created with some kind of organized labor established before the action. The library was organized by the people from publishing sector; health-care center was organized by the trade-unions in health

31 Taksim Solidarity Platform has been the representative committee during the Gezi Protests, comprised of 124 organizations including non-political communities such as sports club fan groups.

sector; toilets needed a lot of work by engineers who were already part of the occupation with their occupational association and barricades were mostly build by young people from neighborhoods of Istanbul which were occasionally on the news with the clashes with the police as they are the ones ahead of the crowd moving against the police. Before Gezi, there was a long history of campaigns about the urban transformation policies and “Taksim Solidarity”, which is the roof-top organization for all the organizations involved in the Gezi Protests, had been established and active long before “the day” through those campaigns. In fact, members of that organization started the resistance by not allowing construction machines into the Gezi Park on “the day”.

At the core of it, what was manifested in the explosive moment was the disenchantment from existing political tools. But it turns out the relationship between organizations and movement itself has also a rift, disconnected than most of the social movements of the past, including 15-16 June Uprising. It can be seen in the tension between Gezi Forums and Taksim Solidarity on June 14 about how to proceed, discussed in the 8th issue of Gezi Post. After the contact with the government, the core organizations did decide to narrow the stand in the park to just one tent, 10 forums consisted of almost 10 thousand people gathered, 9 of them rejected the proposal and yet next day, “one tent” decision was declared anyway. It was the moment where the movement exceeds the existing organizations without an alternative and the organizations started to decide without the mass; that disorganized moment in which form of the movement was tried to be normalized and preserved in a lower density rather than expanding the content was followed by the police occupation and dismantling the crowd.

“Moments make a critique – by their actions – of everyday life, and the everyday makes a critique – by its factuality – of paroxysmal moments.” (Lefebvre, 1961/2002: 348) Gezi surely did that critique, not only against the commodification of public space and daily life and “accumulation of capital through dispossession” but also against the fetishist organizational forms that rely on political representation and “separates social power from the people in the shape of political power” (Marx, 1844:297). “It gives the everyday a certain shape, but taken per se and extrapolated

from that context, this shape is empty.” And Gezi was taken per se when it was abstracted from all processes and dynamics behind and contradictions in it. It wasn’t something that you can take and put elsewhere, it wasn’t a body you can hope to move as a whole as occurred in the moment. As in the hopes that it will be represented as such in the already existing political bodies as they are, the initiatives such as *Gezi Partisi*³² or *Haziran*³³ trying to build a new political body that will integrate it into the existing political arena were doomed to fail to attract anyone.

Similarly, the hopes that some forms of Gezi such as *forums* would be continued as local gatherings in neighbourhoods and will continue as a form of resistance after resumption of everyday life were doomed to failure: it was impossible to sustain the same form as such without a determined content, without a concrete agenda that would lead to an ongoing re-composition of the heterogeneity of the Gezi protests and link them together in their capacity. They really turned into a caricature of Gezi and a caricature of radical democracy unable to decide on anything or move anywhere as it was a delusion to think what Gezi was about “individual and collective existence marked by lack of fixity, essence or any other exteriority” (Tormey, 2010: 124) or solely any other *form* of participation, inclusion or action for that matter. Hence, “the moment imposes an order on the chaos of ambiguity, but taken per se this order is ineffectual and pointless.” The point was the content of the urban tension referring the material contradictions within the mode of production and the effect was the negation of representative democracy, not any empty form. If we draw an analogy between ‘68 and Gezi, it may be that the process that took decades for ‘68 took place in the same direction in Gezi but within a year this time:

“For Graeber, the big event of the ’60s was Paris ’68. I’m going to say that May ’68 is a nice bedtime tale that boomer French Lefties tell their kids. A counter-history is

32 An environmentalist political party founded on October 2013 and became defunct four years later on October 2017. The party has been organized through popular means of social media and is not known to be related to any political tradition.

33 *United June Movement* is a political coalition bringing together the Freedom and Solidarity Party, the Communist Party, the People's Communist Party of Turkey (later named as the “Workers Party of Turkey”), the Labourist Movement Party and the Socialist Liberation Party. Established in October 2014, the organizations forming the movement declared their separation one after another in time. Although official termination has not been declared, it is not active since 2020.

available here: May '68 is the echo of the early 1960s Algerian riots in Paris in which dozens of activists were killed and dumped in the Seine — that's the revolutionary moment. Not May '68. Why? I'm not trying to find the "real" revolution, though it may seem so. But I can't help but notice a white streak in Graeber's analysis that passes over struggles for Civil Rights and anti-colonial revolts against European and imperial empire. Graeber focuses on white, bourgeois struggles for class equality within empire, where brief moments of "playing revolutionary" resulted in few deaths because nothing really was at stake, and where, after everyone got their catharsis on, plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. By this I mean: all the soixante-huitards got to return to society. They got their jobs back, went back to university. They even got a new, radical university: Vincennes. A few had a rough time, but in the end (Cohn-Bendit!) they became part of the party system and came into power with Mitterand. They weren't ghettoized, incarcerated, hunted down, strangled, dumped in the Seine — like the pieds-noirs were.

(...) Let's look at blowback. What did '68 result in? Yes, there are all the good things, Mitterand came in, they got rid of the cobble stones, there were "concessions". But the big blowback of the '60s in general? The '60s struggles led to (as in fed back into) a much more complete and comprehensive system of consumerism designed to sell "revolutionary" values back to the white kids. Silicon Valley and what on Nettime was critiqued as "the California Ideology" is part of this: utopian technocapitalism led by cyberhippies. iRevolution from Apple. Once the "personal became political" it was sold & packaged to the boomers as all manner of retreat-oriented lifestyle products. Then this strategy was marketed worldwide. The Situationists were right; they did warn us." (van Veen, 2013)

On March 11, 2004, *Berkin Elvan*, the child shot by police in *Okmeydanı* during the uprising, died in hospital. Hundred thousands of people (over 1 million according to many witnesses) were at the funeral of *Berkin Elvan*. The day after the funeral, the neighbourhood saw clashes with police again, but there was not any type of solidarity action. Whereas *Okmeydanı* was at the centre of the same urban transformation project stopped in Gezi Park (Şengül, 2001), and the youth of *Okmeydanı* (and other similar neighborhoods) had been in the front barricades and

roadblocks that enabled Gezi. On May 31 2014, one year later than the original protests, people were “celebrating the anniversary”. A call for a gathering in front of Soma Holding on the same day for the commemoration of the Massacre of Soma³⁴ which had recently happened was made by *Gezi Postası* to the organizations and public, but the call was only met by around 50 people. At that point, Gezi has turned into an empty representation, a city mythology rather than an urban struggle.

Just like the reduction of ‘68 to a liberty discourse abstracted from the immigrant struggles, slum riots, strikes etc. that preceded the ‘68 movement, Gezi was also abstracted from social struggles that preceded it, such as anti-HES struggles, TEKEL Resistance etc. It has been abstracted from the social dynamics who are not “local” to central locations such as Kadıköy, Taksim, Beyoğlu and Kızılay.

3.5. A Historical Remnant within the Spatial Dynamics of the Uprising

Although I referred the movement with multiple names, Gezi Park Resistance, Gezi Protests and June Uprising, we may see a same pattern in which Gezi Park Resistance evolved into June Uprising through multiple protests. Departing from the centre of the city and arriving to the poor neighbourhoods of Istanbul, it spread throughout the country and other cities as a rebellion. This spread through country also hides a historical remnant often plays role in politics of Turkey with the composition of the resistance that can be more easily categorized: representation rate of Alevi population in the resistance.

In the small cities like Hatay (An Arab Alevi city near the border of Syria) or Dersim (the only city in Turkey that Kızılbash Alevism is in majority) participation, organisation and the endurance of the resistance was greater. Also, the neighbourhoods with Alevi population played a role as the strongholds of the resistance for a longer time like *Armutlu* of Antakya, *Okmeydanı MŞP* and *Gazi* of İstanbul and *Tuzluçayır* of Ankara. In those neighborhoods the resistance took more

34 The mine explosion in Soma Mines which killed 301 miners. The mine was also another example of capital accumulation related to public binding and governmental power. For the Soma Massacre see. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/soma-slow-massacre-cost-of-turkish-success/> (December 9, 2022)

militant forms as well as the police attacks were more violent. Although the number of the deaths due to police violent (including the bystanders effected from the excessive use of tear gas) changes according to sources (raising as much as 20), 6 of the 7 confirmed killings (*Mehmet Ayvalıtaş, Abdullah Cömert, Ethem Sarısülük, Zeynep Eryaşar, Medeni Yıldırım, Ali İsmail Korkmaz and Berkin Elvan*) by police forces among the protesters were Alevis. This was of course not a surprise:

Two of the six who died in direct relation to the protests, Abdullah Cömert and Ahmet Atakan, faced police brutality and lost their lives in Armutlu—one of the two well-known Alevî neighborhoods of Hatay—while Mehmet Ayvalıtaş was killed in the May 1st district of Ümraniye, and Berkin Elvan in a district of Okmeydanı—both known for the Alevî-Leftist identities of their inhabitants. Ali İsmail Korkmaz lost his life in Eskişehir, and Ethem Sarısülük in Ankara’s Güvenpark. This brief account illustrates that all Gezi victims have been killed outside the epicenters of the protests—namely, Taksim, Beşiktaş and Kadıköy, all characterized by high numbers of protestors—and either in Istanbul’s peripheral districts inhabited by Alevî and Leftist urban dwellers or in protests started in other cities of Turkey in solidarity with the Gezi Park Protests. (...) It must be noted in passing that the aforementioned locations—the May 1st district of Ümraniye, Okmeydanı, Tuzluçayır in Ankara where Ethem Sarısülük lived, Armutlu in Istanbul where Hasan Ferit Gedik lived and Gülsuyu where he was killed—are not only urban spaces characterized by the Alevî-Leftist identities of their inhabitants; they are also sites of organized resistance in the face of an ever-expanding sphere of urban renewal schemes. These spaces also happen to be the epicenters of the leftist organizations on the forefront of the Gezi Protests where the youths who have been leading the resistance movements against urban renewal live. These have been sites of frequent protests and other forms of organized resistance and subsequent police interventions not only during, but also well before, the Gezi Protests. Even though these protests have rarely been covered in the domestic media and the general public in Turkey has remained oblivious to these struggles, an overwhelming majority of these districts’ inhabitants have been living under an unofficial state of exception, where they have gotten to know the police forces intimately, and vice versa. (Karakaya-Stump, 2014)

The historical remnant of Sunni-Alevi division has always been an issue in one way or another and its legacy affects the political arena time to time. The Sunni-Alevi division is rather a complex phenomenon related with the power struggles in the void of Byzantium Empire and Seljuks and migration of nomadic tribes, but still one can also easily recognize that was also based upon Ottoman social, economic and political construction as a military-feodal-central empire with just one look to a map

of Alevi population scattered to the mountain villages: Settlers of those villages with arid lands were in trouble with the Ottoman tax and recruitment policies but also had a geographical opportunity to maintain communal/tribal autonomy against the centralization process (Centralization process also includes Sunnization as the Sunni belief that can be more instrumental for an unbounded authority of a monarch; a sovereign above the law and relatively autonomous from the clergy. Ottoman, just one of the nomadic tribes settled in Anatolia and adopting a heterodox belief system, became gradually a Sunni state as it became the new Byzantium). This historical enmity wasn't a "(religious) identity politics" in a modern sense in the Ottoman era of which it is the remnant. But as the social and cultural differences continued to exist, it manifested itself as a political issue or served as a social base to new political enmities. Dersim rebellion (1937) and massacre is one example when the historical autonomous character of these communities contradicts with the "nation-building process" and, though the close affiliation of Alevi population with the new republic and CHP tradition may seem contradictory, the secular identity and lifestyle works as a shield when they have to live among the Sunni majority. The shield that was provided by the secular identity was especially useful after migration to the cities or the transportation network spends the opportunity of geographic autonomy, especially for a population scattered like them instead of one concentrated like the Kurds. After all, Alevi identity as we know it in modern sense, is a collection of heterogenous beliefs belonging to different communities that preserved a relative autonomy. As long as this hiding strategy works, the Alevi population has been unseen as a subject in the political arena and the Sunni-Alevi distinction has been transferred to another political enmity. That can be observed through the voting behavior and party affiliation as they form the main body of secular CHP against the more Sunni conservative tradition of DP/AP (Ertan, 2008).

The story took another path when labor migration takes its toll on those poor Alevi villages. "The social dynamics of Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s associated the dissolution of the archaic Alevism with the social mobilization of Turkey within the context of urbanization; therefore, the Alevis, who became more visible in the newly urbanizing environment, mainly remained a part of left-wing politics in that period." (Ertan, 2008) With autonomous reflexes that are possibly rooted historically, they

formed their *gecekodu* communities in big cities as the state let them do so on public lands (another remnant from the empire) as this takes the burden of providing accommodation and social security off the shoulders of the state as well as from the wages given by the bourgeoisie. Again it is no coincidence that the revolutionary break in 71 and the movement in 70's where the revolutionaries separated themselves from TKP tradition to build an armed, autonomous rebellion movement (parallel to the partition of '68 generation from official communist parties all over the world) resonated strongly in the Alevi districts of Anatolia and the neighbourhoods of the big cities. Even their power in the trade unions or strikes were based on this affiliation.³⁵

It is not much different story when revolutionary organizations once again resurface in the '90s more in the neighborhoods of the big cities in another turmoil following the neoliberal policies which focuses on marketization of public spheres and gentrification.³⁶ In all these cases the seemingly religious Sunni-Alevi antinomy, which actually manifests itself as such in a metaphysical age as the result of material conditions and social conflicts in that age, now has been transferred to other modern political enmities.³⁷

35 And of course reciprocated by the state with Alevi massacres like Maraş (1978) and Çorum (1980).

36 And again it was replied by state with Gazi Massacre (1995), one of the biggest Alevi settlements in Istanbul.

37 Interestingly, theoretical discussion on these contemporary issues and also on Gezi take this point into consideration less frequently (although political discussions and academic writing on Alevi question itself made a peak after Gezi) and even when they do, they rather talk about it more delicately (sometimes for good reasons, as the "hiding" strategy *takkiye* is there for a reason learned from historical experiences). Although the relationship between revolutionary politics or rebellion and Alevi population is not new for contemporary Turkish history, it is also not uncommon to overlook and disregard that relationship slurring over with a few historical and social analysis. And even when it is argued mostly as a "discrimination against minorities" problem or an identity issue or at best as a critique of totalitarianism. In former approaches "minorities" are leveled as one of many minorities, or identities are leveled as "an" identity, and the latter approach directly fall into the age old and infertile dichotomy of liberal thought: totalitarianism against pluralism. In all cases, this plural identities lost their content as being equaled in a universe of empty signifiers in which subjects and actors of society, of economy or of politics appear a priori to the social, the economic or the political and all boils down to an individual level, "in a private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies" (Schmitt, 1932, p. 28) so that even an obviously relational and historical category such as class can turn into a mere individual cultural belonging. What Schmitt said about the concept of the political, lack of understanding "in their concrete and existential sense", is true for "the social" and "the historical". A modern category such as class is one thing, but in this world of liberal "debating adversary", something such as Sunni-Alevi antinomy is even harder to comprehend. If it is manifested as religious antinomy, then it should be and it can only be "represented" and expressed in the political sphere as such!

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION: SOCIAL AGENCY AND CLASS STRUGGLE UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE STATE

This thesis explored the relationship between the production of space and moments of class struggle focusing on two moments: the 15-16 June Workers' Uprising of 1970 and the 2013 Gezi Resistance/June Uprising in Turkey which are taken as two different reactions born out of the inner conflicts of two different accumulation regimes. My long standing position regarding social agency, furthermore human actions in general, is that asking *how* is the more accurate and principle thing to do rather than asking *why*, as it is more in line with all the acts and movements themselves that occur and relate with others within time-space. As I discussed throughout the thesis, both moments are also examples of *how* social agency and movements become possibilities of the social space, realized through covering that space by which they are also limited.

As I stated in the methodology section, this thesis is intended to be a first step of a broader inquiry about social agency in our age defined by certain transformations which occurred more or less throughout the time span between these two moments. The period following the 1970s marked a significant shift characterized by the deepening **commodification of social relations**, the **financialization of the economy**, and the **reconstruction of the state**. This shift transformed in certain ways how the social movements and class struggles unfolded, alongside with the capitalist relations of production.

Giovanni Arrighi's (1994) analysis of the shifts in accumulation regimes provides a broader historical framework that helps framing this period within the history of capitalism. Arrighi describes the transition from the material expansion of the postwar era to a period of financialization, where capital increasingly sought profit

through speculative markets rather than industrial production. Arrighi emphasizes that this transformation is part of the cyclical nature of capitalist development, where periods of material expansion are followed by financial expansion.

Braverman's seminal work on the labor process, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (1974), offers a crucial lens for understanding how the increasing concentration of capital and the rise of monopoly corporations through this shift transformed the relations of production. As I discussed, the 15-16 June Workers' Uprising was embedded in an industrial context where labor still retained some degree of craftsmanship and organizational power, enabling mass collective action. However, the profound shift in the structure of labor relations accelerated in the 1970s as a response to the structural crises. As Braverman (1974) noted, capital's need to subsume all aspects of life into its logic of surplus extraction resulted in the rise of service labor, precarious employment, deskilling, and the financialization of daily life and public sphere. This created a fragmented, less cohesive working class detached from any real control over their work or environment. This process made it increasingly difficult to sustain the kind of organizational continuity seen in traditional labor movements. Braverman's insights also resonate with the Gezi Resistance, where the context of labor has been transformed far beyond the industrial factory settings of the 1970s.

This was not a process started in 1970s, yet, but both its pace and scale changed during that period. This subjugation under capital, as Braverman describes, extends beyond the factory and infiltrates society as a whole. By the late 20th century, capitalist rationalization not only deskilled workers but also began to shape the very structure of society, transforming social relations into commodified, controlled interactions where individuals are increasingly integrated into systems of control, whether in the workplace, public spaces, or daily life. In this sense, Braverman's insights into the labor process also reflect how capitalism subjugates society at large, with both labor and urban space becoming sites of alienation.

This resonates with my discussion about the spatial dynamics of social movements and class struggle, as explored through Lefebvre's theory of the production of space.

Just as labor is controlled and fragmented, urban spaces are designed to serve the interests of capital rather than those of their inhabitants, limiting the possibilities for social agency (Lefebvre, 1974). The transformations discussed above are not isolated processes but are deeply intertwined with the spatial production and reconfiguration of urban spaces, which directly shape the potential for class struggle and social movements. For Lefebvre (1974), space is not merely a passive backdrop where social action takes place; rather, it is a social product both embodied and shaped by social relations and power structures. The state plays a central role in producing space in ways that facilitate capital accumulation while managing or limiting social movements that challenge these structures. Space, therefore, becomes a contested terrain where class struggles unfold—not only because it is a site for economic production but also because it structures the possibilities of collective action.

One of Lefebvre's key insights in relation to the role of the state is the concept of abstract space, which became particularly relevant in the post-1970s period. Lefebvre (1974) describes abstract space as a space that is produced through capitalist rationalization and state planning. This form of space is homogenized, controlled, and instrumentalized to serve the imperatives of capital, with little regard for the social needs of the population. Urban spaces, especially after the 1970s, were increasingly shaped by this abstract logic, where cities became sites of speculative investment, real estate development, and financialization, all coordinated by the state. The state's regulation of space functions by producing urban spaces that facilitate the expansion of capital, often at the cost of social exclusion and displacement.

Lefebvre's framework is crucial for analyzing the spatial dynamics of both the 15-16 June Workers' Uprising and the Gezi Resistance as the production of space shape the possibilities of social agency and class struggle. In the case of the 15-16 June Workers' Uprising, the spatial organization of industrial Istanbul—with its factories, transportation networks, and worker-dominated neighborhoods—created an environment conducive to mass mobilization. The physical proximity of workers within industrial zones, coupled with the spatial concentration of labor, allowed for collective action that was spatially rooted in the industrial geography of the city. The

very structure of the city, with its focus on industrial production, provided workers with a space that fostered class consciousness and collective organization, as well as coordinated action towards the center of the city through the axis of this structure.

The *gecekondu* areas, populated largely by migrant workers, formed a critical base of support for organizational continuity of labor movements with their community ties. Post-1970s, the relationship between *gecekondu* areas and politics underwent significant transformation. While they continued their initial role of being spaces of solidarity and serving as hubs of political organization, the commodification of urban land began to change the character of these areas. As residents sought legal recognition and the opportunity to own land, property ownership as a key goal fragmented the collective class identity. Despite this shift, the *gecekondu* movement of the 1970s laid the groundwork for future urban struggles. This dual role of the *gecekondus*—both as a base of labor resistance and later as a site of commodification—mirrors the broader transformations within the working class and social movements during the period.

By contrast, the Gezi Resistance occurred in a radically transformed urban landscape. The urban space had been increasingly commodified, with public areas privatized or repurposed to serve the needs of capital—through luxury development, real estate speculation, and the commercialization of formerly public areas. In this context, the resistance was less about traditional labor organizing and more about a broader struggle for urban space. The Gezi Resistance was sparked by the state's attempt to further commodify public space, and assembled a diverse coalition of struggles and people against it. The very symbolic centrality of Gezi Park, located at the heart of Istanbul's most iconic public square, allowed it to become a focal point for a wide array of grievances, from environmental issues to authoritarianism and neoliberal urban policies. Rather than the industrial corridors of labor resistance, Gezi took place in spaces shaped by global capital, yet still retained the ability to serve as focal points for collective resistance. But The Gezi Resistance really evolved into June Uprising by only departing from the center of the city, arriving to the poor neighborhoods of Istanbul and spreading throughout the country and other cities. As I discussed, *gecekondu* neighborhoods and especially Alevi communities played a

role in this evolution in a similar way the community dynamics played their role in 15-16 June Uprising. Yet, their relation to the movement and the organization in both uprisings are vastly different.

Thus, both movements reveal the dialectical relationship between space and class struggle: while space can provide a platform for mobilization, it also imposes spatial constraints that reflect the broader power relations embedded in capitalist society. The spatial organization of the city becomes both a tool of domination and a site of resistance, where social movements emerge to challenge the power structure. However, as both the 15-16 June Uprising and the Gezi Resistance demonstrate, these struggles are ultimately limited by the structural constraints imposed by the production of space itself, which is the embodiment of broader dynamics of capitalist accumulation and relations of productions.

I tried to demonstrate that both uprisings are responses to the contradictions inherent in capitalist accumulation regimes. Their contrasting differences as *war of position* and *sudden explosion of survival* are related with the differentiation of capitalist accumulation which is reflected through the urban form. The 15-16 June Uprising unfolded within a framework where labor unions played a central role in organizing collective action. DISK continued to exist as a political and social actor, kept on organizing actions (strikes, occupations, rallies, etc.) on same issues of the uprising or other topics. The sense of continuity in terms of the actor and the movement was evident, even though the population forming them experienced transformations and differentiations. This is the frame I described with the term of “war of position” borrowed from Gramsci (1976). But I am not using it in contrast with “war of maneuver”, as a way of challenging ideological hegemony instead of attacking state. “War of position” in the thesis defines the class struggle through continuous organizations acting as the body of the movement in which the organization can exceed the limits of this or that action. In that case, the organization can preserve itself as a social agent between those actions with some capacity to move from one to another.

In contrast, the Gezi Resistance represents what I term a “sudden explosion of survival”—a spontaneous, less organized moment of resistance that brought together

disparate grievances against the authoritarian state and neoliberal urban policies. This latter form of resistance reflects the fragmented, precarious nature of labor and social life under contemporary capitalism, where sustained organizational continuity is more difficult to achieve. The movement has only a social body in the moment (regardless of its effects as a political image) with no continuity in an organizational sense.

We might say that there is a trend from “*war of position*” towards “*sudden explosions of survival*” throughout the social transformation following the 1970s. The differentiation of “war of position” and “explosion” is derived from the comparison of two uprisings while relating these qualities with their separate historical context. I believe these categories can be useful for further discussions about the relationship of social movements to the transforming social space. Yet, it can be easily shown that both forms of struggle can be found not only within the time span between these two uprisings, but also outside of it. In fact, Paris 1968, occurred two years before 15-16 June Uprising; and is defined as *eruption* (Lefebvre, 1971), emphasizing the spontaneous and explosive nature of the uprising. On the other end, TEKEL Resistance, a trade-union strike, happened just 4 years before Gezi Resistance. TEKEL workers occupied the city center in Ankara, similar in some ways to the occupation of Gezi, combining the characteristics of the two categories I used. I am aware that it is hard to assemble all social uprisings or resistances which occurred perfectly in the mentioned time span, but the examples I used can be considered as exemplary for the general trend. A further discussion relating more moments in the continuity of historical process and taking the variety between these two categories into consideration will be insightful on structural transformations through the lens of possibilities of social change. As a first step, slicing two sections from the historical process in discussion is more of an exploratory rather than explanatory attempt into the question of social agency.

Another limitation of this slicing act is excluding similar resistances and uprisings around the world in the same time of these two uprisings. But this is mostly a purposive limitation caused by the exploratory nature of the thesis. The urban-form and spatial dynamics are the central theme of this thesis. These two uprisings

occurring in the same city, their overlapping routes, locations and even the shared *gecekondu* phenomenon make it convenient to focus on the main theme as well as developing further questions on the issues surrounding that theme like urban poverty, class formation, migration, organization of labor process, effects of historical backgrounds of migrant working class, tensions between these migrants and settlers, interaction between communities and organizations, and so on. I am again well aware of the occupation movements around the world just at the same time with Gezi for example, but including them will need a much larger analysis to answer these questions. I limited myself to describing the global context of accumulation regime which actually ties all those actions together.

The other purposive limitation is the loose periodization. 15-16 June happened before the fall of Bretton Woods System and the crisis of 1970s mentioned in the context section. On the other hand, despite hardly mentioned, Gezi Resistance followed the 2008 crisis which shook the international accumulation regime, neoliberal period or US Regime of accumulation (Arrighi, 1994) if you prefer, and left a lot of its paradigm in ambiguity to this day. Both of the uprisings are close enough to the beginning and the end of this period to enlighten the tensions within it as the moments in Lefebvrian terms. They form a parenthesis to frame the period between its “generation and corruption”, or “becoming to be and passing away” (Aristotle, 1982).

On the other hand, a strict periodization could be a limitation itself, especially when discussing the reproduction of capitalist social relations. As I demonstrated with examples, the characteristics of capitalist accumulation largely identified with the 1980s and onwards (the combination of financialization, land speculation and urban renewal) already began to show itself around the axis of Istanbul in early periods of post-War. Systems or regimes start to differentiate with deep currents in the moment they are defined, because of the characteristics of capitalist accumulation contradicting itself consistently. If we fall into the trap of focusing on political-economic terms and systems and only look at the global level, we ignore the level of everyday life in which the system has to be reproduced with countless frictions and that is the level where the deep currents originate from.

Again, another purposive limitation of the thesis is a loose terminology on state. I mentioned the Marxist/Structuralist discussion of state criticizing early Marxism with the lack of a state theory in the introduction part. What they are missing is the point of Marx's references to state as *the multiplied productive force determined by the division of labor* (Marx, 1846). The point throughout the text is the emphasis on the reconstruction of the state and the forceful reproduction of capitalist relations as two facets of the same process being exercised on the urban-form. The references to Schmitt's *Total State* (1931) are derived from way before this period as the most pessimistic outcome. It should be remembered though, Schmitt (1931) developed his conception holding it against the other possibility he foresaw: total revolution while declaring the death of liberal democracy. Although his concepts are not sufficient tools in terms of explaining the characteristics of the reconstruction in our age, I believe they resonate well with the discussion of "sudden explosions" instead of "war of position" while we are also passing through a period of limited political channels for the masses and encounters with the state on a daily life level as I discussed in the beginning.

As capital has devalorized, not only the capital itself but also the relations of production as a whole (whole society) have to be reproduced forcefully and speculatively, largely based on urban transformation. The result is an enlarged contradiction on a whole society level between labor and capital, between the social/human needs. This can be seen as a class conflict showing itself as "explosions" disturbing reproduction of relations in daily life and overflowing from the usual spectacle of politics in Greece, in Turkey, France, Egypt and in many other countries. But this overflowing, despite even greater power of disturbing the relations of production and hegemony for a time of being, seemed to have little power on changing and controlling space, hence capacity to change the society, in other words, being a social agent. The more dispersed the capital accumulation became through the space, the more momentarily became the class opposition against it as well as the more ambiguous class lines: The more socialized the labor, the less sustainable to be organized it became.

The main further discussion should be around this paradox and the fact is, we cannot give an answer to this question on a level such as Istanbul or in the scope of this

thesis. The answer has to be on the global level in which the network of hubs and constant flows tie the axis of Istanbul started with London Road to other hubs with multiplied connections and in which the migrant working class is increasingly becoming international. After all, the working class have always been in formation as a migrant class for the entire history of capitalism. The class as a social agent and class movement is unthinkable outside of this migration processes. The urban-form can turn into an empty abstraction just as the political-economic categories used for periodization without acknowledging the historicity of populations carried by them from one place to another. The effects of *muhacir*, Alevi and Kurdish communities on the class movements and politics discussed in the thesis are examples of this fact and it is evident that they are neglected to an extent in the class history of Turkey.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, mekânın üretimi ile sınıf mücadelesi momentleri arasındaki ilişkiyi, iki önemli olaya odaklanarak incelemektedir: 15-16 Haziran 1970 İşçi Ayaklanması ve 2013 Türkiye Gezi Direnişi/Haziran Ayaklanması. Bu olaylar, iki farklı birikim rejiminin iç çelişkilerinden doğan farklı tepkiler olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu çalışma, bu iki moment arasında gerçekleşen dönüşümlerle tanımlanan çağımızda toplumsal öznellik üzerine daha geniş bir sorgulamanın ilk adımı olarak tasarlanmıştır. 1970'lerden sonraki dönem, *toplumsal ilişkilerin derinlemesine metalaşması*, *ekonominin finansallaşması* ve *devletin yeniden inşası* ile karakterize edilen önemli bir değişim geçirmiştir. Bu değişim, kapitalist üretim ilişkileri ile birlikte toplumsal hareketlerin ve sınıf mücadelelerinin nasıl ortaya çıktığını belli şekillerde dönüştürmüştür.

Her düzeyde sayısız kriz dönemi olarak, bu dönemde ve dönüşüm sürecinde toplumsal huzursuzluk anlarının eksik değildir. Bir dizi analitik sebeple, Türkiye'den iki örneği tartışacağım. Her şeyden önce, bu iki, iki farklı toplumsal hareket ve toplumsal etkinlik biçimini somutlaştırıyor gibi görünmektedir. 15-16 Haziran, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türkiye'nin kapitalist gelişimi bağlamında iki sınıf arasında geçen bir “mevzi savaşı”nın (Gramsci, 1947) sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmış gibi görünürken, Gezi, farklı mücadelelerin bir odak noktası etrafında toplanarak aniden patladığı bir an olarak ortaya çıkmış gibi görünüyor.

1970'teki 15-16 Haziran İşçi Direnişi, modern Türkiye tarihinin en büyük ve en etkili işçi eylemi olarak kabul edilmektedir (Aydın, 2020). Bu olay, Türkiye'nin hızlı sanayileşmesi ve kentleşmesinde, özellikle fabrikaların hızla artması ve kırsal alanlardan ve küçük kasabalardan metropollere yönelik göç dalgasının etkisiyle meydana gelen gerilimleri ve çatışmaları yansıtır. Bu gelişmeler, İkinci Dünya

Savaşı sonrası küresel birikim rejimi etkisinde şekillenmiştir. Ayaklanma, hükümetin işçi haklarını kısıtlama girişimleri ile tetiklendi; bu girişimler, 1960'lar boyunca hızla toplumsal ve siyasal bir güç haline gelen işçi örgütlerini hedef alıyor ve sendikal faaliyetleri ve doğrudan eylemleri sınırlamayı amaçlıyordu. Bu sınırlama girişimleri, aynı zamanda siyasi atmosferin değişimiyle uyumlu olup, 1970'lerin yapısal dönüşümlerinin başlangıcını işaret eder. Eylemler, hedef alınan örgütler tarafından organize edilmiş ve sanayi bölgelerinde, çok sayıda fabrikanın bulunduğu yerlerde gerçekleşmiş, bu sanayi bölgeleri boyunca kent merkezlerine doğru kentsel altyapı ekseni üzerinden harekete geçmiştir.

Öte yandan, 2013'teki Gezi Ayaklanması, Türkiye'nin modern tarihindeki katılım açısından en geniş ve en büyük toplumsal huzursuzluk olayıdır. Bu olay, tarihsel olarak “mülksüzleştirme yoluyla birikim” (Harvey, 2004) dönemiyle çerçevelenmiştir: geniş çaplı soylulaştırma, kamusal alanların özelleştirilmesi ve büyük ölçekli inşaat projeleri, çoğunlukla yerel topluluklar ve çevresel kaygılar pahasına, devlet/hükümet planlaması ve büyük mali kredilerle mümkün kılınmıştır. Ayaklanmanın patlak verme anı, “bir avuç çevre aktivisti”ne karşı Gezi Parkı'nı savunan polislin uyguladığı şiddetti. Gezi Parkı, İstanbul'un en önemli ticaret ve tüketim caddelerinden biri olan İstiklal Caddesi ile şehrin en merkezi meydanı olan Taksim Meydanı'nın çevresindeki kamusal bir alandı. Bu olay, sosyal medya aracılığıyla yayılan geniş çaplı protestolar ve toplumsal huzursuzluklarla ülke geneline yayıldı ve çeşitli katılımcı profilleri ile çeşitli direniş biçimlerini çekti. Çeşitliliğe rağmen, direnişin ana unsuru, Gezi Parkı ve Taksim Meydanı'nın işgaliyle başlayarak, kitleler tarafından kamusal alanların işgali ve halk forumlarının kurulması oldu (Tuğal, 2013).

Bu iki an, İstanbul'da ortaya çıkmış ancak 43 yıl arayla gerçekleşmiştir: biri tartışılan tarihsel dönemin başlangıcında, diğeri ise bu dönemin sonuna daha yakın bir zamanda. Her ikisi de, sürekliliği, çelişkileri ve farklılaşmaları ile bu dönemdeki durumu bir süreç olarak kavramsallaştırmak ve kapitalizmin uzun vadeli dönüşümünü toplumsal hareketler ve sınıf mücadelesi dinamikleri bağlamında yeniden çerçevelemek için mükemmel örneklerdir. İstanbul, Türkiye'deki sermaye yatırımlarının merkezi olmasının yanı sıra, ülkeyi uluslararası ticaret yollarına

bağlayan bir merkezdir ve sürekli bir hareketliliğin hedefidir (hem nüfusun gelmesi hem de gitmesi anlamında). İki ayaklanmayı, birikim rejimleri açısından (bağlam), patlama anlarının içerdiği çelişkiler açısından (içerik) ve olayların ve aktörlerin mekânsal olarak nasıl şekillendiği açısından (biçim) karşılaştırmak, bu özel dönemin “oluş ve çözülüş” sürecine ve toplumsal değişim olasılıklarına birlikte bakılmasını sağlayacak bir perspektif sunabilir.

Giovanni Arrighi'nin (1994) birikim rejimlerindeki değişimlere ilişkin analizi, bu dönemi kapitalizmin tarihi bağlamında çerçevelemeye yardımcı olan daha geniş bir tarihsel çerçeve sunmaktadır. Arrighi, savaş sonrası dönemin maddi genişleme sürecinden finansallaşma dönemine geçişi, sermayenin endüstriyel üretim yerine giderek daha fazla spekülasyon piyasalarda kâr arayışına yöneldiği bir dönem olarak tanımlar. Arrighi, bu dönüşümün kapitalist gelişmenin döngüsel doğasının bir parçası olduğunu ve maddi genişleme dönemlerinin finansal genişleme ile takip edildiğini vurgular.

Braverman'ın emek süreci üzerine çığır açan eseri *Emek ve Tekel Sermayesi* (1974) eseri, sermaye yoğunlaşmasının artışı ve tekellerin yükselişinin bu değişimle birlikte üretim ilişkilerini nasıl dönüştürdüğünü anlamak için kritik bir bakış açısı sunar. 15-16 Haziran İşçi Ayaklanması, iş gücünün bir dereceye kadar ustalığı ve örgütsel gücü koruduğu sanayi bağlamında gerçekleşmiştir, bu da kitlesel kolektif eylemleri mümkün kılmıştır. Ancak, emek ilişkilerindeki yapısal değişim, 1970'lerde yapısal krizlere bir yanıt olarak hız kazanmıştır. Braverman'ın (1974) belirttiği gibi, sermayenin hayatın tüm yönlerini fazla değer elde etme mantığına tabi kılma ihtiyacı, hizmet sektöründeki emeğin, güvencesiz istihdamın, yetenek kaybının ve günlük yaşam ile kamusal alanın finansallaşmasının artmasına yol açmıştır. Bu, işçilerin iş veya çevreleri üzerinde herhangi bir gerçek denetimden kopmuş, daha az uyumlu bir işçi sınıfı yaratmıştır. Bu süreç, geleneksel işçi hareketlerinde görülen örgütsel sürekliliği sürdürmeyi zorlaştırmıştır. Braverman'ın iç görüşleri, iş gücünün 1970'lerin endüstriyel fabrika ortamlarının çok ötesine geçtiği Gezi Direnişi bağlamında da yankılanmaktadır.

Bu, 1970'lerde başlamış bir süreç değildir, ancak bu dönemde hızı ve ölçeği değişmiştir. Braverman'ın tarif ettiği gibi sermaye altındaki bu tahakküm, fabrika

sınırlarını aşarak tüm topluma nüfuz etmektedir. 20. yüzyılın sonlarına gelindiğinde, kapitalist rasyonalizasyon sadece işçilerin yeteneklerini köreltmekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda toplumsal ilişkileri de metalaşmış, kontrol edilen etkileşimler haline getirerek toplumun yapısını dönüştürmüştür. Bireyler iş yerlerinde, kamusal alanlarda ya da günlük yaşamda giderek daha fazla kontrol sistemlerine entegre olmaktadır. Bu anlamda Braverman'ın emek sürecine ilişkin iç görüşleri, kapitalizmin yalnızca emeği değil, aynı zamanda toplumu bir bütün olarak tahakküm altına aldığı, hem emek hem de kent mekânının yabancılaşma alanları haline geldiğini yansıtır.

Bu, Lefebvre'nin mekânın üretimi teorisi çerçevesinde toplumsal hareketlerin mekân dinamikleri ve sınıf mücadelesi hakkında yaptığım tartışmayla da örtüşmektedir. Nasıl emek kontrol ediliyor ve parçalanıyorsa, kent mekânı da sermayenin çıkarlarına hizmet edecek şekilde tasarlanmakta ve bu durum toplumsal özne olma için olanakları sınırlamaktadır (Lefebvre, 1974). Yukarıda tartışılan dönüşümler izole süreçler değildir; kent mekânının üretimi ve yeniden yapılandırılması ile derinden iç içe geçmişlerdir ve doğrudan sınıf mücadelesi ve toplumsal hareketler üzerindeki potansiyeli şekillendirmektedir. Lefebvre'ye (1974) göre mekân, yalnızca sosyal eylemin gerçekleştiği pasif bir arka plan değil, toplumsal ilişkiler ve iktidar yapıları tarafından şekillendirilen bir sosyal üründür. Devlet, sermaye birikimini kolaylaştıran mekânlar üreterek, bu yapıları zorlayan toplumsal hareketleri yönetmek suretiyle mekânın üretilmesinde merkezi bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu nedenle mekân, sadece ekonomik üretimin gerçekleştiği bir alan değil, aynı zamanda kolektif eylem olasılıklarını da yapılandıran sınıf mücadelelerinin yaşandığı bir mücadele alanı haline gelir.

Lefebvre'nin devletin rolü ile ilgili en önemli iç görüşlerinden biri, özellikle 1970 sonrası dönemde büyük önem kazanan soyut mekân kavramıdır. Lefebvre (1974), soyut mekânı, kapitalist rasyonalizasyon ve devlet planlaması yoluyla üretilen bir mekân olarak tanımlar. Bu mekân, halkın sosyal ihtiyaçlarına çok az önem verilerek, sermayenin zorunluluklarına hizmet edecek şekilde homojenleştirilmiş, kontrol edilmiş ve araçsallaştırılmış bir mekândır. Özellikle 1970'lerden sonra kent mekânları, devlet tarafından koordine edilen spekülasyon yatırım, emlak geliştirme ve

finansallaşma alanları haline gelmiştir. Devletin mekân düzenlemesi, genellikle sosyal dışlama ve yerinden edilme pahasına, sermaye genişlemesini kolaylaştıran kent mekânları üreterek işlev görür.

Lefebvre'nin çerçevesi, hem 15-16 Haziran İşçi Ayaklanması hem de Gezi Direnişi'nin mekânsal dinamiklerini analiz etmek için kritik öneme sahiptir, çünkü mekânın üretimi, toplumsal öznellik ve sınıf mücadelesi için olanakları şekillendirir. 15-16 Haziran İşçi Ayaklanması örneğinde, sanayi İstanbul'un mekânsal organizasyonu –fabrikaları, ulaşım ağları ve işçi egemen mahalleleri– kitlesel mobilizasyona elverişli bir ortam yaratmıştır. İşçilerin sanayi bölgelerindeki fiziksel yakınlığı, iş gücünün mekânsal yoğunlaşmasıyla birleştiğinde, şehrin sanayi coğrafyasına mekânsal olarak kök salmış kolektif eylemi mümkün kılmıştır. Şehrin sanayi üretimine odaklanan yapısı, işçilere sınıf bilinci ve kolektif örgütlenme için bir mekân sağlamış ve bu yapı ekseninde şehrin merkezine doğru koordineli bir eylemi mümkün kılmıştır.

Göçmen işçilerin yoğun olarak yaşadığı gecekondu bölgeleri, topluluk bağlarıyla işçi hareketlerinin örgütsel sürekliliği için kritik bir destek üssü oluşturmuştur. 1970 sonrası dönemde, gecekondu bölgeleri ile siyaset arasındaki ilişki önemli bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Bu bölgeler başlangıçta dayanışma mekânları ve siyasi örgütlenme merkezleri olmaya devam ederken, kentsel arazilerin metalaşması bu alanların karakterini değiştirmeye başlamıştır. Bölge sakinleri yasal tanınma ve mülkiyet elde etme fırsatı aradıkça, mülkiyet sahipliği, kolektif sınıf kimliğini parçalamıştır. Bu değişime rağmen, 1970'lerin gecekondu hareketi, gelecekteki kentsel mücadelelerin temelini atmıştır. Gecekonduların bu ikili rolü –hem işçi direnişinin bir üssü hem de sonrasında metalaşmanın bir alanı–, bu dönemdeki işçi sınıfı ve toplumsal hareketlerdeki daha geniş dönüşümleri yansıtmaktadır.

Buna karşılık, Gezi Direnişi köklü bir şekilde dönüşmüş bir kent manzarasında gerçekleşmiştir. Kent mekânı giderek daha fazla metalaşmış, kamusal alanlar özelleştirilmiş veya sermayenin ihtiyaçlarına hizmet etmek üzere yeniden düzenlenmiş –lüks gelişmeler, emlak spekülasyonu ve daha önce kamusal alanların ticarileştirilmesi yoluyla. Bu bağlamda, direniş geleneksel işçi örgütlenmesinden

ziyade daha geniş bir kent mekânı mücadelesiydi. Gezi Direnişi, devletin kamusal mekânı daha da metalaştırma girişimiyle tetiklenmiş ve buna karşı çeşitli mücadeleleri ve insanları bir araya getiren farklı bir koalisyon oluşturmuştur. İstanbul'un en ikonik kamusal meydanının tam ortasında yer alan Gezi Parkı'nın sembolik merkezîyeti, çevre sorunlarından otoriterliğe ve neoliberal kentsel politikalara kadar geniş bir şikâyet yelpazesi için bir odak noktası haline gelmesini sağlamıştır. Sanayi direnişinin koridorları yerine, Gezi küresel sermaye tarafından şekillendirilen mekânlarda gerçekleşmiştir, ancak yine de kolektif direniş için odak noktaları olarak hizmet etme kapasitesini korumuştur. Ancak Gezi Direnişi, şehrin merkezinden çıkararak, İstanbul'un yoksul mahallelerine ulaşarak ve tüm ülkeye, diğer şehirlere yayılarak Haziran Ayaklanması'na dönüşmüştür. Tartıştığım gibi, bu dönüşümde, gecekondu mahalleleri ve özellikle Alevi toplulukları, 15-16 Haziran Ayaklanması'ndaki muhacir göçmenlerin topluluk bağları ve mahallerinin oynadığına benzer bir rol oynamıştır. Ancak, her iki ayaklanmada da bu toplulukların harekete ve örgütlenmeye ilişkin ilişkileri büyük ölçüde farklıdır.

Neticede, her iki hareket de mekân ve sınıf mücadelesi arasındaki diyalektik ilişkiyi açığa çıkarır: Mekân, mobilizasyon için bir platform sağlarken, aynı zamanda kapitalist toplumda gömülü olan daha geniş iktidar ilişkilerini yansıtan mekânsal kısıtlamalar da dayatır. Şehrin mekânsal organizasyonu hem bir tahakküm aracı hem de bir direniş alanı haline gelir ve toplumsal hareketler bu güç yapısına meydan okumak için ortaya çıkar. Ancak hem 15-16 Haziran Ayaklanması hem de Gezi Direnişi'nin gösterdiği gibi, bu mücadeleler nihayetinde, kendileri de kapitalist birikim ve üretim ilişkilerinin vücut bulmuş hali olarak sosyal mekânın dayattığı yapısal çerçeveye kısıtlanırlar.

Her iki ayaklanmanın da kapitalist birikim rejimlerinde içsel çelişkilere verilen tepkiler olduğunu göstermeye çalıştım. *Mevzi savaşı* ve ani *patlama* olarak tasvir ettiğim farklı biçimleri, kentte vücut bulan sermaye birikim süreçlerindeki farklılaşma ile ilişkilidir. 15-16 Haziran Ayaklanması, işçi sendikalarının kitlesel kolektif eylemleri organize etmede merkezi bir rol oynadığı bir çerçevede gelişmiştir. DİSK, siyasi ve sosyal bir aktör olarak varlığını sürdürmüş, ayaklanmanın aynı konuları veya diğer konular üzerinde grevler, işgaller, mitingler vb. organize etmeye

devam etmiştir. Hareketin ve aktörün sürekliliği duygusu açıktır, onları oluşturan nüfus dönüşüm ve farklılaşmalar yaşasa bile. Bu, Gramsci'den (1976) ödünç aldığım "mevzi savaşı" terimiyle tarif ettiğim çerçevedir. Onun "mevzi savaşı"nı, "manevra savaşı"na karşı tanımlamasının nedeni aslında 1917 Ekim Devrimi ve bunun Batı kapitalist toplumlarına uygulanabilirliği üzerine bir tartışmaydı. Gramsci, yalnızca sermayenin değil, aynı zamanda ideolojik hegemonyası ve karmaşık sivil toplumu ile modern devletin de Rusya'da tam olarak gelişmediğini ve devrimi mümkün kılanın bu olduğunu öne sürer (Gramsci, 1971).

Bu tartışma, tezin konusuyla doğrudan alakalı olmasa da, kavram, dönem içindeki toplumsal hareketlerin, işçi sınıfı hareketi dahil, birçok özelliğini yansıtmaktadır. Bu kavramı, 1917 Ekim Devrimi ve 'manevra savaşı'na karşı bir kavram olarak değil, 'anlıklar patlamaları' olarak tanımlayacağım mücadele biçimlerine karşıt olarak kullanacağım. Tezde "mevzi savaşı" şu veya bu eylemin yeri ve zamanı ile sınırlı kalmayan örgütlenmeler aracılığıyla yürütülen sınıf mücadelesini tanımlar. Bu durumdaki örgütlenmeler, bu eylemler arasında bir toplumsal özne olarak varlığını koruyabilir ve bir eylemden diğerine hareket edebilme kapasitesine sahip olur.

Buna karşılık, ani patlamalar, herhangi bir örgütsel süreklilikten yoksun olup, belirli toplumsal özelemler ve gelecekte düzenlenmiş bir toplum hayalleriyle ilişkilendirilen kademeli değişim veya stratejik ilerleme fikrini yansıtıyor gibi görünmemektedir. Daha çok, yalnızca doğrudan baskı ile değil, genel olarak fırsatlar ve kaynaklar dâhil olmak üzere "mevcut durum" tarafından ciddi şekilde kısıtlanmış olan politik ve toplumsal etkinliğe karşı bir mücadeleyi temsil etmektedirler.

Gezi Direnişi, otoriter devlete ve neoliberal kentsel politikalara karşı farklı şikâyetleri bir araya getiren daha az organize, kendiliğinden bir direniş anını temsil eder; ani patlama olarak tasvir ettiğim durum budur. Bu ikinci direniş biçimi, günümüz kapitalizmi altında emek ve toplumsal yaşamın parçalanmış, güvencesiz doğasını yansıtır ve sürdürülebilir örgütsel süreklilik daha zor hale gelir. Hareketin, organizasyon anlamında sürekliliği olmayan, yalnızca bir an için toplumsal bir bedeni vardır.

1970'lerden sonra toplumsal dönüşüm boyunca “mevzi savaşı”ndan “ani patlamalar”a doğru bir eğilim olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. “Mevzi savaşı” ve “patlama” arasındaki farklılaşma, iki ayaklanmanın karşılaştırılmasından türetilmiştir ve bu nitelikleri ayrı tarihsel bağlamlarıyla ilişkilendirmektedir. Bu kategorilerin, toplumsal hareketlerin dönüşen toplumsal mekânla olan ilişkisi hakkında daha fazla tartışma için faydalı olabileceğini düşünüyorum. Yine de, bu iki ayaklanma arasındaki zaman diliminde ve hatta bunun dışında her iki mücadele biçiminin de bulunabileceği kolayca gösterilebilir. Aslında, Paris 1968, 15-16 Haziran Ayaklanması'ndan iki yıl önce gerçekleşti ve ayaklanmanın kendiliğinden ve patlayıcı doğasına vurgu yaparak patlama olarak tanımlandı (Lefebvre, 1971). Diğer uçta, TEKEL Direnişi, Gezi Direnişi'nden sadece dört yıl önce gerçekleşmiş bir sendika grevi idi. TEKEL işçileri, Ankara'da tıpkı Gezi'nin işgaline benzer şekilde şehir merkezini işgal ederek, kullandığım iki kategorinin özelliklerini birleştirdiler. Bahsedilen zaman diliminde gerçekleşen tüm sosyal ayaklanmaları veya direnişleri mükemmel bir şekilde bir araya getirmenin zor olduğunu biliyorum, ancak kullandığım örnekler genel eğilim için örnek teşkil edebilir. Tarihsel sürecin sürekliliği içindeki daha fazla momenti ilişkilendiren ve bu iki kategori arasındaki çeşitliliği dikkate alan daha fazla bir tartışma, toplumsal değişim olanakları merceğinden yapısal dönüşümler hakkında yararlı olacaktır. Tartışılan süreçten iki kesit almak, toplumsal özne olma sorusuna yönelik bir ilk adım olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Kent formu ve mekân dinamikleri, bu tezin merkezi temasıdır. Aynı şehirde gerçekleşen bu iki ayaklanma, örtüşen güzergâhları, yerleri ve hatta ortak gecekondular fenomeni ile ana temaya odaklanmayı ve bu tema etrafında kent yoksulluğu, sınıf oluşumu, göç, emek sürecinin örgütlenmesi, göçmen işçi sınıfının tarihsel arka planlarının etkileri, bu göçmenlerle yerleşik halk arasındaki gerilimler, topluluklar ve örgütler arasındaki etkileşim gibi meselelerle ilgili daha fazla soru geliştirmeyi mümkün kılmaktadır.

15-16 Haziran, Bretton Woods Sistemi'nin çöküşü ve 1970'lerin krizinden önce gerçekleşti. Öte yandan, Gezi Direnişi, uluslararası birikim rejimini, neoliberal dönemi ya da ABD birikim rejimini (Arrighi, 1994) sarsan ve günümüze kadar birçok paradigmasını belirsizlikte bırakan 2008 krizinin ardından gelmiştir. Bu iki

ayaklanmanın her ikisi de Lefebvre'ci terimlerle momentler olarak dönemi aydınlatmak için bu dönemin başına ve sonuna yeterince yakındır. Aristoteles'in (MÖ 4. yüzyıl) dediği gibi, "oluş ve bozulma" ya da "varoluşa gelme ve sona erme" dönemi arasında bir parantez oluştururlar. Öte yandan, katı bir dönemlendirme kendi başına bir sınırlama olabilir, özellikle de kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin yeniden üretimini tartışırken. Örneklerle gösterdiğim gibi, büyük ölçüde 1980'ler ve sonrasında özdeşleştirilen kapitalist birikim özellikleri (finansallaşma, arazi spekülasyonu ve kentsel dönüşümün birleşimi), savaş sonrası dönemin erken evrelerinde İstanbul ekseninde kendini göstermeye başlamıştı. Kapitalist birikimin kendi içinde sürekli olarak çelişen yapısından dolayı, sistemler veya rejimler tanımlandıkları anda derin akıntılarla farklılaşmaya başlar. Eğer sadece siyasal-ekonomik terimlere ve sistemlere odaklanıp küresel düzeyde bakma tuzağına düşersek, sistemin sayısız sürtüşme ile yeniden üretilmek zorunda olduğu gündelik yaşam düzeyini göz ardı ederiz ve işte derin akıntılar da bu düzeyden kaynaklanır.

Giriş bölümünde, erken dönem Marksizm'i devlet teorisinin eksikliğiyle eleştiren Marksist/Yapısalcı devlet tartışmasına değindim. Kaçırdıkları nokta, Marx'ın devlete, işbölümü tarafından belirlenen üretici güç olarak yaptığı referanstır (Marx, 1846). Metin boyunca vurgulanan nokta, devletin yeniden inşası ve kapitalist ilişkilerin zorla yeniden üretilmesinin, aynı sürecin kent formu üzerinde icra edilen iki yönü olarak ele alınmasıdır. Schmitt'in "Total Devlet"ine (1931) yapılan referanslar, bu dönemin çok öncesine dayanan en karamsar sonuçlardan türetilmiştir. Ancak hatırlanmalıdır ki, Schmitt (1931), liberal demokrasinin ölümünü ilan ederken, bu kavramı öngördüğü diğer olasılığa, yani "topyekûn devrime" karşı geliştirmiştir. Onun kavramları, günümüzün yeniden inşa sürecinin özelliklerini açıklamak açısından yeterli araçlar olmasa da, kitleler için siyasi kanalların giderek sınırlandığı ve devletle karşılaşmaların günlük yaşam düzeyinde olduğu bu geçiş ve kriz döneminde hatırlanması gerekli bir tartışma olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Sermaye değer kaybettikçe, sadece sermaye değil, bir bütün olarak üretim ilişkileri (yani tüm toplum) zorla ve spekülatif olarak yeniden üretilmek zorunda kalır ve bu büyük ölçüde kentsel dönüşüme dayanır. Sonuç, emek ve sermaye arasındaki, toplumsal/insani ihtiyaçlar arasındaki çelişkinin tüm toplum düzeyinde

genişlemesidir. Bu, günlük yaşamda ilişkilerin yeniden üretimini bozarak ve Yunanistan, Türkiye, Fransa, Mısır ve birçok başka ülkede sıradan siyaset sahnesinden taşarak kendini gösteren bir sınıf mücadelesi olarak görülebilir. Ancak bu taşma, üretim ve hegemonya ilişkilerini bir süreliğine bozma gücüne sahip olmasına rağmen, mekânı değiştirme, dolayısıyla toplumu değiştirme kapasitesine, başka bir deyişle toplumsal bir özne olma gücüne sahip gibi görünmemektedir. Sermaye birikimi mekânda ne kadar yayılırsa, sınıf muhalefeti de o kadar anlık hale gelir ve sınıf çizgileri o kadar belirsizleşir: Emek ne kadar toplumsallaşırsa, örgütlenmesi de o kadar sürdürülemez hale gelir.

Ana tartışma bu paradoks etrafında olmalıdır ve gerçekte bu soruya İstanbul gibi bir düzeyde ya da bu tezin kapsamı içinde bir cevap veremeyiz. Yanıt, Londra Yolu'ndan başlayıp diğer merkezlere çok sayıda bağlantı ile İstanbul eksenini bağlayan merkezlerin ve sürekli akışların ağı içinde ve göçmen işçi sınıfının giderek daha fazla uluslararası hale geldiği küresel düzeyde verilmelidir. Sonuçta, işçi sınıfı kapitalizmin tüm tarihi boyunca her zaman göçmen bir sınıf olarak şekillenmiştir. Sürekli bir oluşum halinde olan sınıfın ve sınıf hareketinin bir toplumsal özne olarak bu göç süreçlerinin dışında düşünülmesi imkânsızdır. Kent formu, bir yerden bir yere taşınan nüfusların tarihsel niteliğini kabul etmeden, dönemlendirme için kullanılan siyasal-ekonomik kategoriler gibi boş bir soyutlamaya dönüşebilir. Farklı dönemlerde gerçekleşen farklı göç dalgalarının sınıf hareketleri ve siyaseti üzerindeki etkileri, bu durumun sıklıkla göz ardı edilen ve tezde dikkat çekilmeye çalışılan örnekleridir.

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